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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

VBCloud

Tracked since Dec 19, 2025 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs39Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishing
Platforms
Windows

VBCloud is a Windows backdoor used by the Cloud Atlas espionage group as part of multi-stage intrusion chains against organizations primarily in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with recent victimology heavily concentrated in Russia and Belarus and including government, diplomatic, telecommunications, construction, industrial, and other commercial entities. It is typically deployed after initial compromise through phishing-delivered Office documents exploiting CVE-2018-0802 or through malicious shortcut and PowerShell-based chains, often alongside other Cloud Atlas tools such as VBShower and PowerShower.

VBCloud is commonly implemented as a Visual Basic Script launcher paired with an encrypted backdoor body that is decrypted and executed in memory, with RC4 used in observed variants. The malware maintains persistence through mechanisms including scheduled tasks and registry autoruns, and it has been installed under masquerading directories within shared Windows data locations. Cloud Atlas has used VBCloud as a modular post-compromise implant that can receive and execute additional scripts or payloads, collect host and system information, and support encrypted communications through cloud-based infrastructure, including WebDAV-backed public cloud storage in some campaigns.

A core function of VBCloud is theft and exfiltration of victim data. Observed behavior includes searching for and stealing documents and archives of intelligence interest, including common office and text formats, recent files, and Telegram-related artifacts. Stolen data has been packaged into encrypted archives and exfiltrated through attacker-controlled cloud channels. VBCloud has also been described as downloading and executing additional malicious scripts, including file-grabber functionality, making it both a persistent backdoor and a data-theft platform within Cloud Atlas operations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-0802via securelistExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation EditorVictims get infected via phishing emails containing a malicious document that exploits a vulnerability in the formula editor (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malware code.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Inception

Мы также фиксировали инциденты, в которых на зараженные хосты устанавливались дополнительные собственные разработки группы, такие как VBCloud и PowerCloud.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Victims get infected via phishing emails containing a malicious document that exploits a vulnerability in the formula editor (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malware code.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“Cloud Atlas... using phishing emails bearing malicious Word documents to distribute custom malware known as VBShower and VBCloud.”

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

PowerShower downloads additional PowerShell scripts from the C2 and executes these.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

VBShower::Launcher ... using the Execute() function to pass control to that file.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

"...malicious document that exploits a vulnerability in the formula editor (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malware code"

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

After the download is complete, the malware adds a registry key to auto-run the VBShower Launcher script. "Software\Microsoft\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

In the case of VBCloud, the script changes the extension of the unpacked file from TXT to VBS and creates a scheduler task to run VBCloud.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

After the download is complete, the malware adds a registry key to auto-run the VBShower Launcher script. "Software\Microsoft\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run"

Stealth

1 technique
T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

“...the malicious document loads a remote template from C2 specified in one of the document's streams...”

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Gets the domain, username and computer.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

This script gets various system information such as the OS version, RAM size, manufacturer, computer name, username and domain name.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Gets information about the file names and sizes in the following folders: %AppData%; %AllUsersProfile%; ...

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

VBCloud::Payload (2) This script is designed to exfiltrate files and documents. It iterates through local drives and removable media in search of files with the extensions DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, PDF, TXT, RTF and RAR.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The script then copies matching files to a ZIP archive it creates, named “mapping.zip”.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

Previously, Cloud Atlas employed PowerShower to download and run an executable file: a DLL library. This DLL would then fetch additional executable modules (plug-ins) from the C2 server and execute these in memory.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The plugins were downloaded and their output was uploaded via the WebDAV protocol over public cloud services.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching39Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.