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Mallory
Malware

AuraStealer

Tracked since Dec 18, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK42Techniques
IOCs600Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationCrypto theftDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionPost exploitation
Delivery
ClickfixCracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

AuraStealer is a Windows malware-as-a-service infostealer that emerged in mid-2025 and has been marketed on cybercrime forums under a subscription model. It is assessed to be operated or developed by Russian-speaking actors and is actively distributed through social-engineering campaigns, notably TikTok-based ClickFix or “Scam-Yourself” lures that persuade victims to execute malicious PowerShell commands. It has also been distributed through cracked software, self-extracting archives, malicious scripts, loaders, DLL sideloading, and process-injection chains.

AuraStealer targets Windows 7 through Windows 11 and collects browser credentials, cookies and session tokens, cryptocurrency-wallet data and recovery phrases, password-manager data, two-factor-authentication data, VPN configurations, API keys, clipboard contents, screenshots, system information, process information, and selected files. It targets data in browsers, browser extensions, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging applications, and gaming-related services. It can bypass Chromium Application-Bound Encryption by executing code in a browser security context to recover browser encryption material, enabling theft of protected browser data. It can also execute additional payloads.

The malware uses encrypted embedded configuration and encrypted command-and-control traffic. Its anti-analysis and defense-evasion features include anti-debugging, anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks, geofencing that avoids systems in former Soviet Union regions, anti-tampering checks, string and constant obfuscation, indirect control-flow obfuscation, runtime API resolution, exception-driven API dispatch, and use of low-level system-call techniques. AuraStealer operations use a web management panel for build generation and handling stolen data.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

42 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“Scam-Yourself” campaigns via TikTok (and similar) tutorials that trick users into running malicious activation commands. Links in descriptions or profiles can point to payloads or script hosts.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Victims manually execute attacker-supplied PowerShell commands (from video or clipboard) in elevated PowerShell / Run dialog to fetch & run the payload.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Heavy direct and obfuscated use of WinAPI/NTDLL (e.g., VirtualAlloc, NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection, NtCreateThreadEx, COM IElevator::Decrypt).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Execution always requires user action (copying & pasting commands, running an installer, enabling a VS Code extension).

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Users click links to “activators”/scripts and then run commands presented on the page/video, resulting in AuraStealer download & execution.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Users voluntarily download and execute “cracked” games/software or malicious VS Code extensions that ultimately drop or load AuraStealer.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Injection into browser processes using NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection + NtCreateThreadEx to run shellcode for ABE bypass.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Indirect control flow obfuscation; XOR-encrypted constants and strings; AES-encrypted embedded configuration; API hashing; exception-driven control flow.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Custom exception-driven API hashing (MurmurHash3 + FNV-1a + XOR) with lookup tables and deliberate exceptions to resolve and call WinAPI.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Injection into browser processes using NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection + NtCreateThreadEx to run shellcode for ABE bypass.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Configuration option to self-delete on completion of data theft, removing forensic artifacts of the stealer binary.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Runtime decryption of strings and AES-CBC decryption of embedded configuration data.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

"injected into legitimate Windows processes like regasm.exe and SndVol.exe"

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1

Refuses to run in certain locales (CIS, Baltic states) via LCID and country code checks; additional anti-VM, anti-sandbox, and human-presence checks restrict execution to “real” user systems.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Combined VM/sandbox detection: hypervisor bit, screen size, RAM, CPU count, process count, blacklisted DLLs; ensures execution only on suitable targets.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Uses cpuid hypervisor bit, screen resolution (GetWindowRect > 1024), non-zero physical memory, CPU-count + process-count heuristic for VM vs real host, and blacklist of sandbox-related DLLs.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Sleep-hook detection via GetSystemTimePreciseAsFileTime before/after Sleep(1000); <900 ms indicates hooked/accelerated sleep.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Position-independent shellcode mapped into remote process memory via sections and executed without conventional module loading.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Reads PEB (BeingDebugged, NtGlobalFlag), checks KUSER_SHARED_DATA; uses NtCreateDebugObject + NtQueryObject to detect extra handles; scans running processes against debugger/monitor blacklist; inspects return addresses for INT3/UD2 and introduces delayed stack corruption.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Extensive obfuscation, exception spam in debuggers, and anti-analysis chains to prevent accurate telemetry and static/dynamic inspection.

T1688Safe Mode BootEvidence1

Uses MapFileAndCheckSumW to compare file checksum with PE header; terminates if modified, blocking patching, binary rewriting, or simple software breakpoints.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Steals browser cookies and active session data (discord/telegram/steam session tokens) from browser profiles.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

"VPN configuration files"

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Reads credentials/API keys from local config files (e.g., RDP/AnyDesk configs, FileZilla credentials, VPN configuration files, wallet data files).

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Steals credentials and secrets from password managers (KeePass, Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) and other local stores.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

Extracts saved passwords and secrets from Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers.

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationEvidence1

Steals 2FA tokens, seeds, and recovery data from 2FA apps and wallets, enabling bypass of MFA protections.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Enumerates running processes to perform anti-VM (process count) and anti-debug (blacklisted analysis tools) checks; also exfiltrates process list.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Collects general system fingerprinting data; uses system metrics extensively in anti-VM/anti-sandbox logic.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Combined VM/sandbox detection: hypervisor bit, screen size, RAM, CPU count, process count, blacklisted DLLs; ensures execution only on suitable targets.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Uses cpuid hypervisor bit, screen resolution (GetWindowRect > 1024), non-zero physical memory, CPU-count + process-count heuristic for VM vs real host, and blacklist of sandbox-related DLLs.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Sleep-hook detection via GetSystemTimePreciseAsFileTime before/after Sleep(1000); <900 ms indicates hooked/accelerated sleep.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Module and process enumeration to detect security tools, emulators, debuggers, and sandbox indicators (DLLs and process names).

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Compares GetUserNameW/GetComputerNameW against known Microsoft Defender emulator values (JohnDoe, HAL9TH) and checks loaded modules against blacklist of analysis/sandbox DLLs.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Reads PEB (BeingDebugged, NtGlobalFlag), checks KUSER_SHARED_DATA; uses NtCreateDebugObject + NtQueryObject to detect extra handles; scans running processes against debugger/monitor blacklist; inspects return addresses for INT3/UD2 and introduces delayed stack corruption.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Steals files from local disk, including via wildcard-based search (configurable masks, paths, recursion) for arbitrary files of interest.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

Aggregates collected data into local archives, then splits them into chunks prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Takes screenshots of the victim’s device.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Captures clipboard contents for sensitive data (e.g., copied passwords, wallet addresses).

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Automatically collects data from a wide range of browsers, wallets, 2FA tools, VPN clients, password managers, and other targeted apps based on configuration and C2 instructions.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

HTTP(S)-based C2 via /api/live, /api/conf, /api/send endpoints.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

...routing all traffic through Cloudflare as a reverse proxy to conceal the real server.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

"To hide the real server, the actor routes all traffic through Cloudflare as a reverse proxy."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"That command quietly downloaded and executed an AuraStealer sample on the target’s machine"; "Soulbind retrieved and executed the payload from remote servers."

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Uses AES-CBC with random keys/IVs and Base64 encoding to encrypt all C2 traffic and exfiltrated data.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence1

Explicitly splits stolen data into smaller archive chunks before sending via /api/send, to manage transfer size and reliability.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Sends stolen data (chunked archives) via the same HTTP(S) C2 endpoints used for configuration.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

600 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching600Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping42Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.