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FileZilla is a legitimate third-party file transfer client that has been observed used by threat actors as an exfiltration tool rather than as malware in its own right. In the provided reporting, Arctic Wolf documented use of WinSCP and FileZilla for exfiltration over alternative, non-C2 protocols, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1048.003 (Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol). The activity was observed in ransomware intrusions involving Akira and Fog affiliates during August-October 2024, where attackers commonly gained early access via SonicWall SSL VPN accounts, then moved rapidly through discovery, credential access, lateral movement, and impact actions. Fog affiliates were specifically observed exfiltrating data to increase ransom leverage, including theft from general business folders and more sensitive HR/accounts-payable data. The content also notes threat actor use of third-party tools such as MegaSync, Rclone, FileZilla, and Windows Secure Copy for data theft. No standalone malicious functionality, infection vector, or malware-specific indicators of compromise for FileZilla are provided in the content.
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13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Technique Technique ID Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol ... Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocol T1071.002
Associated Tools • FileZilla where not expected (file transfer)
“Exfiltration via Rclone, WinSCP, FileZilla, or MegaSync to attacker-controlled cloud storage.”
~77 Go de données exfiltrés via FileZilla (SFTP) vers 185.174.100.203:22 en deux sessions
After creating archives containing collected files, affiliates used different softwares to exfiltrate several gigabytes of data: WinSCP and FileZilla.
The attacker’s first exfiltration method was conventional: FileZilla and FTP to an external IP address. Egress filtering blocked the attempt.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
FTP client abused for data transfer/exfiltration during the intrusions.
FTP client referenced as being used by threat actors for data transfer/exfiltration.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.