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Mallory
Malware

Torii

Tracked since Jan 24, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Brute forcePersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
LinuxIOT

Torii is a multi-architecture IoT botnet and backdoor platform active since at least December 2017. It compromises Internet-exposed devices through Telnet credential attacks against weak passwords, then uses an architecture-discovery shell script and multiple download utilities to retrieve a suitable ELF payload. Torii supports MIPS, ARM, x86, x86-64, PowerPC, SuperH, and other embedded Linux architectures. Its staged deployment installs a persistent second-stage bot that survives reboots through multiple mechanisms, including shell-profile modification, cron, systemd and init configuration, SELinux-policy modification, and inittab changes. The bot employs delayed execution, runtime string decryption, stripped binaries, and randomized process names to impede analysis and detection. Torii communicates through encrypted, non-TLS traffic over TCP/443, supports C2 failover, fingerprints compromised devices, exfiltrates host and system information, transfers and manages files, downloads content, migrates C2 configuration, and executes arbitrary commands. No clear DDoS or cryptomining functionality was established in observed versions. The operator and ultimate operational purpose remain unattributed; Torii has been assessed as a persistent backdoor and orchestration service for compromised IoT devices.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

Automatic execution via “@reboot” clause in crontab

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

capabilities include exfiltration and, command execution... it can be used to run any command on the infected device.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Automatic execution via /etc/inittab

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Automatic execution via injected code into ~\.bashrc

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Automatic execution via “@reboot” clause in crontab

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

Automatic execution as a “System Daemon” service via systemd

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Automatic execution via /etc/init and PATH. Once again, it calls itself "System Daemon"

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Automatic execution via modification of the SELinux Policy Management

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Automatic execution via /etc/inittab

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Automatic execution via injected code into ~\.bashrc

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Automatic execution via “@reboot” clause in crontab

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

Automatic execution as a “System Daemon” service via systemd

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Automatic execution via /etc/init and PATH. Once again, it calls itself "System Daemon"

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Automatic execution via modification of the SELinux Policy Management

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Torii infects systems that have Telnet exposed and protected by weak credentials.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Automatic execution via modification of the SELinux Policy Management

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The information exchanged this way helps fingerprint the device, as the malware exfiltrated hostname, process ID, MAC addresses and system-related details.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

He noticed that the attack was on port 23 specific to Telnet, but the communication was tunneled through the Tor network.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

He noticed that the attack was on port 23 specific to Telnet, but the communication was tunneled through the Tor network, a detail that inspired Avast for the botnet name.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

It executes a sophisticated script that determines the architecture of the device, and uses multiple commands - 'wget,' 'ftpget,' 'ftp,' 'busybox wget,' or 'busybox ftpget' - to ensure delivery of binary payloads.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Communication with the command and control (C2) servers is encrypted... While the traffic to the C2 server is encrypted and carried through the TLS-specific port 443, the malware does not use the TLS protocol.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The information exchanged this way helps fingerprint the device, as the malware exfiltrated hostname, process ID, MAC addresses and system-related details.

Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.