VBCloud is a Windows backdoor used by the Cloud Atlas espionage group as part of multi-stage intrusion chains against organizations primarily in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with recent victimology heavily concentrated in Russia and Belarus and including government, diplomatic, telecommunications, construction, industrial, and other commercial entities. It is typically deployed after initial compromise through phishing-delivered Office documents exploiting CVE-2018-0802 or through malicious shortcut and PowerShell-based chains, often alongside other Cloud Atlas tools such as VBShower and PowerShower.
VBCloud is commonly implemented as a Visual Basic Script launcher paired with an encrypted backdoor body that is decrypted and executed in memory, with RC4 used in observed variants. The malware maintains persistence through mechanisms including scheduled tasks and registry autoruns, and it has been installed under masquerading directories within shared Windows data locations. Cloud Atlas has used VBCloud as a modular post-compromise implant that can receive and execute additional scripts or payloads, collect host and system information, and support encrypted communications through cloud-based infrastructure, including WebDAV-backed public cloud storage in some campaigns.
A core function of VBCloud is theft and exfiltration of victim data. Observed behavior includes searching for and stealing documents and archives of intelligence interest, including common office and text formats, recent files, and Telegram-related artifacts. Stolen data has been packaged into encrypted archives and exfiltrated through attacker-controlled cloud channels. VBCloud has also been described as downloading and executing additional malicious scripts, including file-grabber functionality, making it both a persistent backdoor and a data-theft platform within Cloud Atlas operations.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Мы также фиксировали инциденты, в которых на зараженные хосты устанавливались дополнительные собственные разработки группы, такие как VBCloud и PowerCloud.
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Victims get infected via phishing emails containing a malicious document that exploits a vulnerability in the formula editor (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malware code.
“Cloud Atlas... using phishing emails bearing malicious Word documents to distribute custom malware known as VBShower and VBCloud.”
In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.
PowerShower downloads additional PowerShell scripts from the C2 and executes these.
VBShower::Launcher ... using the Execute() function to pass control to that file.
"...malicious document that exploits a vulnerability in the formula editor (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malware code"
In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.
After the download is complete, the malware adds a registry key to auto-run the VBShower Launcher script. "Software\Microsoft\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run"
In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.
After the download is complete, the malware adds a registry key to auto-run the VBShower Launcher script. "Software\Microsoft\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run"
“...the malicious document loads a remote template from C2 specified in one of the document's streams...”
Gets the domain, username and computer.
This script gets various system information such as the OS version, RAM size, manufacturer, computer name, username and domain name.
Gets information about the file names and sizes in the following folders: %AppData%; %AllUsersProfile%; ...
VBCloud::Payload (2) This script is designed to exfiltrate files and documents. It iterates through local drives and removable media in search of files with the extensions DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, PDF, TXT, RTF and RAR.
The script then copies matching files to a ZIP archive it creates, named “mapping.zip”.
This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands.
Previously, Cloud Atlas employed PowerShower to download and run an executable file: a DLL library. This DLL would then fetch additional executable modules (plug-ins) from the C2 server and execute these in memory.
This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.
The plugins were downloaded and their output was uploaded via the WebDAV protocol over public cloud services.
39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.