Caminho
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Initial accessDefense evasionProcess injectionPersistencePost exploitation
- Delivery
- SpearphishingPhishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
Caminho is a Windows .NET malware loader operated as a Loader-as-a-Service offering and assessed to originate from Brazilian Portuguese-speaking operators. It has been observed in multi-stage intrusion chains that use steganography to conceal the loader inside image files, including Least Significant Bit techniques, and then execute payloads directly in memory. Caminho is designed to retrieve a downstream malware URL at runtime, decode it, and deliver arbitrary customer payloads, which has included REMCOS RAT, XWorm, Katz Stealer, and DCRat. This modularity, combined with architecture checks and varying obfuscation, is consistent with a service used by multiple affiliates or customers rather than a single bespoke campaign.
The loader is commonly delivered through spearphishing campaigns using business-themed lures and archive attachments containing obfuscated script stages, and it has also appeared in phishing chains using malicious documents or SVG-based redirection. Subsequent stages typically invoke PowerShell to download a steganographic image from legitimate hosting services, extract the embedded .NET assembly, and load it without writing the executable payload to disk. Caminho then launches or hollows legitimate Windows processes, including observed use of MSBuild.exe and other benign binaries, to host malicious code and evade detection.
Caminho includes anti-analysis and defense-evasion features such as virtual machine, sandbox, debugger, and security-tool detection. It also validates payload architecture before execution and supports in-memory execution and process injection or hollowing for downstream malware. Persistence has been established in observed campaigns through scheduled tasks that repeatedly relaunch the infection chain. Campaigns using Caminho have targeted government and public-sector entities, including Colombian government organizations, and have also affected victims across multiple regions beyond South America. Caminho has been linked to phishing operations associated with BlindEagle and to broader commodity malware delivery activity.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has used [Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) during operations.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use `System.Net.WebClient.downloadString()` for file download.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has launched and hollowed out MSBuild.exe to host malicious code.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use junk code for obfuscation.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can use code flattening for payload obfuscation.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has launched and hollowed out MSBuild.exe to host malicious code.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) can deobfuscate downloaded files prior to execution.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
[Caminho](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9016) has the ability to download files onto compromised hosts.(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.