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Malware2 associated actors

WikiLoader

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs61Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Defense evasionProcess injectionDLL sideloadingReconnaissanceExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

WikiLoader is a sophisticated Windows downloader first observed in December 2022, designed to retrieve and execute additional malware. It has been distributed by the cybercriminal groups TA544 and TA551, primarily in campaigns targeting Italian organizations, although some campaigns reached broader audiences. Observed follow-on payloads include the Ursnif banking trojan. Delivery chains have used malicious emails impersonating tax authorities and courier services, accounting-themed lures, macro-enabled Excel attachments, OneNote attachments containing embedded executables, and PDF attachments linking to archived JavaScript downloaders. Analyzed infection chains have also used DLL sideloading through a bundled legitimate application.

WikiLoader uses heavily obfuscated DLLs and multiple encrypted shellcode stages. Its defense-evasion techniques include dynamic API resolution through Process Environment Block traversal, encoded strings, indirect system calls, checks for API hooks and analysis tools, hidden suspended threads, thread-context manipulation, and lengthy execution delays. It can overwrite code in a loaded library and inject shellcode into the Windows shell process. Environmental checks include validating a Wikipedia response and querying an unregistered domain to detect suspicious DNS behavior associated with analysis environments.

Later variants collect basic host information, including computer and user names, administrative status, language, and system time, and transmit encoded host data through HTTP cookies. Payload retrieval has used compromised web pages and legitimate content-delivery infrastructure, while one observed version used MQTT to retrieve information needed for a subsequent download. Multiple versions introduced changes to obfuscation, system-call handling, execution delays, and communications.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA544

Proofpoint identified a new malware we call WikiLoader... WikiLoader is a sophisticated downloader with the objective of installing a second malware payload.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
TA551

Proofpoint identified a new malware we call WikiLoader... WikiLoader is a sophisticated downloader with the objective of installing a second malware payload.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Campaigns began with emails containing either Microsoft Excel attachments, Microsoft OneNote attachments, or PDF attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The Microsoft Excel attachments contained characteristic VBA macros which, if enabled by the recipient, would download and execute a new unidentified downloader that Proofpoint researchers eventually dubbed WikiLoader.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

TA544 used accounting themes to deliver PDF attachments with URLs that led to the download of a zipped JavaScript file.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The Microsoft Excel attachments contained characteristic VBA macros which, if enabled by the recipient, would download and execute...WikiLoader.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

If the JavaScript was executed by the recipient, it led to the download and execution of the packed downloader, WikiLoader.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

Function Used to load native API to perform indirect syscalls: ntdll.dll Checks if native calls are hooked.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Thus, user interaction is required to begin the malware installation.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The OneNote attachments contained a hidden CMD file behind an “OPEN” button which, if clicked by the recipient, downloaded and executed WikiLoader.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Creates a mutex 330117 ... It will load CreateMutexA, and attempt to create one with the value

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Shellcode is writte into explorer.exe

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

NtSetContextThread -> Inside the context object in memory there is pointer referencing the start of injected code which will be the threads RIP.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Creates a mutex 330117 ... It will load CreateMutexA, and attempt to create one with the value

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Deobfuscation of strings through even positioned characters. The obfuscation is simple and is only based on getting the character sitting in an even position.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Stage 1 is the packed DLL. The use of packed downloaders is a common technique employed by threat actors to evade detection and analysis.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

Using similar method to load API, the malware retrieves GetProcAddress() from the PEB. Retrieving once again API via PEB walking

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

To avoid this, from Process Hacker I opened the section created by CreateToolHelp32SnapShot and modified the hex values to match svchost.exe, and it worked.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Shellcode is writte into explorer.exe

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

NtSetContextThread -> Inside the context object in memory there is pointer referencing the start of injected code which will be the threads RIP.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Stage 3 is encrypted via a single byte XOR key and placed at the end of the stage 2 shellcode. Stage 2 finds a reference to the start of stage 3, decrypts it via the XOR key and transfers execution.

T1202Indirect Command ExecutionEvidence2

Function Used to load native API to perform indirect syscalls: ntdll.dll

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

Long busy loop to slow down execution. Anti analysis checks for common malware analysis tools (x64dbg.exe, pe-bear, process hacker etc.)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader then checks GetTickCount64... If the value returned is less than 125, the loader will make a request to a specified, hardcoded URL.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Full execution of the loader takes almost an hour given the abundance of busy loops.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Call NtProtectVirtualMemory on bingmaps.dll location with 0x40 rx -> wrx ... Once it has finished injecting code it will call once again NtProtectVirtualMemory with 0x20 PAGE_EXECUTE_READ on the .text section of bingmaps.dll.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Anti analysis checks for common malware analysis tools (x64dbg.exe, pe-bear, process hacker etc.)

Discovery

9 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

GetUserNameA

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

For this, from the PEB it fetches the following API: CreateToolHelp32SnapShot Process32First Process32Next.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Gathers system information to send to C2 ... GetComputerNameA GetUserNameA IsUserAnAdmin GetUserDefaultUILanguage GetSystemTime

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

GetSystemTime

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

Long busy loop to slow down execution. Anti analysis checks for common malware analysis tools (x64dbg.exe, pe-bear, process hacker etc.)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader then checks GetTickCount64... If the value returned is less than 125, the loader will make a request to a specified, hardcoded URL.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Full execution of the loader takes almost an hour given the abundance of busy loops.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

GetUserDefaultUILanguage

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Anti analysis checks for common malware analysis tools (x64dbg.exe, pe-bear, process hacker etc.)

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

On 11 July 2023, researchers identified additional changes to the actively developed malware in the protocol used for reaching compromised webhosts, exfiltration of host information via HTTP cookies... The second filename is pulled via the MQTT protocol rather than reaching the compromised webhosts.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Malware attempts to connect to the 8 hard-coded URLs and read the page... The requests are made to the URLs with cookie Cookie: jfkUg=75888210 + [BASE64 ENCODED SYSTEM DATA]

T1071.005Publish/Subscribe ProtocolsEvidence1

The second filename is pulled via the MQTT protocol rather than reaching the compromised webhosts.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the pages contain a tag containing the string "gmail", inside there is another obfuscated URL which contains the next stage payload.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Before moving to network function the string seen above is converted to BASE64 with CryptBinaryToStringA().

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

This function seems to load BCrypt.dll and perform some decryption on a large data section contained in the shellcode... the key is actually obtained from results of the URL connections.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

In later versions of this upstream PHP, host information is gathered and sent via HTTP cookies. These cookies contain basic host information, and a unique identifier for tracking purposes.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching61Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.