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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

DNSChanger

Tracked since Jan 7, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
Type
Trojan
Capabilities
Brute forceDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
LureMalvertising
Platforms
WindowsmacOSNetwork device

DNSChanger is a DNS-hijacking Trojan that changes DNS settings on compromised computers or routers to use attacker-controlled resolvers. This enables operators to redirect web requests, substitute advertisements, and generate fraudulent advertising, affiliate, and referral revenue. It affects Windows and macOS systems and has also been used against routers. Distribution has included fake multimedia codec installers and malvertising. Some infections block antivirus and operating-system updates, leaving victims exposed to additional malware.

The major historical DNSChanger operation was run by the Rove Digital cybercrime organization. Beginning in 2007, it infected approximately four million computers across more than 100 countries, including systems belonging to individuals, businesses, and government agencies. The operation generated at least $14 million in illicit fees before its disruption through Operation Ghost Click in November 2011. Temporary replacement DNS infrastructure maintained connectivity for affected users until July 2012. DNSChanger also attempted to manipulate DNS settings for other local-network systems using DHCP, potentially affecting computers without directly infecting them.

Some Windows samples generate five pseudorandom domains after changing DNS settings and attempt to resolve them to verify that the changes succeeded. The DNSChanger name has also been applied to later router-focused campaigns that guess default administrative credentials or exploit authentication bypass and unauthenticated DNS-configuration weaknesses. Campaigns during 2018–2019 remotely changed DNS settings on vulnerable consumer routers, including the D-Link DSL-2640B, redirecting users toward malicious or phishing destinations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-0625via supportannouncement us dlinkD-Link DNS configuration authentication bypass and reported command injectionNetlab also documented malware referred to as DNSChanger, which targets router configuration interfaces. This attack attempts to gain access by guessing default credentials such as admin/admin or root/root, or by bypassing authentication through exposed CGI endpoints such as dnscfg.cgi.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Rove Digital

Rove Digital ran a sophisticated operation in which the DNSChanger malware changed the DNS settings on the victim's computers.

via spamhaus blogspamhaus.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The content catalogs numerous websites and domains hosting fake codec/software downloads, such as HIFICODEC.COM, MEDIACODEC2006.COM, ZCODEC.COM, PLAYERCODEC.NET, and related domains tied to executable installers.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

This vulnerability enables an attacker to perform an unauthenticated firmware update.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

When OSX.RSPlug.A was installed, the system's DNS settings were changed to redirect web browsing to phishing web sites, or to web pages displaying ads for other pornographic web sites.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Multiple fake codec and software installers are listed, including 'hificodec1001.exe', 'media_codec_2006_setup.exe', 'tvcodec1000.exe', 'videosaccess1000.exe', and 'moviecodec1000.exe', presented as downloadable applications from themed websites.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The queries to the algorithmically generated domains are made after the DNS settings are changed.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Entries such as 'ZCodec (HQ Codec)', 'PlayerCodec 1.05 (HQ Codec)', 'MediaCodec2006', 'MovieCodec', 'TVCodec', and 'VaxObject' are presented as legitimate codec or software products while detections identify them as trojans or downloaders.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The queries to the algorithmically generated domains are made after the DNS settings are changed.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

In some cases, the malware had the additional effect of preventing users’ anti-virus software and operating systems from updating, thereby exposing infected machines to even more malicious software.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence2

As a result, innocent users were unknowingly directed to websites controlled by Rove Digital rather than to the pages they requested for a number of large web merchants, banks, and other companies with whom those users did business.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The trojan also seeks other systems on the local network that use the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and attempts to change their DNS settings, thereby taking control of computers on the LAN that haven’t been infected.

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence2

As a result, innocent users were unknowingly directed to websites controlled by Rove Digital rather than to the pages they requested for a number of large web merchants, banks, and other companies with whom those users did business.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The top level domain .com is appended to the second level domain by a wsprintf call. A DNS query is made for the domain by calling gethostbyname. The routine returns True if the DGA query succeeds, and False otherwise.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence2

README.md ... Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) of Malware reimplemented in Python.

Impact

3 techniques
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

In 2017, an exploit got posted to exploit-db.com that allows unauthenticated modification of the device's DNS server settings. This vulnerability is used by the DNSChanger malware during its 2018-2019 campaign.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Taking control of such a large device population allows for attacks at scale, such as contributing significant bandwidth in a DDoS attacks.

T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence5

DNSChanger was used to redirect unsuspecting users to rogue servers controlled by the cyber thieves, allowing them to manipulate users’ web activity.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.