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Malware1 associated actor

GhostRAT

Tracked since Dec 31, 2025 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

GhostRAT is a Windows remote access Trojan and backdoor used to provide attackers with remote control of compromised systems and maintain persistent access. It has been deployed by multiple threat actors, including Andariel, a subgroup of Lazarus, and China-linked attackers.

Andariel used GhostRAT during 2015–2016, including an April 2016 campaign against South Korean defense, maritime-services, and ICT organizations that exploited centralized-management software. Observed deployments included Korean-localized controllers and samples protected with Themida packing. GhostRAT was used alongside other publicly available backdoors and Andariel's custom malware.

Later campaigns deployed GhostRAT by exploiting CVE-2024-23692, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Rejetto HTTP File Server, to establish persistent access to affected servers. China-linked attackers have also abused the legitimate Nezha remote monitoring and management tool to deploy it. These campaigns demonstrate its use as a post-compromise payload delivered through vulnerable infrastructure and abused administrative tooling.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Andariel

Andariel used Ghostrat during 2015–2016, including attacks against defense, maritime services, and ICT organizations through centralized-management software vulnerabilities.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

“The following are the TTPs… Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter” (GhostRAT Loader section).

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

“Execution T1129 Shared Modules” (listed for Ndm448 and also for GhostRAT Loader).

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“Persistence T1112 Modify Registry” (GhostRAT Loader list) and also listed multiple times in UNC3886 TTPs.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“Persistence T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution” (GhostRAT Loader list).

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

“Privilege Escalation T1134 Access Token Manipulation” (GhostRAT Loader list) and narrative: “attempting to gain elevated privileges through manipulation of access tokens.”

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“Persistence T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution” (GhostRAT Loader list).

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing” (Ndm448 list) and “Defense Evasion… T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information” (GhostRAT Loader list).

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

“Privilege Escalation T1134 Access Token Manipulation” (GhostRAT Loader list) and narrative: “attempting to gain elevated privileges through manipulation of access tokens.”

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“Persistence T1112 Modify Registry” (GhostRAT Loader list) and also listed multiple times in UNC3886 TTPs.

T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification” (Ndm448 list) and “altering permissions” described in GhostRAT Loader method narrative.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Listed under Discovery for Ndm448 and GhostRAT Loader; also referenced in narrative: “interaction with extensive registry structures…”.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery” (Ndm448 list; also GhostRAT Loader and UNC3886 lists).

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and narrative describing rapid traversal of user/system directories prior to encryption.

Collection

2 techniques
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

“Collection T1115 Clipboard Data” (Ndm448 list) and “Collection T1115 Clipboard Data Collection” (GhostRAT Loader list).

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

“Collection T1125 Video Capture” (GhostRAT Loader list).

Impact

1 technique
T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

“Impact T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot” (GhostRAT Loader list) and narrative: “can disrupt normal operations by forcing system restarts or shutdowns…”.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.