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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Netwire RAT

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs27Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitationExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalspamExploit kit
Platforms
WindowsmacOSLinux

NetWire RAT is a long-running commodity remote access trojan used by criminal operators and also observed in targeted intrusion and cyberespionage activity. It supports remote control of compromised systems over a custom TCP-based command-and-control protocol and uses AES-encrypted communications. Network traffic is characterized by packets that begin with a length field followed by a one-byte command and associated data, and the initial key exchange includes material used to derive the AES session key.

NetWire is commonly delivered as a second-stage payload by malware loaders and downloaders such as GuLoader and DBatLoader, and it has also appeared in phishing and spearphishing campaigns using macro-enabled documents, JavaScript droppers, archive and disk-image containers, and exploit-driven delivery including CVE-2017-11882 and exploit kits. Campaigns have used themes such as travel reservations, tax documents, job-related lures, and topical social-engineering content. It has also been deployed in attacks abusing WinRAR ACE path traversal vulnerability CVE-2018-20250 to achieve persistence and execute on reboot.

The malware has been associated with a broad range of threat activity, including campaigns linked to groups such as SilverTerrier, Hydrojiin, and financially motivated intrusion clusters overlapping with OPERA1ER and Bluebottle. Victimology spans financial services, businesses, medical organizations, educational institutions, military targets, and banks in Africa, reflecting both opportunistic and targeted use.

NetWire primarily targets Windows and has also been described as available for macOS and Linux. As a remote access trojan, it is used for post-compromise control of infected hosts and is frequently paired with broader intrusion activity involving credential theft, persistence, lateral movement, and follow-on tooling. Its prevalence as a commodity payload and its encrypted non-HTTP/S communications have made it a recurring component of both mass-malware distribution and hands-on-keyboard intrusions.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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The White Company

NetWire communicates with custom protocols over TCP and communication is encrypted with AES encryption. Each packet begins with a length of data followed by one byte for the command and then followed by data.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com
SilverTerrier

NetWire communicates with custom protocols over TCP and communication is encrypted with AES encryption. Each packet begins with a length of data followed by one byte for the command and then followed by data.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com
Aggah

Aggah specifically has been seen using paste.ee to host njRAT, NetWire RAT, RevengeRAT, Agent Tesla.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

Campaign infrastructure included domains contacted by the macro to download stage-two-through-five artifacts and domains used as NETWIRE RAT command-and-control nodes.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Server T1583.004 Google Cloud VM with custom DNS/mail infrastructure

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

it’s an easy guess that a travel-related email or website was used to lure the victims to the file’s location.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

These infections typically start through email spam campaigns delivering macro-enabled lure documents.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

notamment par la création des tâches planifiées

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The macro parses the embedded paragraph text on page three of the lure document... [and] uses the CreateObject function to create the required objects and download each of the malware components.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Flight_Travel_Intinery_Details.js is a malicious file ... The javascript (.js) file eventually drops Update.exe, which is a variant of Netwire RAT

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Also, it was found to be delivered via exploit kits.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The malware, first discovered in 2012, is often hidden in malicious files.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

notamment par la création des tâches planifiées

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

notamment par la création des tâches planifiées

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The loader uses the Heaven’s Gate technique and performs injection in the suspended cmd.exe process... [and] creates a suspended cmd.exe process and injects the NETWIRE payload and the last PARALLAX stage.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The fifth and final stage of PARALLAX Loader performs a UAC bypass through CMSTPLUA COM interface.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

The malware extracts a configuration structure from the stenographically-obfuscated PNG that contains the next PARALLAX loader stage and the final payload.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

NetWire utilise des techniques d’évasion telles que le masquage des fichiers légitimes

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The loader uses the Heaven’s Gate technique and performs injection in the suspended cmd.exe process... [and] creates a suspended cmd.exe process and injects the NETWIRE payload and the last PARALLAX stage.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Next, the malware will load cs16.wav and XOR-decrypt it using a key embedded in the file... The malware will then execute the shellcode inside the decrypted WAV file.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

la détection d’environnements d’analyse

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

After infecting a victim's smartphone or laptop, the RAT's capabilities include stealing passwords, keylogging, and remotely controlling the device.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

After infecting a victim's smartphone or laptop, the RAT's capabilities include stealing passwords, keylogging, and remotely controlling the device.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

la détection d’environnements d’analyse

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

After infecting a victim's smartphone or laptop, the RAT's capabilities include stealing passwords, keylogging, and remotely controlling the device.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

This installed version of AsyncRAT connects to its C2 servers located at “znets[.]ddns[.]net” and “dnets[.]ddns[.]net”.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The final three domains... act as ongoing command and control nodes for the NETWIRE RAT.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Almost one-third of prevalent malware families we recently analyzed support communication over non-HTTP/S protocols.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

The macro downloads malicious files used for DLL-side loading and injection.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

AsyncRAT provides remote access to attackers and allows them to remotely monitor and control a compromised machine through a secure encrypted connection.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The use of dynamic DNS domains for C2 communications is a central technique in the arsenal of the DDGroup actor.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

l’utilisation des communications chiffrées avec son infrastructure de contrôle

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Netwire RAT takes control of the compromised machine and performs malicious activities such as data exfiltration and reconnaissance.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching27Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.