RagnarLocker is a Windows ransomware family used in human-operated extortion attacks against enterprises and critical infrastructure organizations since at least 2020. It is associated with the cybercriminal group tracked as Viking Spider, and UNC2447-affiliated actors have also deployed it. Victims span manufacturing, energy, financial services, government, information technology, healthcare, and gaming. Its operators combine file encryption with data theft and threats to publish stolen information, and have used DDoS attacks as additional extortion pressure.
RagnarLocker is notable for executing its encryption payload inside an attacker-deployed Windows XP virtual machine using Oracle VirtualBox. Access to host resources through shared folders enables encryption of host files while reducing visibility to host-based security products. The malware also uses VMProtect, UPX, and custom packing. Before encryption, it checks system locale settings and exits for a defined set of languages associated with Commonwealth of Independent States countries and neighboring states. It collects host and user identifiers, enumerates storage volumes, and assigns drive letters to otherwise unmounted volumes so they can be encrypted. It terminates selected backup, security, and remote-administration services and attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies to inhibit recovery. Encryption excludes selected operating-system and application resources, and checks for existing encryption markers to avoid processing files repeatedly.
RagnarLocker intrusions have involved RDP access using stolen credentials, Cobalt Strike, and exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing infrastructure. In the Capcom intrusion disclosed in November 2020, attackers entered through an unpatched VPN device before pivoting to additional systems. These intrusion and data-exfiltration activities are conducted through the wider attacker toolchain rather than necessarily by the ransomware executable itself. In 2023, an international law enforcement operation disrupted RagnarLocker infrastructure, seized its data-leak portal, and arrested an alleged principal operator. RagnarLocker is distinct from the similarly named Ragnarok ransomware.
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
A 2021 report by Mandiant notes the group had previously deployed RagnarLocker.
In November 2020, the company announced it was hit by a crippling ransomware attack. The attack was orchestrated by the RagnarLocker group.
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP...
Может распространяться путём... обманных загрузок... вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений...
For Egregor, initial access was gained through the use of the QakBot banking Trojan, the targeting of unpatched Virtual Private Network (VPN) appliances...
Может распространяться путём... email-спама и вредоносных вложений...
VirtualBox имеет функцию, которая позволяет операционной системе хоста обмениваться папками и дисками как сетевым ресурсом внутри виртуальной машины... \VBOXSVR
Может распространяться путём... эксплойтов...
Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP...
Finally, to execute the txt in the default session in which the RagnarLocker has worked, it performs an Interactive window station in which we will see how it gets the session identifier, the process that is running the Ransomware, duplicate your token, get the session, and so on, to spawn the file in the session
Finally, to execute the txt in the default session in which the RagnarLocker has worked, it performs an Interactive window station in which we will see how it gets the session identifier, the process that is running the Ransomware, duplicate your token, get the session, and so on, to spawn the file in the session
RagnarLocker uses VMProtect, UPX, and custom packing algorithms
RagnarLocker uses VMProtect, UPX, and custom packing algorithms
Удаляет теневые копии файлов командами: WMIC.exe shadowcopy delete ... vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
The malware then attempts to silently delete all Volume Shadow Copies, preventing user recovery of encrypted files, using two different methods: vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe.shadowcopy.delete.
“To mask active file-system activity from monitoring tools, ransomware gangs sometimes run the entire encryption process inside a virtual machine deployed on the victim’s computer.”
Ragnar Locker uses Windows API GetLocaleInfoW to identify the location of the infected machine. If the victim location is identified as 'Azerbaijani,' 'Armenian,' 'Belorussian,' 'Kazakh,' 'Kyrgyz,' 'Moldavian,' 'Tajik,' 'Russian,' 'Turkmen,' 'Uzbek,' 'Ukrainian,' or 'Georgian,' the process terminates.
«банды вымогателей иногда разворачивают весь процесс шифрования в установленной на компьютере жертвы виртуальной машине, чтобы замаскировать от мониторинга активную деятельность в файловой системе. Шифровальщик RagnarLocker применял VirtualBox, а в кампании CRON#TRAP использовалась среда QEMU».
After identifying disks to be encrypted, it is dedicated to enumerate services, in which, we can see that it uses the EnumServiceStatusA
as well as the MachineGUID of the computer using the Microsoft RegKey Crypthography or the ProductName using the RegKey Windows NT\Current Version
Later, it obtains the computer name and user data
The binary gathers the unique machine GUID, operating system product name, and user name currently running the process.
After identifying disks to be encrypted... Later, it will try to encrypt the files avoiding some folders, files and extensions that it will also check in memory, avoiding touching what it does not need to encrypt
RagnarLocker identifies all attached hard drives using Windows APIs: CreateFileW, DeviceIoControl, GetLogicalDrives, and SetVolumeMountPointA.
“To mask active file-system activity from monitoring tools, ransomware gangs sometimes run the entire encryption process inside a virtual machine deployed on the victim’s computer.”
Ragnar Locker uses Windows API GetLocaleInfoW to identify the location of the infected machine. If the victim location is identified as 'Azerbaijani,' 'Armenian,' 'Belorussian,' 'Kazakh,' 'Kyrgyz,' 'Moldavian,' 'Tajik,' 'Russian,' 'Turkmen,' 'Uzbek,' 'Ukrainian,' or 'Georgian,' the process terminates.
Перед шифрованием проверяет расположение компьютера... использует функцию "GetLocaleInfoW", чтобы получить язык системы пользователя... Затем будет проверен системный язык...
Вымогатели, распространяющие RagnarLocker, могут публиковать украденные данные с целью усиления давления на жертву... операторы-вымогатели начинают кражу данных ещё перед шифрованием файлов.
C2 embedded in malware (snmp.dat and bash.dat and esync.exe)
IP address involved in data exfiltration
the Egregor operators stole unencrypted files from the company and leaked a 380MB archive on its darknet leak site
The crooks steal sensitive data, encrypt a victim's systems, and threaten to leak the stolen documents if the ransom to restore the files isn't paid. To date, the Ragnar Locker criminals have posted stolen data from at least ten organizations on their publicity website.
“ransomware gangs sometimes run the entire encryption process inside a virtual machine” and “RagnarLocker ransomware strain has used VirtualBox for this purpose.”
Перед шифрованием завершает работу следующих служб, среди которых есть программы для удаленного управления: vss sql memtas mepocs sophos veeam... | в случае совпадения вредонос прекратит работу ("TerminateProcess") с кодом ошибки 0x29A.
Удаляет теневые копии файлов командами: WMIC.exe shadowcopy delete ... vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
Triple extortion follows a straightforward formula: adding DDoS attacks to the aforementioned encryption and data exposure threats.
Кроме того, используют DDoS-атаки, чтобы заставить жертву связаться с ними и договориться о выкупе.
The portal, which the gang used to extort its victims by publishing their stolen data... If a victim refused to pay or notified law enforcement of the intrusion, the hackers would publish the victim’s data on the group’s since-seized dark web site.
41 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.