SoftEther VPN
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- WindowsLinux
SoftEther VPN is legitimate open-source VPN software that threat actors abuse for persistent remote access, encrypted communications, and covert connectivity into compromised networks. Its client, server, and bridge components can connect victim systems to attacker-controlled VPN infrastructure or extend internal networks to remote locations. It is not inherently malware.
In malicious deployments, operators rename SoftEther binaries to resemble trusted operating-system or application components and configure services or startup execution to maintain access after reboot. Outbound encrypted connections, including HTTPS-based tunnels, help bypass network restrictions and conceal remote-access traffic. Some deployments use cascading VPN connections to upstream servers. SoftEther provides network access rather than credential-stealing or arbitrary-command-execution functionality; attackers use separate tools and protocols, including RDP, for subsequent operations.
Documented abuse includes activity tracked as Flax Typhoon, UAT-7237, GALLIUM/Red Dev 4, Soft Cell, UNC2814, and Larva-26010. Deployments have occurred in telecommunications, government, web-hosting, and critical-infrastructure environments, including Taiwanese organizations and Korean web and database servers. Attackers typically install the software after obtaining an initial foothold, using compromised servers, web shells, or command-line download utilities.
Associated threat actors
8 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Actors install SoftEther VPN clients disguised as conhost.exe or dllhost.exe to maintain stealthy, startup-persistent remote access.
The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.
The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.
The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.
The AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified attack cases in which attackers targeted web servers in Korea to install SoftEther VPN.
We will discuss some of the recent techniques we’ve seen Red Dev 4 use to maintain footholds within victim environments, such as the delivery of SoftEther VPN clients configured to connect to threat actor-owned infrastructure.
+2 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
Webworm makes use of SoftEther VPN servers that have been seen hosted on Vultr cloud services.
The group exploited vulnerable public-facing servers and installed SoftEther VPN on compromised servers.
Operators have used tools such as Impacket and SoftEther.
Webworm staged tools in its GitHub repo for direct download onto compromised systems.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.
building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims
Flax Typhoon compromet une entreprise chimique taïwanaise via une application publique obsolète, en utilisant SoftEther VPN
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
It then uses PowerShell commands to download a batch malware file, which contains commands to install SoftEther VPN.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003
The threat actor exploited the MS-SQL server for command execution, which in turn downloaded additional payloads.
The threat actor installs the SoftEther VPN on compromised public-facing servers... With the VPN server installed, the actor can then connect to the victim’s network to conduct their post-exploitation movements.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.
building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims
attack cases targeting domestic web servers running SoftEther VPN were identified
"Detect the activity of a SoftEther VPN binary by detecting registry modifications... '...\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\...SoftEther...'"
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.
attack cases targeting domestic web servers running SoftEther VPN were identified
"Detect the activity of a SoftEther VPN binary by detecting registry modifications... '...\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\...SoftEther...'"
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Common characteristics include disguising the SoftEther VPN executable as “vmtoolsd.Exe” or similar filenames
The SoftEther server executable is renamed to either taskllst.exe, tasklist.exe, or tasklist_32.exe ... and curl for the Linux executable
While monitoring attack cases targeting MS-SQL servers, the AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) identified an instance in which the Larva-26009 threat actor installed the XMRig CoinMiner.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
UAT-7237 exploits unpatched servers for initial access, then performs rapid reconnaissance using commands like nslookup, systeminfo, and ping before establishing persistence via SoftEther VPN and RDP rather than web shells.
building VPN servers on compromised public-facing servers to establish access into the private network of victims and performing brute-force attacks to obtain email credentials.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
For data staging and exfiltration, they frequently compressed findings into password-protected RAR archives.
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
Similarly, while both Flax Typhoon and Storm-0558 have used SoftEther VPN software for communication with victim devices, Storm-0558’s activities have targeted a wider variety of organizations than Flax Typhoon’s.
The threat actors... installed Netch and CCProxy to use the infected systems as proxy nodes. Recently, they have been installing SoftEther VPN to exploit the infected systems as VPN servers.
establish persistent tunneling infrastructure using SoftEther VPN, Yuze, and VNT, all disguised as VMware executables or XDR agents
« T1090.003 — Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (Command and Control) »
uses certutil commands to download and install the SoftEther VPN server
“The TA deployed a likely SoftEther VPN client to establish persistent access.”
With the VPN server installed, the actor can then connect to the victim’s network to conduct their post-exploitation movements.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
駭客在入侵政府機關內部的主機與伺服器後,為了要長期潛伏以及將獲取資料傳出,還會安裝 SoftEther VPN 程式,以連線到駭客指定的中繼站。
Observables
55 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.