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Malware

IDAT Loader

Tracked since Dec 30, 2025 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs43Tracked

IDAT Loader is a Windows malware loader first observed by Rapid7 in July 2023. It is described as a sophisticated loader used in fake browser update and ClearFake-driven infection chains to deliver follow-on malware including Lumma Stealer, StealC, Amadey, and in earlier variants SecTop RAT. The loader gets its name from storing an encrypted malicious payload inside the IDAT chunk of a PNG-formatted file.

In the reported chains, victims are lured via compromised websites using fake browser update pages; ClearFake campaigns in October 2023 also delivered IDAT Loader to Windows systems. Rapid7 described a flow in which a fake updater such as ChromeSetup.exe downloads and executes an MSI. The MSI drops a legitimate executable such as VMwareHostOpen.exe or pythonw.exe together with a malicious DLL such as vmtools.dll or python311.dll and an encrypted .log file masquerading as PNG data. The malicious DLL uses API hashing to resolve kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll functions, locates the embedded payload by searching for the IDAT chunk and marker bytes, decrypts it with XOR, decompresses it with RTLDecompressBuffer using LZNT1, then loads mshtml.dll and overwrites its .text section in memory with the decompressed code.

Subsequent stages create a randomized folder under %APPDATA%, relaunch the legitimate host process from that location, and inject into a spawned cmd.exe using NtCreateSection and NtMapViewOfSection. The injected loader reads configuration from %TEMP%\89680228, decrypts it with recursive XOR key 3D ED C0 D3, deletes the initial malicious DLL, and injects the final payload into explorer.exe using Process Doppelgänging with Transactional NTFS APIs including NtCreateTransaction, NtCreateFile, NtWriteFile, NtRollbackTransaction, NtCreateProcessEx, and NtCreateThreadEx. Reported evasion techniques include Heaven’s Gate for many API calls and NtDelayExecution-based delays to hinder sandbox analysis.

Observed packaging varies, but Rapid7 reported IDAT Loader being packaged as DLLs loaded by legitimate programs including VMwareHost, Python, and Windows Defender components. Known filenames and artifacts directly mentioned in reporting include ChromeSetup.exe, vmtools.dll, python311.dll, vmo.log, pz.log, and %TEMP%\89680228; Rapid7 also noted vmtools.dll searched for the string "...IDAT" and marker bytes C6 A5 79 EA in the PNG-like file. Detection content provided for Windows memory scanning specifically targets IDAT Loader and associated payloads such as Stealc, Lumma, Amadey, and RedLine.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

ClearFake is a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites to deliver malware through the drive-by download technique.

Execution

4 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

"IDAT immediately started the implementation of the Heaven’s Gate evasion technique..." and repeated use of low-level NT APIs (e.g., NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection, NtCreateTransaction).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"Victims are prompted to download and run a fake application..." and "instructions ... urges targets to run an executable file (\"setup.exe\")"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

"After the user double clicks the fake update binary, it will proceed to download the next stage payload."

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

"When executed, the legitimate VMWareHostOpen.exe loads the malicious vmtools.dll from the same directory... This technique is known as DLL Search Order Hijacking."

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"IDAT injects code into cmd.exe process by using NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection"

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

"The loader finally injects the infostealer code into the explorer.exe process by using the Process Doppelgänging injection technique."

Stealth

7 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

"It will also drop an encrypted vmo.log file which has a PNG file structure" and "IDAT loader got its name as the threat actor stores the malicious payload in the IDAT chunk of PNG file format."

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"IDAT injects code into cmd.exe process by using NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection"

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

"The loader finally injects the infostealer code into the explorer.exe process by using the Process Doppelgänging injection technique."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

"The DLL... decrypts it using a bitwise XOR... reads the contents from vmo.log... attempts to decrypt... decompressed using the RTLDecompressBuffer function... LZNT1"

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

"ChromeSetup.exe downloads and executes the Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) package..." and "switches intended to avoid detection: /qn /quiet /norestart"

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"the malware delays execution by using NtDelayExecution, a technique that is usually used to escape sandboxes."

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

"When executed, the legitimate VMWareHostOpen.exe loads the malicious vmtools.dll from the same directory... This technique is known as DLL Search Order Hijacking."

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"the malware delays execution by using NtDelayExecution, a technique that is usually used to escape sandboxes."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"distributing a ZIP archive file named 'crowdstrike-hotfix.zip,' which contains a malware loader..."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching43Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.