Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
MSTIC has observed at least five methods of trojanized open-source applications containing the malicious payload and shellcode that is tracked as the ZetaNile malware family. The ZetaNile implants, also known as BLINDINGCAN...
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Beginning in June 2022, ZINC employed traditional social engineering tactics by initially connecting with individuals on LinkedIn to establish a level of trust with their targets. Upon successful connection, ZINC encouraged continued communication over WhatsApp, which acted as the means of delivery for their malicious payloads.
Within that archive, the recipient is provided a ReadMe.txt and an executable file to run... the backdoor only when the user selects ec2-aet-tech.w-ada[.]amazonaws from the drop-down menu in the TightVNC Viewer
The payload in the malicious DLL is decrypted using a custom key, passed as part of the DLL search order hijacking of the legitimate Windows process... Similar to ZINC’s version of PuTTY, the actor uses DLL search order hijacking to load malicious DLL files that perform tasks within the context of these legitimate Windows processes.
LinkedIn Threat Prevention and Defense detected ZINC creating fake profiles claiming to be recruiters working at technology, defense, and media entertainment companies...
The payload in the malicious DLL is decrypted using a custom key, passed as part of the DLL search order hijacking of the legitimate Windows process... Similar to ZINC’s version of PuTTY, the actor uses DLL search order hijacking to load malicious DLL files that perform tasks within the context of these legitimate Windows processes.
By encoding the victim information in the parameters for common keywords like gametype or bbs in the HTTP POSTs, these C2 communications can blend in with legitimate traffic.
The ZetaNile implants use unique custom encryption methods or AES encryption to generate command and control (C2) HTTP requests to known compromised C2 domains. | The ZetaNile implants use unique custom encryption methods or AES encryption to generate command and control (C2) HTTP requests to known compromised C2 domains. By encoding the victim information in the parameters for common keywords like gametype or bbs in the HTTP POSTs, these C2 communications can blend in with legitimate traffic.
17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A modular implant family delivered via trojanized legitimate software (e.g., PuTTY/KiTTY/TightVNC/SumatraPDF/muPDF installers) using techniques like DLL search order hijacking; performs victim check-in and C2 over HTTP with custom/AES encryption, supports additional payload installation, and is used for espionage/data theft and lateral movement.
A modular malware family used by ZINC/Diamond Sleet and delivered via trojanized legitimate software such as PuTTY, KiTTY, TightVNC, Sumatra PDF Reader, and muPDF installers. It uses custom or AES-encrypted HTTP C2 communications, supports victim check-in and information exfiltration, and enables installation of additional payloads on compromised hosts.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.