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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

NFlog

Tracked since Jan 21, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDLL sideloading
Delivery
PhishingWatering hole
Platforms
Windows

NFlog is a Windows remote access trojan associated with espionage activity attributed to DragonOK and later reported in operations linked to SAMURAI PANDA; related reporting also describes IsSpace as a newer variant or evolution of NFlog. It has been used as a follow-on backdoor in targeted intrusions against organizations including Japanese manufacturing and high-technology entities, and has also appeared in watering-hole and exploit-driven delivery chains.

NFlog provides standard RAT functionality and maintains command-and-control communications over HTTP, polling its infrastructure at short intervals for tasking. Reported capabilities include remote command execution, file upload and download, host profiling, and exfiltration of victim information. The malware is proxy-aware and has been observed attempting to obtain or enumerate proxy authentication credentials, including behavior consistent with sniffing or harvesting proxy credentials on some systems. It also performs connectivity checks and uses mutex or event objects to ensure a single running instance.

On Windows systems, NFlog has been observed establishing persistence through autorun mechanisms in the current user context. It has also been reported to attempt privilege escalation or elevated relaunch on newer Windows versions using a CryptBase.dll side-loading technique involving sysprep, functioning as a UAC-bypass style method. Related IsSpace samples retained overlapping command structure and encryption patterns, including XOR-obfuscated network data and similar command-and-control URI conventions, supporting the assessment that IsSpace is closely related to or descended from NFlog.

Delivery observed for NFlog or its IsSpace-related variants includes phishing campaigns and watering-hole attacks leveraging a repurposed Adobe Flash exploit for CVE-2015-5122. In DragonOK operations, NFlog was one of several backdoors staged after initial compromise by first-stage malware. Overall, NFlog is best characterized as a straightforward but operationally useful espionage RAT used in targeted campaigns against organizations of strategic interest.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-5122via wikileaksExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player opaqueBackground Use-After-FreeThe following report details a new variant of the NfLog Remote Access Tool (RAT), also known as IsSpace, used by SAMURAI PANDA. This new variant is deployed using a repurposed version of the leaked Hacking Team Adobe Flash Exploit which leverages CVE-2015-5122. | The following report details a new variant of the NfLog Remote Access Tool (RAT), also known as IsSpace, used by SAMURAI PANDA.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DragonOK

Three of the backdoors, NFlog, PoisonIvy, and NewCT have previously been publicly associated with DragonOK.

via paloaltonetworks historic blogblog.paloaltonetworks.com
Moafee

Based on its codebase and behavioral patterns, it appears that IsSpace could possibly be an evolution of the NFlog backdoor, which has previously been attributed to the adversary groups DragonOK and Moafee.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
SAMURAI PANDA

The following report details a new variant of the NfLog Remote Access Tool (RAT), also known as IsSpace, used by SAMURAI PANDA.

via wikileakswikileaks.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

On July 16, 2015, the Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat intelligence team discovered a watering hole attack on the website of a well-known aerospace firm. The website was compromised to launch an apparent watering-hole attack against the company's customers.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

NfLog is a basic RAT that polls C2 servers every 6 seconds awaiting an encoded response.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

This new variant is deployed using a repurposed version of the leaked Hacking Team Adobe Flash Exploit which leverages CVE-2015-5122.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Persistence is achieved through the setting of an ASEP after the RAT has been installed to a particular folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Persistence is achieved through the setting of an ASEP after the RAT has been installed to a particular folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

NfLog will use the well-known UAC bypass technique of DLL side-loading of CryptBase.dll on Windows Vista and newer operating systems to attempt UAC bypass and privilege escalation.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Multiple string obfuscation routines are included in this malware sample. Strings contained in the binary are decrypted via a simple binary XOR against a single byte key of 0x25.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If the malware detects that it is running on a Windows XP host, it will attempt to check for Internet connectivity by making a HTTP request to www.microsoft.com.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If the malware detects that it is running on a Windows XP host, it will attempt to check for Internet connectivity by making a HTTP request to www.microsoft.com.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The POST data sent in this request is encrypted using the same four-byte XOR key of '\x35\x8E\x9D\x7A' that has been used by the NFlog tool.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The primary C2 server communicates over port 80. Alternate ports are configurable through the secondary C2 server variable.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol... FormerFirstRAT communicates using unencrypted HTTP over port 443... All data is sent via HTTP POST requests.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

This new variant also incorporates the use of the Google App Engine (GAE) hosting to proxy communications to its C2 Server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses. The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Additionally, the actors have now added the popular PlugX backdoor to their toolkit. An additional backdoor appears to be a new, custom-built tool... named 'FormerFirstRAT'.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

After the initial beacon, IsSpace will exfiltrate victim information by making an HTTP request to ‘//SNews.asp?HostID=xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx’, where the HostID contains the victim’s MAC address.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.