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MalwareUsed by 5 actors

AzureHound

AzureHound is a Go-based, open-source data collection and enumeration tool developed by SpecterOps as part of the BloodHound suite for penetration testing in Microsoft cloud environments. It is used to enumerate Azure resources and Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) data and map potential attack paths, including via Microsoft Graph and Azure REST APIs. The content describes AzureHound being used for post-compromise discovery and internal reconnaissance in Microsoft Azure and Entra ID environments. Microsoft observed the Iranian nation-state threat actor Peach Sandstorm (HOLMIUM, with overlap to public reporting on APT33/Elfin/Refined Kitten) using AzureHound in successful intrusions since 2023, alongside ROADtools, after password-spray activity and other access methods. Reported targeting in that campaign focused on satellite, defense, and to a lesser extent pharmaceutical organizations worldwide. The content also notes detection opportunities based on AzureHound/BloodHound-related user-agent activity across Microsoft cloud services and Entra ID sign-in telemetry. No specific file hashes or other AzureHound-specific IOCs are provided in the content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Void Blizzard

Abuse of AzureHound in the Wild — ...leveraged a Go-based open-source data collection tool called AzureHound... enumerate Azure resources and map potential attack paths...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Storm-0501

Abuse of AzureHound in the Wild — ...leveraged a Go-based open-source data collection tool called AzureHound... enumerate Azure resources and map potential attack paths...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Curious Serpens (Peach Sandstorm)

Abuse of AzureHound in the Wild — ...leveraged a Go-based open-source data collection tool called AzureHound... enumerate Azure resources and map potential attack paths...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
APT33

"They used password spray activity, internal reconnaissance with AzureHound or Roadtools..."

via industrialcyberindustrialcyber.co
Curious Serpens

"Threat Actors Abuse AzureHound for Post-Compromise Discovery in Microsoft Azure Environments" ... "AzureHound is an open-source data collection tool initially developed by SpecterOps (@SpecterOps) for penetration testing within the BloodHound suite."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“the infection chain begins when threat actors gain initial access… using stolen credentials or authentication tokens… refresh tokens, or JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), threat actors authenticate to the Azure environment.”

Execution

1 technique
T1059.006PythonEvidence1
TacticExecution

Let's authorize a Microsoft public client application using Python. In this example, we will complete an device authorization grant flow as the Azure CLI public client application.

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“the infection chain begins when threat actors gain initial access… using stolen credentials or authentication tokens… refresh tokens, or JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), threat actors authenticate to the Azure environment.”

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Accessing cleartext access and refresh tokens for various MS APIs (e.g., MS Graph) is often a requirement during engagements and research, especially using pre-consented clients (e.g., AzureCLI) to avoid additional consent prompts.

Discovery

10 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

"AD Explorer for Active Directory environment mapping"; "AzureHound and Roadtools for Azure AD reconnaissance"

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The threat actor has also in some cases enumerated the compromised organization's Microsoft Entra ID configuration using the publicly available AzureHound tool to gain information about the users, roles, groups, applications, and devices belonging to that tenant.

T1069.001Local GroupsEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments ... Local Groups ... Detect SharpHound Usage ... Local Groups ... Group Discovery Via Net ... Local Groups

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments ... Domain Groups ... Detect SharpHound Usage ... Domain Groups ... Group Discovery Via Net ... Domain Groups

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Tokens are needed not only for manual enumeration via APIs but also for tools like AzureHound or GraphRunner, which require a valid refresh token.

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments ... Local Account ... Detect SharpHound Usage ... Local Account ... Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution ... Local Account

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

Step 2 - Reconnaissance T1087.002, T1482, T1518.001, T1057, T1082 | Affiliate Domain enumeration via obfuscated ADRecon.ps1, nltest, net group, tasklist, sc query.

T1087.004Cloud AccountEvidence5
TacticDiscovery

Storm-0501 has conducted enumeration of users, roles, and resources within victim Azure tenants using the tool Azurehound.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments ... Domain Trust Discovery ... Detect SharpHound Usage ... Domain Trust Discovery ... Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution ... Domain Trust Discovery

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence7
TacticDiscovery

APT33 conducts massive password-spraying campaigns against Microsoft 365 and AAD tenants, using TOR exit nodes and open-source tools such as Roadtools and AzureHound for post-compromise reconnaissance.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.