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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

CCleaner

Tracked since Jan 16, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Fake update
Platforms
Windows

The CCleaner supply-chain malware is a multistage Windows backdoor embedded in legitimately signed releases of the CCleaner system-maintenance utility in 2017. It affected the 32-bit CCleaner 5.33 release distributed through official download servers between August 15 and September 12, 2017, and CCleaner Cloud 1.07.3191. The malicious implant is distinct from the legitimate utility and its separate use by threat actors for forensic cleanup.

The initial implant executed before normal application operation, decrypted and loaded malicious components into memory, and allowed CCleaner to continue functioning. It required an administrator context, collected and transmitted system information, and downloaded and executed additional shellcode. Its command-and-control mechanisms included HTTPS communications and a monthly domain generation algorithm for fallback connectivity. Defense-evasion measures included delayed execution, deletion of temporary payload data from memory, and removal of an in-memory executable header.

Selected corporate systems received a second-stage payload containing 32-bit and 64-bit components that abused modified Corel and Symantec DLLs. These components concealed malware in the Windows registry and compiler padding, transmitted host information, and could retrieve and execute a third-stage payload. Additional command-and-control discovery mechanisms used web-hosted messages and DNS-derived address computation. The attacker's identity and country of origin were not reliably established.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-14883via sekoia blogRemote Code Execution in Oracle WebLogic Server Administrative ConsoleCCleaner is a loader written in .NET that performs the following actions:View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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8220 Gang

CCleaner is a loader written in .NET that performs the following actions:

via sekoia blogblog.sekoia.io
APT17

The backdoor in CCleaner called home to receive the second stage payload which we found in the server dump under the name GeeSetup_x86.dll.

via avast blogblog.avast.com
APT28

APT28 has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

The injection of malicious code at the source code level of the compromised software... The injection of malicious code inside C/C++ compiler runtime (CRT) libraries...

Execution

1 technique
T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Method 2 is far more insidious since any tampering in the code is not visible to the developer or any source code parser; the malicious code is introduced at the time of compilation/linking.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The attackers also followed the same anti-forensic procedure, renaming malicious files to random four-character names before deleting them. Plainbit observed additional evidence destruction using SDelete and CCleaner.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Method 2 is far more insidious since any tampering in the code is not visible to the developer or any source code parser; the malicious code is introduced at the time of compilation/linking.

Impact

1 technique
T1485Data DestructionEvidence2

Data Destruction [T1485]: Most of the time, data destruction is aimed at the destruction of forensic artifacts via the use of SDelete or CCleaner. Unfortunately, sometimes ransomware actors destroy production data stores

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.