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Mallory
Malware

Luna

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 26 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK1Technique
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

Luna is a Rust-based ransomware family first publicly identified in July 2022, with variants targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi. It operates under a ransomware-as-a-service model and has been advertised as accepting only Russian-speaking affiliates. Its cross-platform implementation enables attacks against both conventional endpoints and virtualized infrastructure.

Luna encrypts files using AES in CTR mode, with encryption keys derived through X25519 using an embedded operator public key and a newly generated key pair for each file. It overwrites file contents, appends the per-file public key and a family marker, and renames encrypted files. Depending on file size, it encrypts either the entire file or selected portions. Ransom notes provide instructions for contacting the operators.

When executed without arguments, the Windows variant enumerates available drives and attempts to disable or stop 253 services and terminate 997 processes before encryption. Its targets include security software, backup products, databases, and business applications. Windows-specific exclusions help preserve essential operating-system components. The Linux variant supports encryption of individual files or directory trees, but its inadequate Linux-specific exclusions allow critical authentication and authorization files to be encrypted, potentially destabilizing the host. Luna's ESXi implementation does not shut down virtual machines before encryption, creating a risk of file corruption and unsuccessful recovery.

Analyzed Windows and Linux samples lacked network-connectivity functionality. Their ransom demands establish an extortion purpose, but do not establish an inherent data-exfiltration capability.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3

In recent months, we have observed in our telemetry an increase in ransomware that targets ESXi servers.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping1Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.