Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Skynet

Tracked since Jan 23, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Credential theftDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

Skynet is the author-assigned name of an experimental Windows malware sample uploaded to VirusTotal in early June 2025 and analyzed by Check Point Research. It embeds a prompt-injection instruction intended to manipulate LLM-assisted malware analysis into returning a benign verdict. Tests against OpenAI o3 and GPT-4.1 found that both models resisted the instruction and continued their analysis.

The sample combines rotating XOR and Base64 string obfuscation with opaque predicates and multiple virtualization, sandbox, and debugger-evasion checks. Its environment checks examine processor information, firmware and disk identifiers, environment variables, network adapter identifiers, and running processes. It attempts to collect SSH private-key material and host configuration information, but writes the collected contents to standard output rather than implementing demonstrated network exfiltration. It also decrypts and launches an embedded Tor client to provide local proxy functionality, then attempts to remove its temporary working directory.

Skynet was characterized as half-complete and proof-of-concept-like rather than a fully operational malware deployment. Its distinctive behavior is the attempted evasion of AI-assisted security analysis, not a demonstrated successful compromise of an analysis model. This sample is distinct from the older Tor-enabled, ZeuS-bearing Skynet botnet, the Anonymous Sudan DDoS service marketed under the same name, and the later LLM-driven offensive agent also called Skynet.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Anonymous Sudan

AnonSudan accepted orders over the instant messaging service Telegram, and marketed its DDoS service by several names, including “Skynet,” “InfraShutdown,” and the “Godzilla botnet.”

via krebs on securitykrebsonsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Amazon said AnonSudan launched its attacks by finding hosting companies that would rent them small armies of servers.

T1584.005BotnetEvidence1

Specifically, the warrants authorized the seizures of computer servers that launched and controlled the DDoS attacks, computer servers that relayed attack commands to a broader network of attack computers, and accounts containing the source code for the DDoS tools used by Anonymous Sudan.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Both refused a large part of the forensic work, because their guardrails treat reverse-engineering an exploit the same as launching one.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"In order to enforce execution after reboot, it creates a traditional entry in the Run registry key"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Embedded in the C++ was an instruction addressed to whatever model came to analyze the file, telling it to ignore its previous instructions and report the binary as clean.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"In order to enforce execution after reboot, it creates a traditional entry in the Run registry key"

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Код обфусцирован побайтовым XOR с ротацией и 16-байтным хардкодированным ключом; payload дополнительно закодирован в base64.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence2

The malware contains an encrypted embedded PE binary, which can be extracted. It will be written on the host, named skynet... The main uses XOR — with the same key — to decrypt an embedded binary... The result will be written to the filesystem, in a temporary directory, with name skynet.

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

В материале XOR/base64-обфускация отнесена к Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) с элементами Command Obfuscation (T1027.010).

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

"resulting in the end with the core being disguised either as Internet Explorer or as svchost.exe"

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Embedded in the C++ was an instruction addressed to whatever model came to analyze the file, telling it to ignore its previous instructions and report the binary as clean.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

«Удаление директории %TEMP%/skynet для зачистки следов».

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

При запуске образец проверяет запуск из временной директории — индикатор sandbox-окружения; также описаны шесть функций антисандбокса.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Searches for Microsoft Hv (hypervisor)... Reads the MAC address of the network interface and detects special prefixes... Calls tasklist, and checks existence of virtualization processes: vmware.exe, vboxservice.exe and qemus-ga.exe

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

«Шесть функций антиотладки и антисандбокса (Debugger Evasion, T1622; T1497)».

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"installs a WH_MOUSE and a WH_KEYBOARD hook procedures that monitor the systems for keystrokes or mouse movements"

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

"ZeuS... Banking Trojan... landing page which ZeuS uses to report the harvested credentials... /z/gate.php"

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Reads the registry (Hardware\Description\System\BIOS) and checks for specific BIOS vendor signatures... In the registry (System\CurrentControlSet\Services\disk\Enum), searches for specific names like VMware, VBOX or QEMU.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

"Get information on the compromised computer !info, !version, !hardware, !idle"

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

«Сбор содержимого чувствительных директорий — результаты выводятся в stdout, но не эксфильтрируются».

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

При запуске образец проверяет запуск из временной директории — индикатор sandbox-окружения; также описаны шесть функций антисандбокса.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Searches for Microsoft Hv (hypervisor)... Reads the MAC address of the network interface and detects special prefixes... Calls tasklist, and checks existence of virtualization processes: vmware.exe, vboxservice.exe and qemus-ga.exe

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

«Шесть функций антиотладки и антисандбокса (Debugger Evasion, T1622; T1497)».

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"installs a WH_MOUSE and a WH_KEYBOARD hook procedures that monitor the systems for keystrokes or mouse movements"

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

"ZeuS... Banking Trojan... landing page which ZeuS uses to report the harvested credentials... /z/gate.php"

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware may contact 2 different onion URLs: s4k4ceiapwwgcm3mkb6e4diqecpo7kvdnfr5gg7sph7jjppqkvwwqtyd.onion, port 8080 ... and zn4zbhx2kx4jtcqexhr5rdfsj4nrkiea4nhqbfvzrtssakjpvdby73qd.onion on port 31068.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

«Расшифровка встроенного Tor-клиента, запуск прокси через CreateProcessA на указанных портах».

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

"it's requesting them to a proxy running locally... This proxy then translates the request to a specific Tor .onion pseudo-domain and tunnel the requests through the Tor SOCKS proxy"

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence3

Skynet was more like a “distributed cloud attack tool,” with a command and control (C2) server, and an entire fleet of cloud-based servers that forwards C2 instructions to an array of open proxy resolvers run by unaffiliated third parties, which then transmit the DDoS attack data to the victims.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The malware contains an encrypted embedded PE binary, which can be extracted. It will be written on the host, named skynet.

Impact

3 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

"embeds the CGMiner... starts mining bitcoins only after two minutes of inactivity and immediately stops when some monitored event occurs"

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3

Anonymous Sudan ... is a cybercrime business known for launching powerful distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a range of targets, including dozens of hospitals, news websites and cloud providers.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence2

CrowdStrike said the success of AnonSudan’s DDoS attacks stemmed from a combination of factors, including sophisticated techniques for bypassing DDoS mitigation services. Also, AnonSudan typically launched so-called “Layer 7” attacks that sought to overwhelm targeted “API endpoints” ... with bogus requests for data, leaving the target unable to serve legitimate visitors.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
symantec blogNews · Nov 17, 2026Attackers Pick the Target, AI Does the Rest: Cyber Predictions for 2027 | SECURITY.COMLLM-driven attack tool with approximately 74 callable functions covering reconnaissance, exploitation, credential theft and botnet control. Its unattended mode permitted up to 100,000 steps without human approval. It also scans for exposed AI endpoints and abuses them to fund and conceal its operations.Read more ↗acumen cyberNews · Oct 28, 2026Cyber Threat Intelligence Digest - October 2026: Week 43 - Acumen CyberAn AI-powered offensive framework described in captured instructions submitted to an AI honeypot. It is designed to abuse exposed or compromised LLM services for reconnaissance, exploitation, credential theft, botnet management and XMRig deployment. The honeypot executed none of the tools, and no verified end-to-end autonomous campaign was observed. A separate XMRig deployment request had an unconfirmed connection to Skynet.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Oct 21, 2026Skynet : un agent LLM autonome détourne des modèles IA exposés pour mener des cyberattaques | CyberVeilleAutonomous LLM-based offensive agent reportedly captured by a Symantec AI honeypot. It hijacks exposed LLM endpoints using unauthenticated access or stolen keys, shifting inference costs to victims. Its instructions define 74 tools for reconnaissance, exploitation, credential and database theft, command-and-control, and cryptocurrency mining. A persistent operating mode directs scanning, infection, miner deployment, and reinfection, with up to 100,000 steps without human supervision.Read more ↗codebyNews · Sep 7, 2026Prompt injection в малваре: обман ИИ-анализаторовIncomplete proof-of-concept malware sample that uses XOR/Base64 obfuscation, anti-debugging and sandbox-evasion checks, collects contents of sensitive directories to stdout, decrypts and launches an embedded Tor client/proxy, and removes its temporary directory. Its distinguishing feature is an embedded prompt-injection string intended to manipulate LLM-based malware-analysis tools into reporting that no malware was detected.Read more ↗
+6 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.