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Malware

Laplas Clipper

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 16 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs202Tracked
Type
Clipper
Capabilities
Crypto theftPersistenceExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

Laplas Clipper is a Windows cryptocurrency clipboard-hijacking malware family first observed in November 2022 and marketed through subscription-based offerings on cybercrime forums. It monitors clipboard contents for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaces matching values with attacker-controlled lookalike addresses, redirecting payments while reducing the likelihood that users notice the substitution. Supported address patterns cover numerous cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Monero, and Tron.

Variants have been implemented in VB.NET and Go. Laplas Clipper uses regular expressions to identify wallet addresses, communicates with command-and-control infrastructure to obtain replacement addresses, and registers infected hosts using victim identifiers and system metadata. The VB.NET implementation retrieves address-matching expressions from its server. Observed variants persist by copying themselves into the user's application-data area and creating a scheduled task that executes every minute. An analyzed VB.NET sample used VMProtect, and an observed sample employed extensive executable-overlay padding to hinder automated analysis.

Laplas Clipper has been delivered through phishing emails impersonating CoinPayments, with malicious ZIP attachments containing a batch-script downloader. It has also been deployed as a secondary payload by SmokeLoader and Stealc. An unidentified financially motivated actor distributed it in a campaign that also deployed MortalKombat ransomware, with victims primarily in the United States and additional infections in the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Philippines. Its primary targets are cryptocurrency users; clipboard substitution does not require stealing wallet private keys.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

A typical infection in this campaign begins with a phishing email and kicks off a multi-stage attack chain... The initial infection vector is a phishing email in which the attackers impersonate CoinPayments

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

A malicious ZIP file is attached with a filename resembling a transaction ID mentioned in the email body, enticing the recipient to unzip the malicious attachment and view the contents, which is a malicious BAT loader.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Command-Line Interface - T1059

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Using an embedded VB script, the BAT loader script inflates the downloaded malicious ZIP in the “%TEMP%” location

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... T1574 ... DLL Side-Loading

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

This technique is not novel. It has been employed in various forms for several years to achieve different effects, all of which are related to evading defense mechanisms.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

Binary padding is the process of adding extra or junk data to a portable executable (PE) file that, while not changing the behavior of the binary, changes certain characteristics that can help with either obfuscating relevant code or defeating sandboxing solutions and detections.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

drops a malicious executable file with double file extensions “<filename>.PDF.EXE”

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

The loader script will run the dropped payload as a process in the victim’s machine, then delete the downloaded and dropped malicious files to clean up the infection markers.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1497 ... Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1564 ... Hidden Files and Directories

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... T1574 ... DLL Side-Loading

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1562 ... Disable or Modify Tools

Discovery

6 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Practical queries for identifying malware infrastructure with FOFA.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1057 ... Process Discovery

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... System Information Discovery - T1082

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1497 ... Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1518 ... Security Software Discovery

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Laplas ... provides its actors with the ability to substitute cryptocurrency wallet address copied by the victim with one controlled by actor.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Communication with the attacker-controlled Clipper bot is performed using the HTTP GET method.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

upon launch of Erbium, another Trojan, Laplas “clipper”, was downloaded and installed on the same infected device.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1571 ... Non-Standard Port

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003

Indicators of compromise

Observables

202 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching202Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.