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Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs29Tracked

SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE is a malicious JavaScript payload used in ESET-tracked Operation RoundPress. It is injected into vulnerable Roundcube webmail instances via spearphishing emails that exploit XSS flaws in the webmail interface; the payload executes when the victim opens the malicious email in a vulnerable Roundcube portal. ESET reported Roundcube exploitation in 2023 and 2024, including CVE-2020-35730 and CVE-2023-43770. The broader campaign is assessed with medium confidence by ESET to be run by Sednit, also known as APT28, Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, and Sofacy, with the goal of stealing confidential data from selected email accounts. Observed targeting primarily involved governmental entities and defense-related organizations, especially in Eastern Europe and organizations connected to the war in Ukraine, with additional victims in Africa, Europe, and South America. Once deobfuscated, SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE is described as having functionality similar to SpyPress.MDAEMON: credential theft, exfiltration of the address book and the about page, exfiltration of emails, and creation of malicious Sieve rules. Some samples can log victims out and capture credentials when they reauthenticate through the legitimate login form, and some create Sieve rules that forward copies of incoming emails to an attacker-controlled address. The payload is obfuscated, uses randomized variable and function names, decrypts strings only when needed, lacks true persistence, and is reloaded whenever the victim reopens the malicious email. SpyPress payloads exfiltrate stolen data to hardcoded command-and-control servers via HTTP POST requests, typically with base64-encoded content. Reported SpyPress C2 infrastructure includes sqj[.]fr, tgh24[.]xyz, tuo[.]world, lsjb[.]digital, jiaw[.]shop, hfuu[.]de, raxia[.]top, rnl[.]world, hijx[.]xyz, and ikses[.]net.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-35730via gist jcranStored XSS in Roundcube Webmail link-reference handlingPatch Roundcube to the latest release; the injection vector is a known Roundcube XSS CVE (e.g., CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2023-43770, CVE-2024-37383).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-37383via gist jcranStored XSS via SVG animate attributes in Roundcube WebmailPatch Roundcube to the latest release; the injection vector is a known Roundcube XSS CVE (e.g., CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2023-43770, CVE-2024-37383).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-43770via gist jcranCross-site scripting in Roundcube plain-text email link handlingPatch Roundcube to the latest release; the injection vector is a known Roundcube XSS CVE (e.g., CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2023-43770, CVE-2024-37383).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE is the JavaScript payload injected into vulnerable Roundcube webmail instances. Once deobfuscated, it reveals similar functionalities to what is implemented in SpyPress.MDAEMON: credential stealing, exfiltration of the address book and the about page, exfiltration of emails, and malicious Sieve rules.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
APT29

"The attackers unleash JavaScript payloads SpyPress.HORDE, SpyPress.MDAEMON, SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE, and SpyPress.ZIMBRA upon the targets."

via help net securityhelpnetsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Sednit bought domains at various registrars.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

Sednit rented servers at M247 and other hosting providers.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Sednit developed JavaScript stealers (SpyPress.HORDE, SpyPress.MDAEMON, SpyPress.ROUNDCUBE, and SpyPress.ZIMBRA) to steal data from webmail servers.

T1587.004ExploitsEvidence1

Sednit developed (or acquired) XSS exploits for Roundcube, Zimbra, Horde, and MDaemon.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Sednit exploited known and zero-day vulnerabilities in webmail software to execute JavaScript code in the context of the victim’s webmail window.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

SpyPress is a family of malicious JavaScript payloads... The payload runs inside an authenticated Roundcube session

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

the operation exploits cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Roundcube, Horde, MDaemon, and Zimbra webmail to inject JavaScript

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

SpyPress payloads are obfuscated with an unknown JavaScript obfuscator.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Hooks the input[name=_pass] field; if empty, attaches a change listener and waits for the victim to type. POSTs _user + _pass + parent .username to the C2.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

SpyPress payloads try to steal webmail credentials by creating a hidden login form, to trick the browser and password managers into filling the credentials.

T1187Forced AuthenticationEvidence1

SpyPress payloads can log out users to entice them into entering their credentials in a fake login form.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Uses the victim's CSRF token ( window.rcmail.env.request_token ) to call ?_task=addressbook&_source=0&_action=export

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Harvests login credentials. Hooks the input[name=_pass] field... POSTs _user + _pass + parent .username to the C2.

Discovery

1 technique
T1087.003Email AccountEvidence1

SpyPress payloads get information about the email account, such as the contact list.

Collection

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Hooks the input[name=_pass] field; if empty, attaches a change listener and waits for the victim to type. POSTs _user + _pass + parent .username to the C2.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

SpyPress payloads try to steal webmail credentials by creating a hidden login form, to trick the browser and password managers into filling the credentials.

T1114.002Remote Email CollectionEvidence1

SpyPress payloads collect and exfiltrate emails, from the victim’s mailbox.

T1114.003Email Forwarding RuleEvidence1

SpyPress.MDAEMON adds a Sieve rule to forward any incoming email to an attacker-controlled email address.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

SpyPress payloads automatically collect credentials and email messages.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

exfiltrates address books, contacts, login history, and email messages

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

all exfiltrating to the same C2 endpoint via HTTP POST

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

In case of email forwarding rules, the exfiltration is done via email.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Data is base64 encoded before being sent to the C&C server.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

SpyPress payloads automatically exfiltrate credentials and email messages to the C&C server.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

all exfiltrating to the same C2 endpoint via HTTP POST... Exfiltration primitive: fetch(C2, {method:'POST', body: <stolen data>})

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.