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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

UPX

UPX is a common public executable packer referenced across multiple malware campaigns as a packing/obfuscation layer rather than as a malware family itself. In the provided reporting, it is used to pack diverse malware including Rust-based P2Pinfect samples recovered from compromised Google Kubernetes Engine/Redis environments, GoBruteforcer Golang botnet binaries targeting phpMyAdmin/MySQL/FTP/Postgres services on Unix-like systems, C++ DLL implants used in archive-based intrusion chains targeting Ukraine and Poland, and an AutoIT backdoor associated with the Dropping Elephant/Patchwork espionage actor. The content also notes attackers sometimes use unaltered versions of common public packers such as UPX. High-confidence details from the content indicate packed samples included Linux and Windows payloads, DLL implants, and botnet/backdoor components; however, UPX itself is described only as the packer used to compress or obfuscate those malicious binaries, not as the malware performing the intrusion or post-compromise actions. No standalone infection vector, C2, or IoCs specific to UPX itself are provided beyond its repeated use as the packing method.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Patchwork

“The backdoor is usually UPX packed...”

via securelistsecurelist.com
FrostyNeighbor

The implant is a C++ DLL ... and has been packed with UPX.

via harfanglab insidethelabharfanglab.io
UNC1151

The implant is a C++ DLL ... and has been packed with UPX.

via harfanglab insidethelabharfanglab.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Running file on it shows something odd: crypt: ELF 64-bit MSB *unknown arch 0x3e00* (SYSV) The ELF header has its endianness byte set to 02 (big-endian) instead of 01 (little-endian) — intentional obfuscation. The hexdump also reveals a UPX signature embedded inside.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence9
TacticStealth

T1027.002 – Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing. The soc.dll file used by the Threat Actor was packed with UPX/modified UPX, an open-source packer, to conceal the content of the file.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

We fix the header and unpack: python3 -c " data = bytearray(open('crypt','rb').read()) data[5] = 0x01 open('crypt_fixed','wb').write(bytes(data)) " # Unpack with UPX upx -d crypt_fixed -o crypt_unpacked

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

GDB isn’t able to execute the breakpoints, either software or hardware... But we could miss important stuff in other packers and this could be a good anti-debug trick.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Performs memory scanning of /proc/$pid/exe against signatures for known competing botnets: QBOT/Bashlite variants... UPX-packed binaries... Zollard worm... Remaiten...

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

GDB isn’t able to execute the breakpoints, either software or hardware... But we could miss important stuff in other packers and this could be a good anti-debug trick.

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.