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Malware1 associated actor

Deadbolt

Tracked since Dec 31, 2025 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Extortion
Platforms
Linux

DeadBolt is ransomware targeting internet-exposed network-attached storage (NAS) devices, particularly QNAP and ASUSTOR systems. Its campaigns affected thousands of devices worldwide in 2022. Operators exploited vulnerabilities in NAS software to deploy the ransomware, using a heavily automated, high-volume approach rather than concentrating exclusively on large organizations.

DeadBolt combines Go, HTML, and Bash components. On compromised QNAP devices, it encrypts user files with AES-128 and replaces the normal web login page with a ransom interface. Its configuration controls encryption and payment-related behavior. The payment mechanism delivers victim-specific decryption keys through the OP_RETURN field of a Bitcoin transaction, allowing key delivery without direct communication with the operators. A supplied key is checked against stored hashes before decryption begins.

The operation uses a multitiered extortion model aimed at both device owners and manufacturers. Early QNAP campaigns demanded 0.03 BTC from individual victims, while separately offering vulnerability details to QNAP for 5 BTC or a purported universal decryption key and vulnerability details for 50 BTC. These vendor-directed offers were attacker claims, not guarantees of recovery. DeadBolt's targeting centers on exposed NAS infrastructure rather than a particular industry or geographic region.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DeadBolt Team

“DeadBolt Team ransom note on a browsed NAS — prior compromise by another group on infrastructure later accessed by The Gentlemen.”

via ransom isac blogransom-isac.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

If you need to access your NAS device remotely, do it securely by opting to use either your NAS vendor’s remote access services (which most major NAS vendors offer) or use a virtual private network (VPN) solutions.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

As with all ransomware attacks against QNAP devices, the DeadBolt attacks only affect devices accessible to the Internet.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The initial command to encrypt files is: [random_file_name] -e [config] /share

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

the Bash script is used to start the decryption process if the provided decryption key is correct

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

A new DeadBolt ransomware group is encrypting QNAP NAS devices worldwide using what they claim is a zero-day vulnerability in the device's software.

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

If you need to access your NAS device remotely, do it securely by opting to use either your NAS vendor’s remote access services (which most major NAS vendors offer) or use a virtual private network (VPN) solutions.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

If your NAS device supports 2FA, enable it to add an extra layer of protection against brute force attacks.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

QNAP said it is “urgently” fixing two vulnerabilities that allow hackers to remotely access systems... A malicious actor could use those problems to get full access to a QNAP device.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence9

Actors have used privately developed ransomware, such as Maui and H0lyGh0st [T1486]. Actors have also been observed using or possessing publically available tools for encryption.

T1491DefacementEvidence2

DeadBolt will also replace the /home/httpd/index.html file so that when victims access the device, they will see the ransom screen demanding a ransom of 0.03 bitcoins to a specified bitcoin address.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

24 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.