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Malware2 associated actors

AWFULSHRED

Tracked since Jan 24, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
Linux

AWFULSHRED is a destructive Linux wiper implemented as an obfuscated shell script and used by Sandworm, the Russian military intelligence threat group associated with GRU Unit 74455. It is designed to corrupt or erase data and render compromised systems unusable. The script uses the shred utility to overwrite data, stops services, kills processes, deactivates swap, and can disable or corrupt Apache, HTTP, and SSH services. It also clears Bash history and can enable Linux SysRq functions to force a system reboot, combining destructive activity with measures that impede investigation and recovery.

Sandworm deployed AWFULSHRED during the April 2022 operation against a Ukrainian energy provider that also involved Industroyer2, CaddyWiper, ORCSHRED, and SOLOSHRED. The coordinated operation targeted electrical substations and supporting computing infrastructure, with disk-wiping tools intended to hinder recovery. AWFULSHRED was subsequently identified in the January 2023 destructive attack against Ukrinform, Ukraine’s national news agency, alongside other wiping tools. Its documented targets therefore include Linux systems in Ukrainian energy and media organizations. The initial access method for the April 2022 operation remains unknown.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

Industroyer2 has also been accompanied by various wiper malware types, including “CaddyWiper,” “ORCSHRED,” “SOLOSHRED,” and “AWFULSHRED.”

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
UAC-0082

"...AwfulShred (Linux)..."; file reference: "r.sh (AwfulShred)"

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

"/root/r.sh (AwfulShred)" and "/sbin/audit.sh (BidSwipe)"

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

deactivate swap files, clear bash history and finally reboot the system

Impact

4 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence3

Among the tools that Sandworm deployed on the energy company's network was a Windows disk wiper called CaddyWiper and similar disk-wiping tools dubbed Orcshred, Soloshred, and Awfulshred for Linux and Solaris systems.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

This obfuscated malicious script can also disable and corrupts apache, HTTP and SSH services

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

The malware was designed to wipe the Master Boot Record, MBR, and proceed to corrupt the files on disk, destroying all traces of the data.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

finally reboot the system

Activity feed

Recent activity

19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.