CCleaner
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Fake update
- Platforms
- Windows
The CCleaner supply-chain malware is a multistage Windows backdoor embedded in legitimately signed releases of the CCleaner system-maintenance utility in 2017. It affected the 32-bit CCleaner 5.33 release distributed through official download servers between August 15 and September 12, 2017, and CCleaner Cloud 1.07.3191. The malicious implant is distinct from the legitimate utility and its separate use by threat actors for forensic cleanup.
The initial implant executed before normal application operation, decrypted and loaded malicious components into memory, and allowed CCleaner to continue functioning. It required an administrator context, collected and transmitted system information, and downloaded and executed additional shellcode. Its command-and-control mechanisms included HTTPS communications and a monthly domain generation algorithm for fallback connectivity. Defense-evasion measures included delayed execution, deletion of temporary payload data from memory, and removal of an in-memory executable header.
Selected corporate systems received a second-stage payload containing 32-bit and 64-bit components that abused modified Corel and Symantec DLLs. These components concealed malware in the Windows registry and compiler padding, transmitted host information, and could retrieve and execute a third-stage payload. Additional command-and-control discovery mechanisms used web-hosted messages and DNS-derived address computation. The attacker's identity and country of origin were not reliably established.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CCleaner is a loader written in .NET that performs the following actions:
The backdoor in CCleaner called home to receive the second stage payload which we found in the server dump under the name GeeSetup_x86.dll.
APT28 has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.
Techniques & procedures
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
The injection of malicious code at the source code level of the compromised software... The injection of malicious code inside C/C++ compiler runtime (CRT) libraries...
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Method 2 is far more insidious since any tampering in the code is not visible to the developer or any source code parser; the malicious code is introduced at the time of compilation/linking.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
The attackers also followed the same anti-forensic procedure, renaming malicious files to random four-character names before deleting them. Plainbit observed additional evidence destruction using SDelete and CCleaner.
Method 2 is far more insidious since any tampering in the code is not visible to the developer or any source code parser; the malicious code is introduced at the time of compilation/linking.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Data Destruction [T1485]: Most of the time, data destruction is aimed at the destruction of forensic artifacts via the use of SDelete or CCleaner. Unfortunately, sometimes ransomware actors destroy production data stores
Observables
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.