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Malware

Linux/Cdorked

Tracked since Jan 24, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Defense evasionPost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

Linux/Cdorked is a stealthy HTTP backdoor for Apache web servers that was used to hijack legitimate websites and redirect visitors to malicious content, including exploit kits. It is associated with Operation Windigo, a profit-driven server-side malware ecosystem that also included Linux/Ebury, Linux/Onimiki, and Perl/Calfbot. The malware targeted Linux and Unix hosting environments, with reporting repeatedly noting impact on Apache deployments running cPanel, although that did not by itself demonstrate exploitation of a cPanel vulnerability.

Linux/Cdorked modifies the Apache httpd binary and keeps operational state in shared memory, minimizing forensic artifacts on disk and complicating detection. Its configuration can be delivered through obfuscated HTTP requests that do not appear in normal Apache logs. The in-memory payload can be cleared by rebooting, but the altered web-server binary remains a durable sign of compromise. Its primary function was web-traffic redirection: visitors to compromised legitimate sites were selectively sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure serving exploit kits such as Blackhole and later Neutrino. In the Windigo operation, these redirects were used to deliver Windows malware to downstream victims, including Glupteba and Boaxxe variants, with payload selection varying by geography.

The initial root-compromise vector for affected servers was not conclusively established. Contemporary assessments considered stolen credentials, phishing against administrators, and brute-force access plausible paths, and broader Windigo reporting concluded the operation expanded primarily through credential theft rather than novel Linux vulnerabilities. Linux/Cdorked was notable for its stealth, selective redirection logic, and role in monetizing compromised servers through drive-by malware delivery and traffic brokerage.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

Trojanized httpd (Apache), nginx or lighttpd.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

web visitors accessing pages hosted on websites infected with Linux/Cdorked can be redirected to exploit kits. These exploit kits, if successful, install two different malware families, depending on the visitor’s geographic location. | Web servers infected with Linux/Cdorked redirect users to exploit kit servers, which in turn attempt to infect users with malware.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

web visitors accessing pages hosted on websites infected with Linux/Cdorked can be redirected to exploit kits.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

One can use the following command to determine if the server he is on is compromised: ssh -G 2>&1 | grep -e illegal -e unknown > /dev/null && echo "System clean" || echo "System infected"

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

Ebury uses an abstract UNIX socket to communicate with an external process that will be responsible for data exfiltration.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Trojanized sshd, ssh, ssh-add and the target of the libkeyutils.so.1 symbolic link.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The redirection is not automatic and depends on certain conditions set by the operators through a series of Linux/Ebury infected servers.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

ESET and Sucuri simultaneously blogged about the discovery of Linux/CDorked, a backdoor impacting Apache servers running cPanel.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The redirection is not automatic and depends on certain conditions set by the operators through a series of Linux/Ebury infected servers.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

No configuration files are kept on disk

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Trojanized sshd, ssh, ssh-add and the target of the libkeyutils.so.1 symbolic link.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

This rule matches the configuration commands that are sent to Linux/Cdorked. Any external host contacting properly identified Web servers on HTTP ports with Linux/Cdorked’s specific cookie and URL will trigger the alert.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The gang practices good operational security. They never directly connect to any of the compromised servers to perform an operation. They use one of the anonymizing tunnel services running on another compromised server part of the malicious infrastructure.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

This rule matches the configuration commands that are sent to Linux/Cdorked. Any external host contacting properly identified Web servers on HTTP ports with Linux/Cdorked’s specific cookie and URL will trigger the alert. | The following domains are used to exfiltrate HTTP POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Any external host contacting properly identified Web servers on HTTP ports with Linux/Cdorked’s specific cookie and URL will trigger the alert.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

This server is the entry-point of a chain of reverse proxy servers terminating on an exploit serving machine.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

First, the complete source code of the targeted web server is downloaded, along with a malicious “diff patch” coming from a server under the attacker’s control.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The redirection is not automatic and depends on certain conditions set by the operators through a series of Linux/Ebury infected servers.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.