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Malware8 associated actors

SoftEther VPN

Tracked since Jan 8, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors8Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs55Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
WindowsLinux

SoftEther VPN is legitimate open-source VPN software that threat actors abuse for persistent remote access, encrypted communications, and covert connectivity into compromised networks. Its client, server, and bridge components can connect victim systems to attacker-controlled VPN infrastructure or extend internal networks to remote locations. It is not inherently malware.

In malicious deployments, operators rename SoftEther binaries to resemble trusted operating-system or application components and configure services or startup execution to maintain access after reboot. Outbound encrypted connections, including HTTPS-based tunnels, help bypass network restrictions and conceal remote-access traffic. Some deployments use cascading VPN connections to upstream servers. SoftEther provides network access rather than credential-stealing or arbitrary-command-execution functionality; attackers use separate tools and protocols, including RDP, for subsequent operations.

Documented abuse includes activity tracked as Flax Typhoon, UAT-7237, GALLIUM/Red Dev 4, Soft Cell, UNC2814, and Larva-26010. Deployments have occurred in telecommunications, government, web-hosting, and critical-infrastructure environments, including Taiwanese organizations and Korean web and database servers. Attackers typically install the software after obtaining an initial foothold, using compromised servers, web shells, or command-line download utilities.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

8 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Flax Typhoon

Actors install SoftEther VPN clients disguised as conhost.exe or dllhost.exe to maintain stealthy, startup-persistent remote access.

via malware newsmalware.news
Larva-26010

The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
ToddyCat

The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
GALLIUM

The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
UNC3500

The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
Red Dev 4

We will discuss some of the recent techniques we’ve seen Red Dev 4 use to maintain footholds within victim environments, such as the delivery of SoftEther VPN clients configured to connect to threat actor-owned infrastructure.

via trooperstroopers.de

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

Webworm makes use of SoftEther VPN servers that have been seen hosted on Vultr cloud services.

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

The group exploited vulnerable public-facing servers and installed SoftEther VPN on compromised servers.

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

Operators have used tools such as Impacket and SoftEther.

T1608.002Upload ToolEvidence1

Webworm staged tools in its GitHub repo for direct download onto compromised systems.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence14

building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Flax Typhoon compromet une entreprise chimique taïwanaise via une application publique obsolète, en utilisant SoftEther VPN

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

It then uses PowerShell commands to download a batch malware file, which contains commands to install SoftEther VPN.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The threat actor exploited the MS-SQL server for command execution, which in turn downloaded additional payloads.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

The threat actor installs the SoftEther VPN on compromised public-facing servers... With the VPN server installed, the actor can then connect to the victim’s network to conduct their post-exploitation movements.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence14

building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

attack cases targeting domestic web servers running SoftEther VPN were identified

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"Detect the activity of a SoftEther VPN binary by detecting registry modifications... '...\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\...SoftEther...'"

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

attack cases targeting domestic web servers running SoftEther VPN were identified

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"Detect the activity of a SoftEther VPN binary by detecting registry modifications... '...\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\...SoftEther...'"

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence11

Common characteristics include disguising the SoftEther VPN executable as “vmtoolsd.Exe” or similar filenames

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

The SoftEther server executable is renamed to either taskllst.exe, tasklist.exe, or tasklist_32.exe ... and curl for the Linux executable

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

UAT-7237 exploits unpatched servers for initial access, then performs rapid reconnaissance using commands like nslookup, systeminfo, and ping before establishing persistence via SoftEther VPN and RDP rather than web shells.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims and performing brute-force attacks to obtain email credentials.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

For data staging and exfiltration, they frequently compressed findings into password-protected RAR archives.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Similarly, while both Flax Typhoon and Storm-0558 have used SoftEther VPN software for communication with victim devices, Storm-0558’s activities have targeted a wider variety of organizations than Flax Typhoon’s.

T1090ProxyEvidence9

The threat actors... installed Netch and CCProxy to use the infected systems as proxy nodes. Recently, they have been installing SoftEther VPN to exploit the infected systems as VPN servers.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence3

establish persistent tunneling infrastructure using SoftEther VPN, Yuze, and VNT, all disguised as VMware executables or XDR agents

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

« T1090.003 — Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (Command and Control) »

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence12

uses certutil commands to download and install the SoftEther VPN server

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence5

“The TA deployed a likely SoftEther VPN client to establish persistent access.”

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence5

With the VPN server installed, the actor can then connect to the victim’s network to conduct their post-exploitation movements.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

駭客在入侵政府機關內部的主機與伺服器後,為了要長期潛伏以及將獲取資料傳出,還會安裝 SoftEther VPN 程式,以連線到駭客指定的中繼站。

Indicators of compromise

Observables

55 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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malware newsNews · Oct 9, 2026CISA AA26-281A: How Chinese Government-Linked Actors Steal Sensitive Data - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsLegitimate VPN software explicitly abused in the intrusion for persistent remote access. Clients are disguised using executable names conhost.exe or dllhost.exe; the content does not describe a distinct malware family or modification of the software.Read more ↗mkd cirtNews · Oct 9, 2026ФБИ заплени седум домени и ги оневозможи алатките на групата Flax Typhoon користени за упади во критична инфраструктура | MKD-CIRT | Национален центар за одговор на компјутерски инцидентиLegitimate VPN software explicitly abused by attackers, who installed it on victim devices to retain access. The reference describes malicious persistence use, not a trojanized version or an inherently malicious malware family.Read more ↗ahnlab asec blogNews · Aug 10, 2026Attack Cases for Domestic Web Servers Running SoftEther VPN in Korea - ASECAn open-source VPN tool abused by the threat actor to turn compromised web and MS-SQL servers into VPN servers, likely for relay, persistence, and concealed command-and-control via cascade connections.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Feb 26, 2026Google GTIG disrupted China-linked APT UNC2814 halting attacks on 53 orgs in 42 countriesLegitimate VPN software abused post-compromise to establish an encrypted outbound connection (tunneling) from victim environments.Read more ↗
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IOC matching55Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors8Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.