Laplas Clipper
- Type
- Clipper
- Capabilities
- Crypto theftPersistenceExfiltrationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Phishing
- Platforms
- Windows
Laplas Clipper is a Windows cryptocurrency clipboard-hijacking malware family first observed in November 2022 and marketed through subscription-based offerings on cybercrime forums. It monitors clipboard contents for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaces matching values with attacker-controlled lookalike addresses, redirecting payments while reducing the likelihood that users notice the substitution. Supported address patterns cover numerous cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Monero, and Tron.
Variants have been implemented in VB.NET and Go. Laplas Clipper uses regular expressions to identify wallet addresses, communicates with command-and-control infrastructure to obtain replacement addresses, and registers infected hosts using victim identifiers and system metadata. The VB.NET implementation retrieves address-matching expressions from its server. Observed variants persist by copying themselves into the user's application-data area and creating a scheduled task that executes every minute. An analyzed VB.NET sample used VMProtect, and an observed sample employed extensive executable-overlay padding to hinder automated analysis.
Laplas Clipper has been delivered through phishing emails impersonating CoinPayments, with malicious ZIP attachments containing a batch-script downloader. It has also been deployed as a secondary payload by SmokeLoader and Stealc. An unidentified financially motivated actor distributed it in a campaign that also deployed MortalKombat ransomware, with victims primarily in the United States and additional infections in the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Philippines. Its primary targets are cryptocurrency users; clipboard substitution does not require stealing wallet private keys.
Techniques & procedures
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
A typical infection in this campaign begins with a phishing email and kicks off a multi-stage attack chain... The initial infection vector is a phishing email in which the attackers impersonate CoinPayments
A malicious ZIP file is attached with a filename resembling a transaction ID mentioned in the email body, enticing the recipient to unzip the malicious attachment and view the contents, which is a malicious BAT loader.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below
cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Command-Line Interface - T1059
Using an embedded VB script, the BAT loader script inflates the downloaded malicious ZIP in the “%TEMP%” location
The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... T1574 ... DLL Side-Loading
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below
cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f
The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Laplas Clipper also creates a Windows scheduled task by executing the schtasks command shown below
cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /tn OQaXPFVvfW /tr ”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\OQaXPFVvfW\TCOBAisZyL.exe” /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
This technique is not novel. It has been employed in various forms for several years to achieve different effects, all of which are related to evading defense mechanisms.
Binary padding is the process of adding extra or junk data to a portable executable (PE) file that, while not changing the behavior of the binary, changes certain characteristics that can help with either obfuscating relevant code or defeating sandboxing solutions and detections.
drops a malicious executable file with double file extensions “<filename>.PDF.EXE”
The loader script will run the dropped payload as a process in the victim’s machine, then delete the downloaded and dropped malicious files to clean up the infection markers.
The BAT loader script uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) bitsadmin to download a malicious ZIP file from the attacker-controlled download server
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1497 ... Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1564 ... Hidden Files and Directories
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... T1574 ... DLL Side-Loading
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1562 ... Disable or Modify Tools
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
Practical queries for identifying malware infrastructure with FOFA.
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1057 ... Process Discovery
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... System Information Discovery - T1082
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1497 ... Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1518 ... Security Software Discovery
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Laplas ... provides its actors with the ability to substitute cryptocurrency wallet address copied by the victim with one controlled by actor.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Communication with the attacker-controlled Clipper bot is performed using the HTTP GET method.
upon launch of Erbium, another Trojan, Laplas “clipper”, was downloaded and installed on the same infected device.
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... T1571 ... Non-Standard Port
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs... Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003
Observables
202 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.