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Malware2 associated actors

GateKeeper

Tracked since Jan 22, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Clickfix
Platforms
Windows

GateKeeper is an encrypted .NET payload and loader used in KongTuke (Woodgnat) infection chains targeting Windows systems. It employs layered string encryption, anti-analysis checks, and victim-fingerprinting logic to profile hosts and reduce execution in analysis environments. GateKeeper has been observed in a non-domain-host branch of KongTuke’s CrashFix campaign, a ClickFix-style social-engineering scheme delivered through a malicious browser extension that pressures victims to run clipboard-staged PowerShell commands. The campaign uses host and domain-join status to selectively determine subsequent payload delivery. KongTuke is a financially motivated initial-access broker associated with enterprise-focused intrusions and ransomware-access ecosystems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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KongTuke

KongTuke has also been seen using a wider kit, including WinPython, Node.js, finger.exe, a fake NexShield browser extension, the encrypted GateKeeper .NET payload, and loaders like MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
Woodgnat

KongTuke has also been seen using a wider kit, including WinPython, Node.js, finger.exe, a fake NexShield browser extension, the encrypted GateKeeper .NET payload, and loaders like MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

In each case the victim is ultimately tricked into running an attacker-supplied PowerShell command... Once a command is executed, a multi-stage PowerShell chain downloads and unpacks a portable WinPython environment and launches the ModeloRAT Python scripts.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

ClickFix... fake error or fake CAPTCHA tests to trick users into pasting malicious scripts into the Windows Run dialog... FileFix... manually pasting and executing malicious commands... CrashFix... trick them into manually executing code... In each case the victim is ultimately tricked into running an attacker-supplied PowerShell command.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

GateKeeper is described as a .NET payload featuring layered encryption and victim-fingerprinting logic.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Lure and loader stages routinely profile the victim host for analysis tools and virtual-machine indicators and distinguish domain-joined corporate machines from standalone WORKGROUP hosts so that the higher-value ModeloRAT payload is reserved for enterprise targets.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

GateKeeper is described as a .NET payload featuring layered encryption and victim-fingerprinting logic.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Lure and loader stages routinely profile the victim host for analysis tools and virtual-machine indicators and distinguish domain-joined corporate machines from standalone WORKGROUP hosts so that the higher-value ModeloRAT payload is reserved for enterprise targets.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.