CopperStealer
- Type
- Infostealer
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationDefense evasionPost exploitation
- Delivery
- Cracked softwarePhishing
- Platforms
- Windows
CopperStealer is a Windows malware family centered on browser credential and cookie theft, with additional downloader functionality and later cryptocurrency-focused extensions. Active since at least 2019, it has been used to steal saved browser credentials, session cookies, and account data from major online platforms, including social media, e-commerce, payment, and web service providers. A prominent objective has been the takeover and monetization of Facebook and Instagram business and advertiser accounts, using stolen cookies and credentials to obtain access tokens and enumerate associated assets. Later activity linked to the same ecosystem expanded into cryptocurrency theft through a malicious Chromium-based browser extension that harvested exchange account information, captured or created API keys, stole two-factor authentication codes through fake prompts, and initiated unauthorized transfers from victim wallets.
CopperStealer has commonly been distributed through fake crack, keygen, and warez sites, and has also been associated with pay-per-install distribution. In some campaigns it was bundled with other malware and potentially unwanted software, and its downloader capability enabled delivery of additional payloads after initial theft activity. Observed follow-on payloads have included SmokeLoader, and one delivery chain abused the legitimate Xunlei download manager to retrieve subsequent malware.
The malware incorporates multiple anti-analysis and resilience features, including debugger and virtualization checks, locale-based execution filtering, encrypted command-and-control traffic over HTTP, and an evolving domain generation scheme supplemented in later variants by backup infrastructure. It has searched multiple browsers for stored credentials and cookies, including Chromium-based browsers and Firefox. In cryptocurrency-focused deployments, the associated malicious extension modified Chromium browser settings to install itself persistently and targeted a broad range of Chromium-derived browsers.
CopperStealer is associated with the threat actor tracked as Water Orthrus, which has been linked to broader financially motivated activity involving ad injection, personal information theft, cryptocurrency theft, and later campaigns such as CopperStealth and CopperPhish. Multiple researchers have noted similarities between CopperStealer and other Chinese-linked malware used to monetize compromised online accounts, including overlap in tradecraft, delivery patterns, and infrastructure style. The family is best characterized as an infostealer with downloader functionality that evolved into a broader criminal toolkit for account compromise and financial theft.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Since 2021, we have been tracking the activities of a threat actor we called Water Orthrus, which distributed CopperStealer malware via pay-per-install (PPI) networks. The threat actor has upgraded and modified the malware multiple times for different purposes, such as injecting network advertisements, acquiring personal information, and stealing cryptocurrency. We believe that they are associated with the threat campaign reported as “Scranos” in 2019.
Techniques & procedures
24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Proofpoint researchers observed suspicious websites advertised as “KeyGen” or “Crack” sites ... These sites advertise themselves to offer “cracks”, “keygen” and “serials” to circumvent licensing restrictions of legitimate software.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
The first campaign distributed CopperStealth on March 8, 2023, delivering the malware via installers provided on a popular Chinese software sharing website. It disguised the malware as free software and targeted the country’s users.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The analyzed sample extracts a 7z archive named xldl.dat ... and then executes one of the extracted files (ThunderFW.exe ... ) via: C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Local\Temp\download\ThunderFW.exe ThunderFW "C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Local\Temp\download\MiniThunderPlatform.exe"
Similar to previous routines, this new component is spread via fake crack (also known as warez) websites.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
A newly installed extension is also added to the extension installation allow list located in the registry.
we found a malicious browser extension capable of creating and stealing API keys from infected machines when the victim is logged in to a major cryptocurrency exchange website.
the routine responsible for stealing the 2FA passwords from the victims... The modal window has input boxes... they are concatenated into one “tfa” (2FA) variable and sent as a parameter of “createApi” message to the background script.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The analyzed sample also can drop and load a kernel driver ... The purpose of this driver is currently unknown.
This component uses the same cryptor described in previous posts in the first stage, followed by the second stage wherein the decrypted DLL is Ultimate Packer Executables-(UPX) packed... Both Javascript files are heavily obfuscated.
The analyzed sample created a mutex called "Global\exist_sign_install_r3" while other samples have created related mutexes
Device enumeration looking for indicators of virtualization
The malware does make use of several basic anti-analysis techniques to avoid running within researcher systems. IsDebuggerPresent() check GetSystemDefaultLCID() == 0x804 ... Window/class enumeration looking for common analysis tools ... Device enumeration looking for indicators of virtualization
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
A newly installed extension is also added to the extension installation allow list located in the registry.
A certificate ... related to Charles Proxy is loaded into the victim machine's "My" and "Trusted Root" certificates stores.
the routine responsible for stealing the 2FA passwords from the victims... The modal window has input boxes... they are concatenated into one “tfa” (2FA) variable and sent as a parameter of “createApi” message to the background script.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
The malware contains the ability to find and send saved browser passwords. The following Internet browsers are searched specifically for Facebook saved credentials: Chrome Edge Yandex Opera Firefox
In addition to the saved browser passwords, the malware uses stored cookies to retrieve a User Access Token from Facebook.
the routine responsible for stealing the 2FA passwords from the victims... The modal window has input boxes... they are concatenated into one “tfa” (2FA) variable and sent as a parameter of “createApi” message to the background script.
we found a malicious browser extension capable of creating and stealing API keys from infected machines... If successful, the background script then continues with extracting two API keys (API Key and API Secret) from the “API key details” form, saves them to Chromium’s local storage for later use, and exfiltrates them
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Device enumeration looking for indicators of virtualization
The malware does make use of several basic anti-analysis techniques to avoid running within researcher systems. IsDebuggerPresent() check GetSystemDefaultLCID() == 0x804 ... Window/class enumeration looking for common analysis tools ... Device enumeration looking for indicators of virtualization
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
The first one is a GET request to http://<C&C server>/traffic/chrome... the data contains the domains of cryptocurrency-related websites based on the cookies found in the machine
Once the User Access Token is gathered, the malware requests several API endpoints for Facebook and Instagram to gather additional context, including a list of friends, any advertisement accounts configured for the user and a list of pages the user has been granted access
This bundle is compressed into a password-protected archive and has been distributed in the wild since July.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The first one is a GET request to http://<C&C server>/traffic/chrome ... The second query is a POST request to http:// <C&C server>/traffic/domain ... The result of this request is also exfiltrated to http://<C&C server>/traffic/step .
CopperStealer’s downloader function retrieves a download configuration from the c2 server. The analyzed sample extracts a 7z archive named xldl.dat ... and then executes one of the extracted files
the malware uses a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) in order to generate new command and control servers on a daily basis.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
CopperStealer sends the exfiltrated data to the C2 server via a POST request to a variety of target specific URIs
Impact
1 technique
Impact
If the wallet balance is non-zero, it attempts to send 85% of the available funds to the attacker-controlled wallet.
Observables
72 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.