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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

VSingle

Tracked since Jan 21, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK31Techniques
IOCs97Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
Platforms
LinuxWindows

VSingle is a Lazarus-associated multi-platform backdoor used in North Korean espionage operations. It has been observed in intrusions against organizations including energy-sector targets, often after exploitation of internet-facing enterprise software such as VMware Horizon. Security reporting has documented both Windows and Linux variants, with the malware used to establish long-term access, receive remote tasking over HTTP, and support follow-on operations including data theft and deployment of additional payloads.

On Windows, VSingle has been described as a multi-layer implant that injects shellcode into a spawned benign process and reflectively loads a DLL payload. It supports arbitrary command execution, reverse shell access, file transfer, downloading and executing plugins, updating itself, reporting host information, and uninstalling itself. Reported plugin support includes executable content and in-memory shellcode execution. VSingle has also been observed persisting through multiple mechanisms including services, scheduled tasks, Startup-folder entries, and Run-key autostart.

On Linux, newer VSingle variants include fallback logic to retrieve updated command-and-control information from attacker-controlled GitHub repositories when hard-coded servers are unavailable. These variants use command-line web retrieval utilities for network communications, store responses in temporary files, and exfiltrate command output via HTTP POST after Base64 encoding. Across variants, VSingle uses encrypted or obfuscated communications and has been reported to obtain encrypted tasking from HTTP responses.

VSingle is closely associated with Lazarus Group activity and has been reported alongside other Lazarus malware families including YamaBot and MagicRAT. It has been used as a durable post-compromise implant in hands-on-keyboard intrusions involving reconnaissance, credential access, lateral movement, and exfiltration. Targeting has included Windows and Linux systems in enterprise environments, with reporting highlighting campaigns affecting organizations in the United States, Canada, Japan, and other regions.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-44228via talosintelligence otherExploited in the wildLog4ShellThe initial vector was the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability on exposed VMware Horizon servers... Cisco Talos identified the exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability on VmWare Horizon public-facing servers as the initial attack vector. | Talos has discovered the use of two known families of malware in these intrusions — VSingle and YamaBot. ... followed by the deployment of the group's custom malware implants, VSingle and YamaBot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Talos has discovered the use of two known families of malware in these intrusions — VSingle and YamaBot. ... followed by the deployment of the group's custom malware implants, VSingle and YamaBot.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1590Gather Victim Network InformationEvidence1

After the interactive shell is established, the attackers perform a preliminary reconnaissance on the endpoint to get network information and directory listings [T1083], [T1590], [T1518].

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Cisco Talos identified the exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability on VmWare Horizon public-facing servers as the initial attack vector [T1190].

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

schTasks /Create /F /TN "%s" /TR "%s" /SC onlogon Scheduled task triggered at logon [T1053/005]

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

cmd.exe /c %s... ValeforBeta commands... Execute arbitrary shell command... Uninstall (Executes cmd /c ping -n 4 127.0.0.1 >NUL & echo VFB > "file name of itself")

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

During actual communication, the following commands are executed. sh - c "wget -t 1 --server-response --no-check-certificate ..."

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

schTasks /Create /F /TN "%s" /TR "%s" /SC onlogon Scheduled task triggered at logon [T1053/005]

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

sc create "%s" DisplayName= "%s" type= own type= interact start= auto error= ignore binpath= "cmd.exe /k start \"\" \"%s\" Auto start Service Creation [T1543/003]

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ /v "%s" /t REG_SZ /d "%s" /f Run registry key [T1547/001]

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

schTasks /Create /F /TN "%s" /TR "%s" /SC onlogon Scheduled task triggered at logon [T1053/005]

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The implant spawns a new 'explorer.exe' process and injects shellcode (layer 3) into it for execution.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Once launched, this malware runs Explorer and executes its main code through DLL injection. (Some samples do not perform DLL injection.)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

sc create "%s" DisplayName= "%s" type= own type= interact start= auto error= ignore binpath= "cmd.exe /k start \"\" \"%s\" Auto start Service Creation [T1543/003]

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ /v "%s" /t REG_SZ /d "%s" /f Run registry key [T1547/001]

Stealth

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The implant spawns a new 'explorer.exe' process and injects shellcode (layer 3) into it for execution.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Once launched, this malware runs Explorer and executes its main code through DLL injection. (Some samples do not perform DLL injection.)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Most of the strings in VSingle are obfuscated... A fixed key value ... decodes the strings by XOR... Data after 0x05 is XOR-encoded... The command execution result is XOR-encoded.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The current version of VSingle uses wget command to communicate with the C2 server while the previous versions used system call.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=allow RemoteDesktop dir=in protocol=TCP localport=3389 action=allow Modify Firewall [T1562/004]

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

cmd.exe /c reg save hklm\sam <local_path>\zsam.tmp Credential harvesting [T1003]

T1003.003NTDSEvidence1

cmd.exe /C copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit <local_path>\phPzFvOU.tmp ... OS Credential Dumping: NTDS [T1003/003]

T1003.005Cached Domain CredentialsEvidence1

The attackers also force the system to cache credentials so that it is possible to harvest them afterward [T1003/005]. reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

powershell.exe Get-NetUser 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\<impacket_log_file> 2>&1 User Discovery [T1033]

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

systeminfo & ipconfig /all & netstat -naop tcp & tasklist & net user & net view & arp -a System Information Discovery [T1082]

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

After the interactive shell is established, the attackers perform a preliminary reconnaissance on the endpoint to get network information and directory listings [T1083], [T1590], [T1518].

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

After the interactive shell is established, the attackers perform a preliminary reconnaissance on the endpoint to get network information and directory listings [T1083], [T1590], [T1518].

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

reg.exe add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d 3389 /f Configure RDP [T1021/001]

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

VSingle deployment on new hosts was done by using WMIC to start a remote process. This process was, in fact, a PowerShell snippet that would download VSingle from a remote system.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

<local_path>\rar.exe a <local_path>\zzzzz.tmp <local_path>\zs*.tmp Archive Collected Data [T1560]

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Recently, the malware used by Lazarus VSingle has been updated to retrieve C2 servers information from GitHub.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

As for the command execution results, the contents of the file (/tmp/.sess_%04x) in which the execution results are saved are Base64-encoded and sent via HTTP POST communication as shown below.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

These two tools working together create a proxy on the victim system which has its listening port 'exported' to a port on a remote host.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The GitHub repository used by the attacker includes a URL in the <videolink1> tag, as shown in Figure 2. The malware obtains this URL from the GitHub repository and connects to it.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

The data after <contents> in this data is the AES key, IV data and command (with Base64+RC4).

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

the contents of the file (/tmp/.sess_%04x) in which the execution results are saved are Base64-encoded and sent via HTTP POST communication

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Some types of malware use DGA, obfuscate destination information, or contain fake C2 server information in order to hide the original C2 server. Others obtain C2 server information from legitimate servers. Recently, the malware used by Lazarus VSingle has been updated to retrieve C2 servers information from GitHub.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

The GitHub repository from which the communication is obtained is not fixed but dynamically generated. The following is the pattern of URLs to be accessed.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

As a response to this request, AES-encrypted data including commands is downloaded from the server. The encryption key is specified in Set-Cookie header... The command execution result is XOR-encoded.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

97 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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talos intelligence blogNews · Aug 24, 2023Lazarus Group's infrastructure reuse leads to discovery of new malwareNamed Lazarus-associated malware family used alongside MagicRAT in the referenced campaign; specific functionality not detailed in the provided content.Read more ↗talos intelligence blogNews · Sep 8, 2022Lazarus and the tale of three RATsCustom Lazarus-developed multi-stage backdoor/RAT used post-exploitation for long-term access. Implements layered loader + injected shellcode leading to a reflectively loaded DLL implant; supports reverse shell, command execution via cmd.exe, downloading/executing additional plugins (shellcode/scripts/executables), and multiple persistence mechanisms (Startup folder, service creation, Run key, scheduled tasks). Used for recon, exfiltration, and manual backdooring (e.g., creating admin users, enabling RDP-related settings).Read more ↗talosintelligence otherNews · Sep 8, 2022Lazarus and the tale of three RATsA Lazarus-developed multi-layer MFC-based backdoor/RAT used to establish long-term access. It injects shellcode through multiple stages, opens a reverse shell, downloads and executes additional plugins or payloads, supports persistence via services/Run keys/scheduled tasks/startup folders, and is used for reconnaissance, exfiltration, and lateral movement support.Read more ↗talos intelligence blogNews · Sep 7, 2022MagicRAT: Lazarus’ latest gateway into victim networksCustom Lazarus-attributed implant observed being deployed after MagicRAT removal in some infections.Read more ↗
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IOC matching97Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping31Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.