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Malware2 associated actors4 associated CVEs

Tmanger

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs60Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationReconnaissance
Delivery
Fake update
Platforms
Windows

Tmanger is a modular Windows remote access trojan used by the China-linked threat actor TA428 in cyberespionage operations against East Asian government organizations. It was identified during investigation of Operation LagTime IT in February 2020, where it was deployed by Poison Ivy after attackers used EternalBlue for lateral movement. The campaign initially compromised systems through Royal Road-generated RTF lure documents exploiting CVE-2018-0798; Tmanger served as a follow-on implant rather than the initial exploitation payload.

Tmanger comprises setup, loader, and client components. The setup component checks administrative privileges and establishes persistence through a Windows service when elevated or a per-user Run entry otherwise. The loader decrypts configuration data and unpacks the client payload. The client collects operating-system, architecture, drive, host, and user information and communicates with command-and-control servers using RC4-encrypted traffic. Its capabilities include remote shell and PowerShell execution, process execution, directory enumeration, file retrieval and exfiltration, file writing, copying and deletion, keylogging, screen capture, and cleanup.

Tmanger was also distributed through the compromised Able Desktop software update channel during Operation StealthyTrident against Mongolian organizations. In July 2020, it replaced HyperBro on at least one affected system. That operation involved tooling associated with TA428 and LuckyMouse, but these overlaps do not establish exclusive attribution of the campaign to either actor.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0144via vb2020 vblocalhostEternalBlueUsed a tool to exploit MS17-010 for lateral movement, NETBIOS scanner for environmental investigations, tools to steal credentials and new RATs such as Tmanger or nccTrojan.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0798via nao sec blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCERoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0802via nao sec blogExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via nao sec blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA428

During Operation StealthyTrident ... the attackers used Tmanger, attributed to TA428, and Zupdax, associated with Space Pirates.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
Threat Group-3390

TmangerにはAlbaniiutas以外にも、類似したマルウェアが存在します。今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

One of the group’s immediate post-exploitation steps often includes deploying web shells ... to execute commands and upload additional payloads.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

Sekoia established that “MìMì” Messenger’s MacOS version is trojanized since May 26, 2022 to download and execute a Mach-O binary dubbed “rshell”.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

One of the Able update servers was likely compromised in order to deploy HyperBro and Tmanger.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Tmanger has following functions: Remote Shell (cmd.exe); Remote Shell (powershell.exe)... nccTrojan has following functions: Remote Shell.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

As a result of our analysis, we consider that the functions of this RAT are as follows: • Command execution by PowerShell

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

ServiceMain takes a service name as an argument and attempts to register a service control handler with a specific HandlerProc function meant to check and set the status of that service. With a valid service status handle, Mail-O detaches the calling process from its console, changes the service status values to reflect its current running state, and calls the Entery function.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

先程System32に作成したDLLをサービスとして登録します。最後に、そのサービスを起動します。

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

And then it persists to execute master.exe with the key ‘HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Master’.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

先程System32に作成したDLLをサービスとして登録します。最後に、そのサービスを起動します。

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

And then it persists to execute master.exe with the key ‘HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Master’.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

続いて、ファイルの更新時刻を10年前の値に設定します。これはSystem32でファイルが目立たないようにするためだと考えられます。

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

HyperBro and Korplug payloads are XOR encoded. Tmanger configuration is RC4 encrypted.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

If the string exists, it will execute again using rundll32.exe. This time, it will execute a function called ‘DllEntry10’, rather than ‘DllEntryPoint’.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

As a result of our analysis, we consider that the functions of this RAT are as follows: • Keylogger.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

It then uses rundll32.exe to execute a function called ‘Entery’ in ‘test.dll’... After collecting information from the PC, it attempts to communicate with the C&C server

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

We confirmed that the same following functions are implemented in the nccTrojan as the RAT. • Send File List

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

As a result of our analysis, we consider that the functions of this RAT are as follows: • Keylogger.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence6

Tmanger has following functions: Send Screen Capture Images.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

Tmanger can fallback to a secondary C&C.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Configuration data lists C&C servers on ports 443, 8080, 80, and 5222; sections describe C&C communication for Poison Ivy, Tmanger, and nccTrojan.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Tmanger communicates using raw TCP.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

It is used to download three cab files (‘o.cab’, ‘nbt.cab’ and ‘in.cab’) from the C&C server, and execute the files stored in the cab files.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Poison Ivy... starts working as a RAT. Cotx RAT... Tmanger... starts working as a RAT. nccTrojan... activates its C&C functions.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

トラフィックはRC4によって暗号化されていますが、それをデコードすると図 4のような構造になっています。

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Tmanger messages are RC4 encrypted.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

3, 19, 35 クライアントからC&Cサーバーへファイルの送信

Indicators of compromise

Observables

60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching60Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.