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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In this article, we will deep dive into internals works and key components of a new sample of the DHCSpy Android spyware family... DHCSpy is a malicious spyware disguised as a VPN application, built on edited open-source OpenVPN code.
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The exported activity com.p003bl.bl_vpn.activities.MainActivity is configured to intercept browsable HTTPS links to https://www.google.com/* via an intent filter. This technique can be used in a malicious way to steal user information... sensitive OAuth credentials are sent to the malicious app. In this particular version of the malware, this feature is not utilized
ConfigRequestBodyModel - Deep Sytem and Application Info Field Description IMSI_1 / IMSI_2 Subscriber IDs (can reveal SIM country/operator) SIM_1 / SIM_2 SIM card info
14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Android spyware disguised as VPN applications. It contacts C2 servers to fetch VPN/OpenVPN configuration and tasking, requests runtime permissions based on server-provided command bits, steals device information, contacts, call logs, accounts, and files including WhatsApp databases, screenshots, recordings, and camera files, compresses stolen data, and exfiltrates it over SFTP. It also includes persistence-oriented behavior such as boot startup and Xiaomi autostart prompting, and supports remote APK update/install.
Malware deployed in campaigns attributed to MuddyWater (no further capability details provided in the content).
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.