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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

CryptoLocker

Tracked since Jan 6, 2026 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
PersistenceExtortion
Delivery
MalspamPhishingExploit kitDrive by
Platforms
Windows

CryptoLocker is a Windows file-encrypting ransomware family first observed in September 2013. It encrypts documents, databases, images, design files, certificates, and other selected file types on local disks and accessible network drives; later versions also targeted removable drives. It uses Microsoft CryptoAPI to encrypt each file with a unique AES-256 key and protects those keys with an attacker-controlled RSA public key obtained from its command-and-control infrastructure. Encryption begins only after successful contact with an active server.

Early campaigns distributed CryptoLocker through malicious spam attachments, including compressed archives containing executables and business-oriented lures. Large-scale distribution subsequently relied on Upatre and Gameover Zeus, with Cutwail supplying spam delivery. Blackhole and Magnitude exploit kits also supported the Gameover Zeus distribution chain. CryptoLocker establishes persistence through Windows autorun entries and locates command-and-control servers using both embedded destinations and a domain generation algorithm.

After encryption, CryptoLocker displays a ransom demand and countdown, requesting payment through Bitcoin or prepaid payment services. Its operators also introduced a higher-priced recovery service for victims who missed the original deadline. Infections occurred worldwide, disproportionately affecting English-speaking countries, particularly the United States. Early infections included financial institutions, but broader observations did not establish industry-specific targeting. Secureworks estimated 200,000–250,000 infected systems during its first 100 days. Other ransomware families subsequently reused CryptoLocker branding, so the name alone does not establish a relationship to the original family.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-0311via threatpostExploited in the wildRemote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerThe malware proceeds through a number of checks for the presence of virtual machines or antivirus before dropping a Flash exploit for CVE-2015-0311 or an Internet Explorer exploit CVE-2013-2551.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2013-2551via threatpostExploited in the wildUse-after-free in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6–10The malware proceeds through a number of checks for the presence of virtual machines or antivirus before dropping a Flash exploit for CVE-2015-0311 or an Internet Explorer exploit CVE-2013-2551.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Evgeniy Bogachev

Individual operators often dropped other malware • CryptoLocker – first in-house development, destructive

via blackhatblackhat.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

the samples were downloaded from a compromised website located in the United States... Gameover Zeus has also been distributed by the Blackhole and Magnitude exploit kits.

T1566PhishingEvidence8

Early versions of CryptoLocker were distributed through spam emails targeting business professionals... The lure was often a 'consumer complaint'... Attached to these emails was a ZIP archive... The archive contained a single executable

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence9

Attached to these emails was a ZIP archive with a random alphabetical filename... The archive contained a single executable with the same filename as the ZIP archive but with an EXE extension.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Some of the most commonly used commands used by attackers are: user_execute <url> ... The user_execute command was used specifically for CryptoLocker installations too

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The command that is run when you click on an executable is: "C:\Windows\SYsWOW64\cmd.exe" /C "C:\Windows\Sysnative\vssadmin.exe" Delete Shadows /All /Quiet

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The infection will also hijack your .EXE extensions... The .EXE hijack in the Registry will look similar to the following... [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.exe] @="Myjiaabodehhltdr" ... [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Myjiaabodehhltdr\shell\open\command] @="\"C:\\Users\\User\\AppData\\Local\\Rlatviomorjzlefba.exe\" - \"%1\" %*"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The payload process creates a subprocess to maintain persistence and avoid termination. If either the parent or child process is terminated, the other will recreate it.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

CryptoLocker then creates an 'autorun' registry key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 'CryptoLocker': <random>.exe Some versions of CryptoLocker create an additional registry entry... RunOnce '*CryptoLocker'

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The payload process creates a subprocess to maintain persistence and avoid termination. If either the parent or child process is terminated, the other will recreate it.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

CryptoLocker then creates an 'autorun' registry key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 'CryptoLocker': <random>.exe Some versions of CryptoLocker create an additional registry entry... RunOnce '*CryptoLocker'

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

These zip files contain executables that are disguised as PDF files as they have a PDF icon and are typically named something like FORM_101513.exe or FORM_101513.pdf.exe. Since Microsoft does not show extensions by default, they look like normal PDF files and people open them.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

When first executed, the malware creates a copy of itself in either %AppData% or %LocalAppData%. CryptoLocker then deletes the original executable file.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CryptoLocker only encrypts data stored on network shares if the shared folders are mapped as a drive letter on the infected computer. Despite what some articles state, CryptoLocker does not encrypt data on a network through UNC shares.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The infection will also hijack your .EXE extensions... The .EXE hijack in the Registry will look similar to the following... [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.exe] @="Myjiaabodehhltdr" ... [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Myjiaabodehhltdr\shell\open\command] @="\"C:\\Users\\User\\AppData\\Local\\Rlatviomorjzlefba.exe\" - \"%1\" %*"

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware begins the encryption process by using the GetLogicalDrives() API call to enumerate the disks on the system that have been assigned a drive letter.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence3

In early CryptoLocker samples, the GetDriveType() API call then determines if the drives are local fixed disks or network drives... Only those two types of drives are selected for file encryption in early samples.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CryptoLocker only encrypts data stored on network shares if the shared folders are mapped as a drive letter on the infected computer. Despite what some articles state, CryptoLocker does not encrypt data on a network through UNC shares.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence9

Initially peer-to-peer + traditional comms via gameover2.php

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

CryptoLocker cycles indefinitely until it connects to a C2 server via HTTP.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

This service is available by connecting directly to a Command & Control server's IP address or hostname or through Tor via the f2d2v7soksbskekh.onion/ address.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

GOZ includes code that permits the defendants to install additional malicious software onto computers infected with GOZ. The defendants and their co-conspirators have used this capability to install Cryptolocker onto numerous computers within the GOZ botnet.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

This decryption service can also be accessed via TOR at the address f2d2v7soksbskekh.onion/.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence3

The malware's network communications use an internal domain generation algorithm (DGA) that produces 1,000 potential C2 domain addresses per day.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence7

The malware's network communications use an internal domain generation algorithm (DGA) that produces 1,000 potential C2 domain addresses per day.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

After connecting to an attacker-controlled C2 server, CryptoLocker sends a phone-home message encrypted with an RSA public key embedded within the malware.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence30

CryptoLocker changes this dynamic by aggressively encrypting files on the victim's system... Each file is encrypted with a unique AES key, which in turn is encrypted with the RSA public key received from the C2 server.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

WinLock was the first locker ransomware, a variant that completely locks victims out of their devices.

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1

The overall mechanism of version 2.0 is largely identical to version 1.0: C2 communication Built-in domains Encrypt files and store the encrypted AES key into the files Change the wallpaper

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

The panel functions include DDoS, cryptocurrency-mining capabilities, and execution of arbitrary files... After categorization, compromised assets are used or sold for particular purposes such as proxies, hosting services, or cryptocurrency mining.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

82 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.