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GateKeeper is an encrypted .NET payload and loader used in KongTuke (Woodgnat) infection chains targeting Windows systems. It employs layered string encryption, anti-analysis checks, and victim-fingerprinting logic to profile hosts and reduce execution in analysis environments. GateKeeper has been observed in a non-domain-host branch of KongTuke’s CrashFix campaign, a ClickFix-style social-engineering scheme delivered through a malicious browser extension that pressures victims to run clipboard-staged PowerShell commands. The campaign uses host and domain-join status to selectively determine subsequent payload delivery. KongTuke is a financially motivated initial-access broker associated with enterprise-focused intrusions and ransomware-access ecosystems.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
KongTuke has also been seen using a wider kit, including WinPython, Node.js, finger.exe, a fake NexShield browser extension, the encrypted GateKeeper .NET payload, and loaders like MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader.
KongTuke has also been seen using a wider kit, including WinPython, Node.js, finger.exe, a fake NexShield browser extension, the encrypted GateKeeper .NET payload, and loaders like MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader.
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
In each case the victim is ultimately tricked into running an attacker-supplied PowerShell command... Once a command is executed, a multi-stage PowerShell chain downloads and unpacks a portable WinPython environment and launches the ModeloRAT Python scripts.
ClickFix... fake error or fake CAPTCHA tests to trick users into pasting malicious scripts into the Windows Run dialog... FileFix... manually pasting and executing malicious commands... CrashFix... trick them into manually executing code... In each case the victim is ultimately tricked into running an attacker-supplied PowerShell command.
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A .NET malicious payload with layered encryption and logic to fingerprint victims.
An encrypted .NET payload mentioned as part of the KongTuke/Woodgnat malware toolkit.
An encrypted .NET payload used by KongTuke as part of its toolset.
A .NET payload used in Woodgnat attack chains that employs layered encryption, anti-analysis measures, and victim fingerprinting.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.