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Malware1 associated actor

Rustock

Tracked since Jan 5, 2026 · Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Rootkit
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

Rustock is a Windows kernel-mode rootkit and spam-bot malware family used for financially motivated, large-scale email campaigns, including penny-stock pump-and-dump schemes and rogue online pharmacy advertising. Its botnet was estimated to comprise approximately one million infected computers and generate tens of billions of spam messages daily. Rustock variants were distributed as secondary payloads by malware downloaders, including Pushdo.

Rustock combines driver-based execution, concealed boot-time persistence, and an embedded spam module injected into a legitimate Windows system process. Its rootkit hides startup configuration through registry-function hooking and uses layered encryption and obfuscation to protect its components. An analyzed variant removed executable headers from its decoded rootkit in memory to impede forensic analysis and hooked networking drivers to support the spam module.

Rustock uses RC4-encrypted HTTP POST communications for command and control, with separate key-exchange and instruction phases. It retrieves recipient lists, spam templates, message content, and mail-server discovery information. Host profiling includes operating-system version, bandwidth, SMTP availability, virtual-machine status, and DNS blacklist status. The malware can terminate competing malware, delete associated files, download and execute arbitrary code, and update its spam component.

Rustock's infrastructure suffered disruption when the McColo hosting provider was disconnected in 2008, but operators subsequently restored botnet communications. A Microsoft-led operation in March 2011 seized command-and-control infrastructure and halted its spam operations. The infrastructure takedown did not itself remove Rustock from infected endpoints, which required separate remediation.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cosma

Earlier in my Pharma Wars series, I detailed the activities of Cosma — the top SpamIt affiliate who appears to have been responsible for a botnet that competed directly with SPM’s – Rustock.

via krebs on securitykrebsonsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

6 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence6

No surprise, as it turns out the motive is spam. Using a sandnet, I injected myself into the botnet, able to capture (and blackhole) a small portion of the spam being sent through the system.

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

Docent: Especially is large volumes ). And from bots. 🙂

T1584.005BotnetEvidence4

This episode tells the stories of some of the worlds biggest spamming botnets. We’ll talk about the botnets Rustock, Waledac, and Cutwail.

T1585Establish AccountsEvidence2

2007 A Case Study of the Rustock Rootkit and Spam Bot

T1585.002Email AccountsEvidence1

The brief resurrection allowed miscreants who rely on McColo to update a portion of the massive botnets they use to push spam and malware... Rustock is capable of sending 30 billion spam messages per day.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

the company was shut down by two upstream providers, Global Crossing and Hurricane Electric, because a significant amount of malware and botnets had been trafficking from the McColo servers.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

This technique is known as a “drive-by download”; when a user views the infected site, malicious code will be installed to the victim machine without the user’s knowledge or consent.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Google rented his crime machine to members of SpamIt, an organization that paid spammers to promote rogue Internet pharmacy sites... SpamIt members could rent access to the collection of hacked machines via... 'Reactor Mailer.'

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

McColo customers were responsible for a substantial proportion of all email spam then flowing and subsequent reports claim a two-thirds or greater reduction in global spam volume.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

criminals typically control large botnets, collections of sometimes tens of thousands of computers infected by backdoor Trojans.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The registry key HKLM\system\CurrentControlSet\services\pe386 used to start the malware disappears from the registry as soon as the malware is loaded... the rootkit component entry function... [uses] the registry path pointing to the registry key that loaded the malware driver file into the operating system.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

This notify routine creates at most two threads to inject the spam component into the services.exe process... It was previously mentioned that the spam module is injected into the services.exe process, this is another step taken by the malware to thwart detection.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The registry key HKLM\system\CurrentControlSet\services\pe386 used to start the malware disappears from the registry as soon as the malware is loaded... the rootkit component entry function... [uses] the registry path pointing to the registry key that loaded the malware driver file into the operating system.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence8

MITRE ATT&CK catalogs the technique as T1014 under defense evasion.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

2009 Rootkit Installation and Obfuscation in Rustock

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

This notify routine creates at most two threads to inject the spam component into the services.exe process... It was previously mentioned that the spam module is injected into the services.exe process, this is another step taken by the malware to thwart detection.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Deletes all sub-keys in the hive: HKLM\system\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\Legacy_lzx32.sys

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Next, the client sends information about itself to the server including bandwidth, OS version, SMTP availability (if outbound TCP/25 is allowed), if it is a virtual machine...

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence2

Deletes all sub-keys in the hive: HKLM\system\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\Legacy_lzx32.sys Replaces the registry functions to hide the registry key created to load the malware at boot.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The bootkit then decrypts this packet, and inside there is a DLL file which the bootkit loads to memory and which does not exist as a file on disk!

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Next, the client sends information about itself to the server including bandwidth, OS version, SMTP availability (if outbound TCP/25 is allowed), if it is a virtual machine, and if it is blacklisted on a DNS blacklist.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Next, the client sends information about itself to the server including bandwidth, OS version, SMTP availability (if outbound TCP/25 is allowed), if it is a virtual machine...

T1654Log EnumerationEvidence1

And, as with a lot of spam these days, it's the pump-and-dump kind of spam touting penny stocks to would-be investors.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Microsoft crippled Rustock by convincing a court to let it seize dozens of Rustock control servers... the servers only were used to coordinate the activities of hundreds of thousands of PCs infected with Rustock, periodically sending them program updates and new spamming instructions.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Both phases are initiated by the client in the form of HTTP POSTs... The HTTP POST from the client contains a 96-byte encrypted payload and is sent to the login.php page on the server... The instruction phase... consists of a variable number of HTTP POSTs from the client and corresponding responses from the server.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

McColo was one of the leading players in the so-called "bulletproof hosting" market — ISPs that will allow servers to remain online regardless of complaints.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the servers only were used to coordinate the activities of hundreds of thousands of PCs infected with Rustock, periodically sending them program updates and new spamming instructions.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

McColo briefly returned online so it could hand-off command and control channels to a new source... PCs infected by the Rustock botnet [were] being updated so they'd report to a new server located at abilena.podolsk-mo.ru for instructions.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

By looking through a network traffic dump we determine that all C&C communications are encrypted... the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the data was RC4.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.