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Malware1 associated actor

FormerFirstRat

Tracked since Jan 21, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitation
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

FormerFirstRAT is a custom Windows backdoor associated with the DragonOK intrusion set and observed in targeted operations against Japanese organizations, including manufacturing and high-technology entities. It appeared as a follow-on payload in phishing-led campaigns in which first-stage malware established an initial foothold and then enabled deployment of additional remote-access tooling.

The malware provides remote administration capabilities typical of an operator-controlled backdoor. It gathers host profiling data including user and system attributes, privilege context, operating system details, language, and a victim identifier derived from local system characteristics. It supports command execution with output return, file-system browsing, file download, file deletion, exfiltration of victim information, and configurable sleep timing for beacon control.

FormerFirstRAT communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, including use of port 443 without TLS protection. Its traffic is encrypted with AES-128 using a key derived via MD5 from a hard-coded string. For persistence, it creates autorun entries in Windows Run locations under either the current-user or local-machine hive.

The malware has been linked to a broader DragonOK toolchain that also included Sysget or HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, NFlog, and NewCT. Reporting on the related Aveo malware family identified notable similarities to FormerFirstRAT, including overlapping implementation patterns and comparable command-and-control behavior, suggesting a related development lineage or closely connected operational cluster focused on Japanese-speaking targets.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DragonOK

DragonOK has previously targeted Japanese high-tech and manufacturing firms, but we’ve identified a new backdoor malware, named “FormerFirstRAT,” deployed by these attackers.

via paloaltonetworks historic blogblog.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The remote server can also send the following example response. This response will instruct the malware to execute the given command.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

We have identified the following functionalities: Modify sleep timer between requests Execute a command and return the command output Browse the file system Download files Delete files

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware then proceeds to send an HTTP POST request with information about the victim system. The following information is collected: Victim IP address Username Administrative privileges RAT status... Microsoft Windows version... Language

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

We have identified the following functionalities: Modify sleep timer between requests Execute a command and return the command output Browse the file system Download files Delete files Exfiltrate victim information

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

To encrypt the provided data, the malware makes use of the RC4 algorithm, using a key of ‘hello’.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol... FormerFirstRAT communicates using unencrypted HTTP over port 443... All data is sent via HTTP POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses. The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Additionally, the actors have now added the popular PlugX backdoor to their toolkit. An additional backdoor appears to be a new, custom-built tool... named 'FormerFirstRAT'.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

This response will instruct the malware to upload the specified file... The results of this execution are stored in a temporary text file... An example upload of these results can be seen below.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.