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Malware1 associated actor

RustyBuer

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs42Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

RustyBuer is a Rust-based rewrite of the Buer malware family designed to preserve compatibility with existing Buer command-and-control infrastructure while improving evasion against detections focused on earlier C-based builds. It functions primarily as a first-stage malware-as-a-service loader or downloader used to establish an initial foothold on Windows systems and retrieve additional payloads. Observed follow-on payloads have included Cobalt Strike Beacon, and Buer operators have been assessed in some cases to support access-as-a-service activity by selling or transferring compromised access to other threat actors. RustyBuer has also been discussed in reporting on tooling associated with actors linked to the TrickBot ecosystem.

Observed delivery has relied on phishing campaigns themed as shipping notices, with victims lured to malicious Microsoft Office documents. Infection required user interaction to enable macro execution, after which the document dropped and launched the Rust-based payload. Campaigns used a Windows Shell DLL application-bypass technique involving trusted system components to reduce endpoint detection opportunities, and persistence was established through startup shortcut creation.

RustyBuer includes anti-analysis and regional filtering logic. Documented behavior includes virtual-machine checks and locale checks intended to avoid execution in certain CIS environments. During beaconing, the malware collects host profiling data such as operating system version, architecture, privilege level, computer and user context, processor information, disk usage, and Active Directory domain details, then transmits this information to its controllers over HTTP(S). Server responses can instruct the malware to download and execute additional payloads.

Campaigns distributing RustyBuer affected organizations across a wide range of industry verticals, consistent with its role as broadly distributed initial-access malware rather than sector-specific tooling.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Trickbot

...after the discovery of NimRod/Nimza and RustyBuer which are both being leveraged by actors associated with the TrickBot crew.

via walmart global tech infosecmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The campaigns generally used DHL-themed phishing emails to distribute malicious Word or Excel documents.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The loader uses emails with Word attachments containing macros to download the next stage.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

They contained a link to a malicious Microsoft Word or Excel document download that used macros to drop the new malware variant.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

A notable aspect of Buer Loader’s arrival is its use of malicious Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel documents containing an embedded VBA macro that creates a process via WMI.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The C2 functions are handled via HTTP(S) POST requests.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

This leads to a Base64-encoded command that is executed by PowerShell.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Further inspection of the command being executed by cmd.exe shows the full base64 command.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

They contained a link to a malicious Microsoft Word or Excel document download that used macros to drop the new malware variant.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

RustyBuer was embedded directly into the document macro and required user interaction to initiate the infection.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

the beacon response can be configured to use one of two options provided to the operator for achieving persistence. These options are to either use a shortcut (LNK) that runs on startup or create a RunOnce registry key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Once RustyBuer is dropped, it establishes persistence by using a shortcut (.LNK) file which runs at startup.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

the beacon response can be configured to use one of two options provided to the operator for achieving persistence. These options are to either use a shortcut (LNK) that runs on startup or create a RunOnce registry key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Once RustyBuer is dropped, it establishes persistence by using a shortcut (.LNK) file which runs at startup.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

the macro function itself is obfuscated using Hex-encoded strings that must be concatenated, reordered, and decoded.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

It is observed that a signed XLL file delivers Buer Loader.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

This macro leveraged an Application Bypass (Windows Shell DLL via LOLBAS) to evade detection from endpoint security mechanisms. Example Script execution: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL C:\ProgramData\OfficeSignCheck.exe

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Anti-analysis features Checks for virtual machines.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Buer Loader also uses code obfuscation techniques... Additionally, the loader makes use of several time-based evasion techniques: Reading the Windows installation date; Querying the system time; Using long sleep periods to make dynamic analysis difficult.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Using long sleep periods to make dynamic analysis difficult.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The GetProcessHeap and IsDebuggerPresent functions are used to detect if the malware is being debugged.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

One of the notable changes made by Buer Loader was the purchase of Sectigo OV Code Signing certificates. This allowed for a new delivery mechanism, observed as the use of a signed XLL file, to deliver Buer Loader.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

A Rust crate ... is used to retrieve system information that is to be sent in an HTTP POST request to the C&C.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Another functionality that this loader contains is to enumerate processes or threads and query a list of all running processes by using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and ProcessInformation.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

These requests contain encrypted system information from the infected machine.

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

One such functionality is to query local or system time, or GetSystemTimeAsFileTime as seen in Figure 13.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Anti-analysis features Checks for virtual machines.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Buer Loader also uses code obfuscation techniques... Additionally, the loader makes use of several time-based evasion techniques: Reading the Windows installation date; Querying the system time; Using long sleep periods to make dynamic analysis difficult.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Using long sleep periods to make dynamic analysis difficult.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The GetProcessHeap and IsDebuggerPresent functions are used to detect if the malware is being debugged.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

With respect to infrastructure, the C&C functionality for Buer Loader is handled by HTTPS POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Proofpoint researchers observed RustyBuer distributing Cobalt Strike Beacon as a second-stage payload in some instances.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

The requests use the following to encrypt or encode the information: Base64, Hex encoding, RC4 encryption.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching42Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.