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Malware1 associated actor

Caminho

Tracked since Dec 17, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasionProcess injectionPersistencePost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Caminho is a Windows .NET malware loader operated as a Loader-as-a-Service offering and assessed to originate from Brazilian Portuguese-speaking operators. It has been observed in multi-stage intrusion chains that use steganography to conceal the loader inside image files, including Least Significant Bit techniques, and then execute payloads directly in memory. Caminho is designed to retrieve a downstream malware URL at runtime, decode it, and deliver arbitrary customer payloads, which has included REMCOS RAT, XWorm, Katz Stealer, and DCRat. This modularity, combined with architecture checks and varying obfuscation, is consistent with a service used by multiple affiliates or customers rather than a single bespoke campaign.

The loader is commonly delivered through spearphishing campaigns using business-themed lures and archive attachments containing obfuscated script stages, and it has also appeared in phishing chains using malicious documents or SVG-based redirection. Subsequent stages typically invoke PowerShell to download a steganographic image from legitimate hosting services, extract the embedded .NET assembly, and load it without writing the executable payload to disk. Caminho then launches or hollows legitimate Windows processes, including observed use of MSBuild.exe and other benign binaries, to host malicious code and evade detection.

Caminho includes anti-analysis and defense-evasion features such as virtual machine, sandbox, debugger, and security-tool detection. It also validates payload architecture before execution and supports in-memory execution and process injection or hollowing for downstream malware. Persistence has been established in observed campaigns through scheduled tasks that repeatedly relaunch the infection chain. Campaigns using Caminho have targeted government and public-sector entities, including Colombian government organizations, and have also affected victims across multiple regions beyond South America. Caminho has been linked to phishing operations associated with BlindEagle and to broader commodity malware delivery activity.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT-C-36

[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has used [Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) during operations.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence2

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use `System.Net.WebClient.downloadString()` for file download.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has launched and hollowed out MSBuild.exe to host malicious code.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence2

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use junk code for obfuscation.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use code flattening for payload obfuscation.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has launched and hollowed out MSBuild.exe to host malicious code.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can deobfuscate downloaded files prior to execution.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has the ability to download files onto compromised hosts.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)

Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.