Asprox is a botnet and spam-focused malware operation first identified around 2008, also known as Badsrc and Aseljo. It is best known for large-scale spam activity, phishing-related campaigns, and the compromise of vulnerable websites through automated SQL injection, particularly against Microsoft Active Server Pages applications. Infected systems were used to scan for susceptible sites, inject malicious iframe or script-based redirects, and drive visitors to exploit or malware delivery infrastructure, giving the operation worm-like propagation characteristics through botnet-assisted website compromise rather than a self-contained worm mechanism.
Operationally, Asprox combined commodity botnet functions with web-application exploitation. Compromised hosts searched for vulnerable websites, attempted SQL injection, and modified pages so that visitors were redirected to malicious content that installed additional malware. Reported payloads associated with Asprox-driven campaigns included Asprox itself, Cutwail, rogue security software, and in later ecosystems malware distributed through Sasfis. Asprox was also used as the sole spreading mechanism for the 2012 Sasfis campaign, where spam lures themed as delivery notices and later image-based emails linked victims to malicious executables. The broader Asprox ecosystem has also been associated with theft of personal and financial information and monitoring of user online activity.
The botnet operated in waves, infecting large numbers of websites and then going dormant for periods, apparently to reduce defensive pressure. Documented waves occurred in 2008, 2009, and 2010, with rapid growth in the number of compromised domains during some surges. Reported targets included government, healthcare, business, and major consumer-facing websites. Asprox has been characterized as a notable non-targeted malware threat globally and as a long-running criminal botnet centered on spam distribution, phishing enablement, and SQL-injection-based malware propagation.
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8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
When infections are successful, the pages then redirect visitors to websites that silently install a malware cocktail that includes the Asprox malware.
The Asprox spambot, which is capable of injecting SQL into websites written in ASP, started to infect legitimate websites by injecting an iframe
Asprox initially used the name of a trusted delivery company as the bait to trick users into opening an executable email attachment with a document icon. In early August, however, it was observed that the spam had been improved by replacing the email content with an image containing the same text.
46 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malware 2008 Asprox Agent.BTZ Mariposa
Mentioned as an external traffic source that redirected users toward Bredolab infrastructure.
2008 Asprox
A spambot used as the sole spreading mechanism for Sasfis, distributing malicious email lures and links/attachments and sharing infrastructure with the 2012 Sasfis campaign.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.