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Malware

ACRStealer

Tracked since Dec 18, 2025 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK49Techniques
IOCs432Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Cracked softwareSeo poisoningClickfixMalvertisingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

ACRStealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family that harvests browser passwords, session cookies, payment-card information, cryptocurrency wallet data, and application credentials for exfiltration. Its collection targets also include AI development-tool configurations, including Cline and Continue AI, which can contain plaintext API keys and model-routing information. It uses encryption and obfuscation to hinder analysis, and observed deployment chains employ DLL sideloading through legitimate applications.

ACRStealer is distributed through cracked-software and key-generator lures promoted through SEO poisoning and hosted on file-sharing or cloud-storage services. It has also been deployed through ClickFix attacks that present fake CAPTCHA prompts and persuade users to execute attacker-supplied commands. ClearFake campaigns have delivered ACRStealer through compromised legitimate websites, with blockchain-hosted JavaScript supporting payload routing. Other campaigns impersonate developer-tool documentation and installation pages, using search advertisements and malicious copy-and-paste installation commands to reach developers and steal API keys and cloud-development credentials. Multi-stage delivery chains have abused legitimate Python runtimes and Ren'Py components, and ACRStealer has appeared alongside SectopRAT in multi-payload operations.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

49 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

6 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Experts found over 88 fake domains mimicking Claude Code and other developer sites. The campaign utilises SEO infection and Google ads to deploy malicious install web pages over genuine documentation.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Notes Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 casyetnx[.]pw via CNOBIN, hosting via dataforest/VDSINA

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: VPS T1583.003 VDSINA VPS procurement (17 servers)

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

"Attackers are now distributing malware by writing posts on legitimate sites to bypass this... Recently, there has been an increase in cases where attackers target poorly managed WordPress sites to create distribution posts."

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Compromise Infrastructure T1584.004 Compromised acecareer.edu WordPress for payload hosting

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence6

SEO poisoning, aimed at achieving top search engine rankings, was used, and file-hosting services, cloud storage platforms, Mega, and Mediafire were identified as the primary distribution sites.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence4

ClearFake spreads by compromising legitimate websites and injecting hidden JavaScript code into their pages. Victims do not need to do anything suspicious to get infected. Simply visiting a tampered legitimate site can trigger the malware’s multi-stage delivery chain.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence5

These websites closely impersonate genuine vendor resources and demonstrate installation commands that look genuine but include hidden separators, such as “&,” that launch malicious actions along with the expected software deployment.

Execution

11 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Blackpoint SOC alerted to suspicious cmd.exe usage by a user on a host... The command used cmd.exe to pull a second-stage DLL from an attacker-controlled WebDAV server and launch it via rundll32.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence6

Stage 1 -- ACRStealer Dropper : A PowerShell script hosted at hxxps://casyetnx[.]pw/eq8e1l4b0qjd22w

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

Distribution exploiting Renpy (a Python-based open-source game development tool) was identified. Inside a ZIP file, setup.Exe and setup.Py were linked to execute malicious scripts sequentially, ultimately launching ACRStealer.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Experts found various delivery techniques, such as rundll32.exe loading infected DLLs, Base64-encoded commands, mshta.exe abuse, JavaScript-based payloads, and GitHub-hosted scripts.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Execution Native API T1106 ntdll.dll NtCreateThreadEx / NtAllocateVirtualMemory

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Windows users were instructed to open the Run dialog and paste it, loading a remote DLL into memory with no file ever written to disk.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

A ClickFix-style social engineering attack tricked a user into running a command that pulled a malicious DLL loader from an attacker-controlled WebDAV server and launched it using rundll32.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Victim clicks checkbox ... Page displays: "Press Win+R, Ctrl+V, Enter"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

The delivery diversity is striking: DLL Sideloading ... ZIPs containing a legitimate executable alongside a malicious DLL ... ISO Images ... MSI Installers ... HTA Droppers

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The attacker directly tampered with and injected malicious code into a specific Python script (.py) inside the legitimate Python library folder (Lib). They then packaged this modified script together with a legitimate Python executable into a compressed archive and distributed it.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

File Name libvlccore.dll Malicious proxy DLL used in VLC DLL sideloading triad (ACRStealer)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Calls NtAllocateVirtualMemory to allocate RWX memory in the current process ... Calls NtCreateThreadEx to spawn a thread executing the shellcode

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Experts found various delivery techniques, such as rundll32.exe loading infected DLLs, Base64-encoded commands... After execution, the malware uses a multi-level malicious chain that features encoded C2 communications...

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

After execution, the malware uses a multi-level malicious chain that features encoded C2 communications, anti-analysis capabilities, fileless execution tactics, and credential theft functions.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

The report includes cases involving disguising as cracks and keygens... Statistics on companies disguised by new malware... were extracted based on version and certificate information.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Notes Defense Evasion Masquerading T1036.005 FNPLicensingService.exe (renamed pythonw.exe)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Calls NtAllocateVirtualMemory to allocate RWX memory in the current process ... Calls NtCreateThreadEx to spawn a thread executing the shellcode

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

Experts found various delivery techniques, such as rundll32.exe loading infected DLLs, Base64-encoded commands, mshta.exe abuse, JavaScript-based payloads, and GitHub-hosted scripts.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence2

The command used cmd.exe to pull a second-stage DLL from an attacker-controlled WebDAV server and launch it via rundll32.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

After execution, the malware uses a multi-level malicious chain that features encoded C2 communications, anti-analysis capabilities...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Victims on Windows and macOS were routed to separate payloads tailored to their operating system, with routing handled by real-time OS detection in the browser.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The attacker directly tampered with and injected malicious code into a specific Python script (.py) inside the legitimate Python library folder (Lib). They then packaged this modified script together with a legitimate Python executable into a compressed archive and distributed it.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

File Name libvlccore.dll Malicious proxy DLL used in VLC DLL sideloading triad (ACRStealer)

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Victims saw a convincing fake Google reCAPTCHA overlay complete with an “I’m not a robot” checkbox. Clicking it triggered the ClickFix social engineering panel...

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Contrary to infostealers, the campaign pick on AI assets like authentication tokens, API Key, and cloud development credentials from tools such as Continue[.]dev, Cline.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

ACRStealer, a C++ infostealer that harvests passwords, credit card numbers, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

The agents actively searched server-side systems, identified weaknesses, and carried out targeted actions against online infrastructure... [The Recon] dashboard was designed to organize, validate, and manage more than 23,800 stolen secrets in real time, including API keys connected to cloud and AI services.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence2

The Recon dashboard was built to organize, validate, and manage more than 23,800 harvested secrets, including cloud and AI-service API keys. The report identifies secrets.json and config.yaml as targeted by ACRSTEALER collection rules.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

The malware particularly attacks AI-based assets such as cloud development credentials, API keys, and verification tokens.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

[7] INFORMATION STEALER ACTIVATES Credential theft | Cookie extraction | Crypto wallet theft ... Browser data harvesting

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

After execution, the malware uses a multi-level malicious chain that features encoded C2 communications, anti-analysis capabilities...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Victims on Windows and macOS were routed to separate payloads tailored to their operating system, with routing handled by real-time OS detection in the browser.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Collection Data from Local System T1005 Document harvesting (DOC/TXT/PDF)

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Victims saw a convincing fake Google reCAPTCHA overlay complete with an “I’m not a robot” checkbox. Clicking it triggered the ClickFix social engineering panel...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

ImageSharp Screenshot capture -- the stealer grabs what is on your screen

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Clicking it triggered the ClickFix social engineering panel, which simultaneously injected a malicious command directly into the victim’s clipboard.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

What It Steals ACRStealer targets a comprehensive list: Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Opera, Brave, and Vivaldi browser data (logins, cookies, history, autofill, credit cards); crypto wallets ... FTP clients ... email ... VPN configs ... password managers ... and chat apps

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Threat actors used a technique called EtherHiding to store payload routing instructions inside blockchain smart contracts, bypassing all URL-based blocking methods entirely.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

C2 communication over HTTPS via TLS 1.3

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1090.002 Cloudflare CDN as C2 proxy layer.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Dead Drop Resolvers (DDR) are an increasingly popular C2 obfuscation technique. Instead of hardcoding a C2 address in the malware binary ... the malware fetches it from a legitimate service. Previous ACRStealer variants used Google Docs, Google Slides, Google Forms, and Steam community pages. This variant uses Telegram's Telegraph blogging platform at telegra[.]ph.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

Dead Drop Resolver: Hiding C2 in Plain Sight ... The attacker creates profiles on Steam Community, Google Docs, Google Slides, or Telegram ... The malware fetches the page ... and decodes the Base64 to obtain the real C2 address

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

The command used cmd.exe to pull a second-stage DLL from an attacker-controlled WebDAV server and launch it via rundll32.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

"...a significant modification occurred in the C2 communication... utilizes the ECDH and ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithms... a public key exchange process..."

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Encrypted Channel T1573.001 AES-256-CBC + RC4 C2 communication

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

TLS 1.3 with AES-256-GCM

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Stolen data sent via MessagePack-serialized HTTPS

Indicators of compromise

Observables

432 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching432Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping49Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.