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Malware1 associated actor

Prometheus

Tracked since Jan 5, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationExtortionDefense evasionPersistence
Platforms
Windows

Prometheus is a Windows ransomware family first observed in February 2021 and widely assessed as a Thanos-derived variant built from leaked Thanos code. It is associated with a double-extortion operation that encrypts victim files while also threatening to leak stolen data through a dedicated extortion site and negotiation portal. The operators publicly claimed links to REvil, but reporting consistently found no technical evidence supporting that affiliation. Victims spanned multiple sectors, with manufacturing and transportation/logistics appearing prominently among observed cases, alongside government, financial, healthcare, energy, legal, consulting, agriculture, and other enterprises across several regions.

Prometheus is implemented as a .NET ransomware strain targeting Windows environments. Across analyses, it has been reported using Salsa20 for file encryption, with some reporting on Prometheus-linked Thanos samples describing AES-based encryption behavior in related campaigns. Prometheus appends victim-specific extensions to encrypted files, drops text and HTA ransom notes, and uses common Thanos-family markers also seen in related variants such as Haron, Spook, and Midas. The malware attempts to maximize encryption success by terminating processes and services associated with backups, databases, office applications, and security tooling, including artifacts related to the Raccine anti-ransomware utility. It has also been observed modifying service configurations and, in some reporting on Prometheus-linked samples, altering firewall or registry settings as part of pre-encryption preparation and defense evasion.

The family is notable for weaknesses identified in some Prometheus encryption implementations. Multiple researchers documented flawed key generation tied to system tick count or uptime, enabling development of decryptors that could recover at least some encrypted files, especially where known file headers or other recoverable parameters were available. These weaknesses distinguished Prometheus from more mature ransomware families whose cryptography generally prevents recovery without attacker-held keys.

Prometheus forms part of a broader cluster of Thanos-based ransomware activity and has been linked genealogically and operationally to later variants including Haron and Spook. Its emergence illustrates how leaked ransomware builders enabled rapid rebranding, customization, and commercialization of extortion operations by multiple actors.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Prometheus

Prometheus Different Thanos-based Ransomware Prometheus Ransomware "GotAllDone" Ransomware Prometheus NextGen Ransomware Variants, variation, modification: Getin, CGP, Haron (Chaddad), Boooom, Spook, ltnuhr, Steriok, Unlock, ZZZZZZZZZZ, Matilan.

via id ransomware blogid-ransomware.blogspot.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Может распространяться путём ... обманных загрузок, ... вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Может распространяться путём ... эксплойтов

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Может распространяться путём ... с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1569.002 Service Execution

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Defense Evasion The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry [T1112]

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence, Privilege Escalation The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001]

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence, Privilege Escalation The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001]

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Raccine, которая не даёт шифровальщикам удалять теневые копии файлов

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Записки с требованием выкупа называются: RESTORE_FILES_INFO.txt RESTORE_FILES_INFO.hta

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Defense Evasion The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry [T1112]

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Since the password use [the] tickcount as the key, we can guess it brutally.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

С июля 2021 года стал использоваться другой формат расширения — краткое название атакованной компании, учреждения, банка, финансовой группы и прочее.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Использует список команд для принудительного завершения множества процессов, мещающих шифрованию файлов.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

We also gathered highly confidential/personal data. These data are currently stored on a private server.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence7

MITRE ATT&CK ... T1486 – Data Encrypted for Impact ... Spook, mirroring the manifestos of others, boasts “very strong (AES) encryption” ... Encryption of a full disk can occur within just a few minutes

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

When Prometheus ransomware is executed, it tries to kill several backups and security software-related processes, such as Raccine, a ransomware prevention tool that tries to stop ransomware from deleting shadow copies in Windows.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

YOUR DATA ON OUR SERVER AND WE WILL RELEASE YOUR DATA TO PUBLIC OR RE-SELLER!

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.