DoiLoader
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
For TA2727, payloads are tailored... Windows typically receives DoiLoader and LummaStealer...
Techniques & procedures
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 techniqueMessages contained URLs leading to a website instructing the recipient to sign a form and click “submit”. Then, the user would be redirected to a ClickFix landing page.
Execution
1 technique"Victims are prompted to download and run a fake application..." and "instructions ... urges targets to run an executable file (\"setup.exe\")"
Stealth
1 technique"threat actors are exploiting the situation to distribute Remcos RAT ... under the guise of providing a hotfix" and "phishing email impersonating CrowdStrike recruitment"
Collection
1 techniqueIf the target completed the ClickFix steps as instructed, a command was initiated to download a tar archive and run CastleLoader.
Command and Control
1 techniqueThis macro downloaded a .bin file containing shellcode and executed it
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.