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Mallory
Malware

SilentFade

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs42Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SilentFade could determine accounts that already had linked payment methods, so that attackers could run ads and pay for them using the account owner’s payment method.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

SilentFade is often bundled with potentially unwanted programs (PUP) in pirated copies of popular software, and is likely downloaded by other malware as well.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Use of popular and smaller URL-shorteners to hide the landing page... Heavy use of cloaking and traffic redirection.

Execution

2 techniques
T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The service is responsible for persistence across reboots and for dropping 32-bit and 64-bit version DLLs... in Chrome’s application directory. This is done for the purpose of DLL hijacking...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

This is done for the purpose of DLL hijacking so that the malicious DLL is loaded by Chrome in place of the real winhttp.dll.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SilentFade could determine accounts that already had linked payment methods, so that attackers could run ads and pay for them using the account owner’s payment method.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The cloaking service would decide whether to send a user to the malicious page or an innocuous one based on the geolocated IP address of the user clicking on the ad, the presence of the correct HTTP Referer header, and other features.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The downloader application either downloads a standalone malware component or a Windows service installed as either ‘AdService’ or ‘HNService’. The service is responsible for persistence across reboots...

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

As soon as SilentFade accessed Facebook accounts from an infected machine, it explicitly called the appropriate web endpoints to disable notifications.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SilentFade could determine accounts that already had linked payment methods, so that attackers could run ads and pay for them using the account owner’s payment method.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The downloader application either downloads a standalone malware component or a Windows service installed as either ‘AdService’ or ‘HNService’. The service is responsible for persistence across reboots...

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Since then, SilentFade has resorted to using string obfuscation to make it more difficult to hunt for malware samples and to complicate AV detection signatures.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The service is responsible for persistence across reboots and for dropping 32-bit and 64-bit version DLLs (usually as winhttp.dll or winmm.dll) in Chrome’s application directory.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

With these changes, SilentFade minimized the likelihood of users noticing unrecognized activity on their accounts – preserving undetected access to compromised accounts for longer.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SilentFade could determine accounts that already had linked payment methods, so that attackers could run ads and pay for them using the account owner’s payment method.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The cloaking service would decide whether to send a user to the malicious page or an innocuous one based on the geolocated IP address of the user clicking on the ad, the presence of the correct HTTP Referer header, and other features.

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

The authors discovered that the confidence checks performed by the account-blocking web UI were incomplete in the server-side code, which was subsequently exploited by SilentFade. This bug allowed SilentFade to block both the Login Alerts and Facebook Business pages and ensured that users could not unblock the pages even if they tried.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Samples in this family often contain code to detect virtual machines and halt execution when detected, to thwart automated and manual analysis attempts.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

This is achieved by checking the description field of all available display drivers against ‘Virtual’ or ‘VM’.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The service is responsible for persistence across reboots and for dropping 32-bit and 64-bit version DLLs... in Chrome’s application directory. This is done for the purpose of DLL hijacking...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

This is done for the purpose of DLL hijacking so that the malicious DLL is loaded by Chrome in place of the real winhttp.dll.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

As soon as SilentFade accessed Facebook accounts from an infected machine, it explicitly called the appropriate web endpoints to disable notifications.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Cookies are more valuable than passwords because they contain session tokens, which are post-authentication tokens... Session tokens, on the other hand, are only issued after a successful login so the attackers can use them to bypass multi-factor authentication enabled by the user.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Once installed, the malware stole Facebook credentials and cookies from various browser credential stores, including Internet Explorer and Chromium clones, with support for Firefox added later on.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

As soon as SilentFade accessed Facebook accounts from an infected machine, it explicitly called the appropriate web endpoints to disable notifications.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Samples in this family often contain code to detect virtual machines and halt execution when detected, to thwart automated and manual analysis attempts.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

This is achieved by checking the description field of all available display drivers against ‘Virtual’ or ‘VM’.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

All Chromium and Firefox-based browsers store credentials and cookies in SQLite databases, which are accessible once you have executable code running on an infected endpoint.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The data was then sent back as an encrypted JSON blob through custom HTTP headers...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Some variants have the ability to download additional payloads from their C2 servers. However, the C2 simply provides URLs to the payloads...

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The cloaking service would decide whether to send a user to the malicious page or an innocuous one based on the geolocated IP address of the user clicking on the ad, the presence of the correct HTTP Referer header, and other features.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The data was then sent back as an encrypted JSON blob through custom HTTP headers (usually through Server and Server-Key or MicroServer and MicroServer-Key).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching42Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.