Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware4 associated actors2 associated CVEs

SNATCH

Tracked since Dec 19, 2025 · Updated 23 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceExtortion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishing
Platforms
WindowsLinux

Snatch is a ransomware family associated with the financially motivated Snatch Team, active since 2018. Its operations combine file encryption with theft of confidential information and threats to publish stolen data. Attacks have affected organizations in the United States, Canada, and several European countries. The operators have recruited affiliates with existing access to corporate networks and offered supporting infrastructure and tools.

Snatch is particularly known for forcing Windows systems to reboot into Safe Mode before encrypting files, circumventing endpoint security products that do not operate in that environment. The ransomware installs itself as a Windows service configured to run in Safe Mode, changes the boot configuration, and forces a restart. It then deletes Volume Shadow Copies to inhibit recovery and encrypts local files, appending a victim-specific extension. Analyzed Windows samples were written in Go and packed with UPX. Linux variants have also been used in Snatch attacks.

Documented intrusions began with brute-force attacks against exposed RDP services, including an administrator account on an Azure-hosted server. Operators subsequently accessed domain controllers, conducted extended reconnaissance, scanned internal networks, collected credential material through LSASS memory dumps, and exfiltrated organizational data before deploying ransomware. Their toolkit has included a separate data-stealing component, Cobalt Strike, surveillance software, and legitimate administration utilities used for remote execution, lateral movement, and disabling security products. Attackers have remained inside victim environments for days or weeks before encryption. Snatch operators also maintain leak infrastructure and have publicly released stolen victim data to increase extortion pressure.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-6693via stairwellExploited in the wildHard-coded encryption key in Fortinet configuration secretsThe first of these tools was named decrypt.py ... and is used for decrypting password data from Fortinet devices vulnerable to CVE-2019-6693... Unlike decrypt.py, this tool chains CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 in order to increase the effectiveness of exploitation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-40684via stairwellExploited in the wildAdministrative Authentication Bypass in Fortinet FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManagerThe other tool identified for exploitation of Fortinet devices was named fortiConfParser.py ... This Python script is used for remotely extracting the configuration of Fortinet devices, using a publicly known authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684) ... Unlike decrypt.py, this tool chains CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 in order to increase the effectiveness of exploitation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
G0092

For example, in 2017 TA505 (also known as G0092, GOLD TAHOE) began using GlobeImposter in replacement of Jaff, GandCrab, and Snatch to extend the reach and effectiveness of their campaigns.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
CL0P

For example, in 2017 TA505 (also known as G0092, GOLD TAHOE) began using GlobeImposter in replacement of Jaff, GandCrab, and Snatch to extend the reach and effectiveness of their campaigns.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
Snatch

The ransomware, which calls itself Snatch, sets itself up as a service that will run during a Safe Mode boot. It quickly reboots the computer into Safe Mode... Snatch encrypts the victims’ hard drives.

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
TA554

The actor frequently, but not always, uses one or more intermediate downloader, such as an as yet unnamed PowerShell script, sLoad, Snatch, or Godzilla.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using the Azure server as a foothold, the attackers leveraged that administrator’s account to log into a domain controller (DC) machine on the same network, and then performed surveillance tasks on the target’s network over the course of several weeks.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Looking for affiliate partners with access to RDP\VNC\TeamViewer\WebShell\SQL inj [SQL injection] in corporate networks...

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

then runs a batch file (also located in the temp directory) that uploads the tasklist file to the C2 server.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The LNK file or document macros in turn download the next stage -- typically a PowerShell script which may download the final payload or another downloader such as sLoad.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

...outputs it to a file in the temp directory, then runs a batch file (also located in the temp directory) that uploads the tasklist file to the C2 server.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using the Azure server as a foothold, the attackers leveraged that administrator’s account to log into a domain controller (DC) machine on the same network, and then performed surveillance tasks on the target’s network over the course of several weeks.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The malware then adds this key to the Windows registry so it will start up during a Safe Mode boot. HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\SuperBackupMan:Default:Service

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Looking for affiliate partners with access to RDP\VNC\TeamViewer\WebShell\SQL inj [SQL injection] in corporate networks...

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

Using the BCDEDIT tool on Windows, it issues a command that sets up windows operating system to boot in Safe Mode... bcdedit.exe /set {current} safeboot minimal

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

We’ve also observed that the attackers set up one-off Windows services to orchestrate specific tasks... The ransomware installs itself as a Windows service called SuperBackupMan.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using the Azure server as a foothold, the attackers leveraged that administrator’s account to log into a domain controller (DC) machine on the same network, and then performed surveillance tasks on the target’s network over the course of several weeks.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

We’ve also observed that the attackers set up one-off Windows services to orchestrate specific tasks... The ransomware installs itself as a Windows service called SuperBackupMan.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The samples we’ve seen are also packed with the open source packer UPX to obfuscate their contents.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using the Azure server as a foothold, the attackers leveraged that administrator’s account to log into a domain controller (DC) machine on the same network, and then performed surveillance tasks on the target’s network over the course of several weeks.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

By targeting virtual machines, ransomware operators can also encrypt multiple servers at once with a single command. In June, researchers spotted a new REvil ransomware Linux encryptor designed to target VMware ESXi virtual machines, a popular enterprise virtual machine platform.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

Using the BCDEDIT tool on Windows, it issues a command that sets up windows operating system to boot in Safe Mode... bcdedit.exe /set {current} safeboot minimal

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The malware then adds this key to the Windows registry so it will start up during a Safe Mode boot. HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\SuperBackupMan:Default:Service

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The attackers typically use them to try to disable AV products.

T1688Safe Mode BootEvidence3

Snatchランサムウェアはセーフモードで暗号化を行う珍しいランサムウェアです。

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

We also observed them dump WMIC system & user data, process lists, and even the memory contents of the Windows LSASS service, to a file…

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

Snatch dumps lsass from memory then uploads the dump …then upload them to their C2 server.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

The attackers initially accessed the company’s internal network by brute-forcing the password to an administrator’s account on a Microsoft Azure server, and were able to log in to the server using Remote Desktop (RDP).

Discovery

6 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

The attackers also installed a free Windows utility called Advanced Port Scanner and used that tool to discover additional machines on the network they could target.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

The attackers query the list of users authorized to log in on the box, and write the results to a file.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The attackers also installed a free Windows utility called Advanced Port Scanner and used that tool to discover additional machines on the network they could target.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

These services have long randomized filenames, such as this one, which queries the list of running processes from the tasklist program, outputs it to a file in the temp directory, then runs a batch file...

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

We also observed them dump WMIC system & user data, process lists, and even the memory contents of the Windows LSASS service, to a file.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

By targeting virtual machines, ransomware operators can also encrypt multiple servers at once with a single command. In June, researchers spotted a new REvil ransomware Linux encryptor designed to target VMware ESXi virtual machines, a popular enterprise virtual machine platform.

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

The attackers initially accessed the company’s internal network by brute-forcing the password to an administrator’s account on a Microsoft Azure server, and were able to log in to the server using Remote Desktop (RDP).

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

The attackers initially accessed the company’s internal network by brute-forcing the password to an administrator’s account on a Microsoft Azure server, and were able to log in to the server using Remote Desktop (RDP).

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

As viewed through Sophos Central, the system is manipulated into downloading the ransomware file to disk, then executes it using PSEXEC

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence2

At some point during the attack... the attacker downloads the ransomware component to the targeted machine(s).

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

In this campaign, Proofpoint researchers observed the execution of Get2, which downloaded SDBbot for the first time.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Snatch dumps lsass from memory then uploads the dump …then upload them to their C2 server.

T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence1

As 14 ransomware gangs are now stealing data and publishing it in their blogs, we can assume that more ransomware operators will adopt the tactic and will require double ransoms.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

本動画ではSnatchランサムウェアの感染の様子や、セーフモードでの暗号化に至るまでに具体的にどのような挙動を行うのか、またセーフモードで暗号化される事がどのような脅威となり得るのかについて解説しています。

T1489Service StopEvidence1

When the computer comes back up after the reboot, this time in Safe Mode, the malware uses the Windows component net.exe to halt the SuperBackupMan service... net stop SuperBackupMan

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

the malware uses the Windows component vssadmin.exe to delete all the Volume Shadow Copies on the system, which prevents forensic recovery of the files encrypted by the ransomware. vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence2

bcdedit.exe /set {current} safeboot minimal shutdown /r /f /t 00

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

38 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+32 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.