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Malware1 associated actor

TriFive

Tracked since Dec 15, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

TriFive is a PowerShell-based backdoor associated with the xHunt espionage cluster, which has targeted organizations in Kuwait, particularly in government, shipping, and transportation. It was identified during compromises involving Microsoft Exchange Server and related IIS infrastructure, where xHunt maintained long-term access using scheduled-task persistence, covert command-and-control channels, and companion tooling such as the BumbleBee web shell and the Snugy backdoor.

TriFive is designed for remote command execution and post-compromise control. It was observed running repeatedly via a scheduled task at five-minute intervals, indicating persistent beaconing and automated task-based execution. Its command-and-control mechanism abuses a legitimate compromised mailbox on the victim Exchange server through Exchange Web Services. The implant retrieves commands from specially formatted draft messages stored in the Deleted Items folder, decodes and transforms the message content, executes the resulting PowerShell commands, and writes command output back into draft messages in the same mailbox. This mailbox-draft workflow is intended to blend malicious traffic with normal enterprise email activity and reduce reliance on conventional external C2 infrastructure.

Observed activity shows TriFive being used after initial compromise rather than as the initial access vector. In the documented intrusions, attackers had already obtained access to Exchange infrastructure and stolen or otherwise acquired valid account credentials. The malware formed part of a broader xHunt intrusion set that included web-shell-enabled command execution, credential abuse, persistence through masqueraded scheduled tasks, and lateral movement across internal systems. TriFive reflects xHunt’s emphasis on stealthy, living-off-trusted-services tradecraft and covert communications within compromised Microsoft messaging environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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xHunt

The activity we observed involved two backdoors – one of which we call TriFive and a variant of CASHY200 that we call Snugy – as well as a web shell that we call BumbleBee.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The TriFive sample used a legitimate account name and credentials from the targeted organization. This suggests that the threat actor had stolen the account's credentials prior to the installation of the TriFive backdoor.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On Aug. 28 and Oct. 22, 2019, the actors created the ResolutionHosts and ResolutionsHosts tasks to run two separate PowerShell-based backdoors. The actors used these two scheduled tasks as a persistence method, as they ran the two PowerShell scripts repeatedly, albeit at different intervals.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The suspicious commands being executed via the Internet Information Services (IIS) process w3wp.exe. Actors issued these commands via a web shell we call BumbleBee that had been installed on the Exchange server.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The commands executed by the two tasks attempt to run splwow64.ps1 and OfficeIntegrator.ps1 ... powershell -exec bypass -file C:\Users\Public\Libraries\OfficeIntegrator.ps1 ... powershell -exec bypass -file c:\windows\splwow64.ps1

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On Aug. 28 and Oct. 22, 2019, the actors created the ResolutionHosts and ResolutionsHosts tasks to run two separate PowerShell-based backdoors. The actors used these two scheduled tasks as a persistence method, as they ran the two PowerShell scripts repeatedly, albeit at different intervals.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The TriFive sample used a legitimate account name and credentials from the targeted organization. This suggests that the threat actor had stolen the account's credentials prior to the installation of the TriFive backdoor.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

This investigation resulted in the discovery of two new backdoors called TriFive and Snugy... as well as a new webshell that we call BumbleBee... The actor used the BumbleBee webshell to upload and download files to and from the compromised Exchange server, but more importantly, to run commands that the actor used to discover additional systems and to move laterally to other servers on the network.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On Aug. 28 and Oct. 22, 2019, the actors created the ResolutionHosts and ResolutionsHosts tasks to run two separate PowerShell-based backdoors. The actors used these two scheduled tasks as a persistence method, as they ran the two PowerShell scripts repeatedly, albeit at different intervals.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The TriFive sample used a legitimate account name and credentials from the targeted organization. This suggests that the threat actor had stolen the account's credentials prior to the installation of the TriFive backdoor.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The script opens the email draft, base64 decodes the contents in the message body of the email and decrypts the decoded contents by subtracting 10 from each character.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

We believe that the actor chose these task names specifically to blend in and appear to be part of the legitimate WDI.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The TriFive sample used a legitimate account name and credentials from the targeted organization. This suggests that the threat actor had stolen the account's credentials prior to the installation of the TriFive backdoor.

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Figure 2 shows an example command email with a subject of 555 and a message body of woFyeWt3cw== , which decodes and decrypts to whoami .

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Both of the backdoors installed on the compromised Exchange server of a Kuwait government organization used covert channels for C2 communications, specifically DNS tunneling and an email-based channel using drafts in the Deleted Items folder of a compromised email account.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.