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Mallory
Malware2 associated CVEs

Maze Ransomware

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK51Techniques
IOCs102Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-15982via bleeping computerExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Remote Code ExecutionWhen redirected to the exploit, Spelevo will attempt to exploit the critical CVE-2018-15982 use after free vulnerability in the browser, with users of Flash Player versions 31.0.0.153 / 31.0.0.108 and earlier being the ones exposed. Upon successful exploitation, the exploit kit will automatically download and install the Maze Ransomware payload via arbitrary code execution. | The Spelevo exploit kit has been spotted by security researchers while infecting victims with Maze Ransomware payloads via a new malicious campaign that exploits a Flash Player use after free vulnerability.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-8174via fireeyeDouble KillA100-509 - Exploit Kit Activity - Fallout Exploit Kit CVE-2018-8174, Github PoC A100-339 - Exploit Kit Activity - Fallout Exploit Kit CVE-2018-8174, Landing PageView vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

51 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

the attackers created a fake Abra cryptocurrency site to buy ad network traffic which was later used to redirect visitors to the exploit kit landing page under certain conditions.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"Most recently, the malvertising-based Fallout exploit kit chain has been used to deliver instances of Maze ransomware"

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

Weak RDP credentials on machines accessible from the internet also pose a threat as the operators of Maze may use this flaw as well.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Past Maze infections have been traced back to exploit kits, unsecured remote desktop connections, impersonation emails and compromised email accounts via malicious Word documents.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

The distribution tactic of the Maze ransomware initially involved infections via exploit kits (namely, Fallout EK and Spelevo EK), as well as via spam with malicious attachments.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

Maze tends to use known vulnerabilities like the Pulse VPN CVE-2019-11510 to break in

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Maze Ransomware usually deploy phishing emails with MS Office attachments and fake/phishing websites laced with Exploit Kits.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

Maze Ransomware usually deploy phishing emails with MS Office attachments

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

The threat actor group APT28 leverages TTPs like obfuscated files or information, PowerShell, exploitation of remote services for lateral movement, credential stealing through spear-phishing links

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For the first two attempts, the Maze attacker attempted to launch various ransomware executables using scheduled tasks named 'Windows Update Security,' or 'Windows Update Security Patches,' or 'Google Chrome Security Update.'

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The threat actor group APT28 leverages TTPs like obfuscated files or information, PowerShell

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Once the virtual machine was started... a batch file called startup_vrun.bat batch file would be executed that preps the machine with the Maze executables.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

If they fall for it, the malicious macro contained inside the document will execute, which in turn will result in the victim’s PC being infected with Maze ransomware.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Past Maze infections have been traced back to exploit kits, unsecured remote desktop connections, impersonation emails and compromised email accounts via malicious Word documents.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

compromised email accounts via malicious Word documents

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For the first two attempts, the Maze attacker attempted to launch various ransomware executables using scheduled tasks named 'Windows Update Security,' or 'Windows Update Security Patches,' or 'Google Chrome Security Update.'

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

Weak RDP credentials on machines accessible from the internet also pose a threat as the operators of Maze may use this flaw as well.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Past Maze infections have been traced back to exploit kits, unsecured remote desktop connections, impersonation emails and compromised email accounts via malicious Word documents.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The Maze binary creates persistence by adding itself to Windows’ autorun registry.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For the first two attempts, the Maze attacker attempted to launch various ransomware executables using scheduled tasks named 'Windows Update Security,' or 'Windows Update Security Patches,' or 'Google Chrome Security Update.'

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The IP addresses <Details Masked> mentioned in Cognizant attack vector was seen exploiting two old vulnerabilities CVE-2016-7255 and CVE-2018-8453. Both these Win32k Elevations of Privilege Vulnerabilities

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

Weak RDP credentials on machines accessible from the internet also pose a threat as the operators of Maze may use this flaw as well.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The Maze binary creates persistence by adding itself to Windows’ autorun registry.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

once admin privileges are achieved the groups exfiltrates information and deploy the maze ransomware

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The threat actor group APT28 leverages TTPs like obfuscated files or information

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The Maze ransomware is typically distributed as a PE binary (EXE or DLL depending on the specific scenario) which is developed in C/C++ and obfuscated by a custom protector.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Necessary API names are hashed, and compared with the hash of the DLL function names, then the matched functions are resolved dynamically with the usual LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress functions.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

These email spoofs are notable for using convincing stolen branding and lookalike domains of European taxation agencies and other public-facing entities such as Internet service providers. Most recently, the actor has attacked US organizations spoofing the United States Postal Service.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Of particular note is the use of stolen branding as well as the use of lookalike .icu domains used for the sender email address in order to craft effective lures.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

To counter dynamic analysis, this Trojan will also terminate processes typically used by researchers, e.g. procmon, procexp, ida, x32dbg, etc.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

As with most ransomware, it deletes shadow copies with the Windows Management Instrumentation command line utility WMIC.exe.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

Weak RDP credentials on machines accessible from the internet also pose a threat as the operators of Maze may use this flaw as well.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

In their third attack, Maze deployed an MSI file that installed the VirtualBox VM software on the server along with a customized Windows 7 virtual machine.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The Maze ransomware operators have adopted a tactic previously used by the Ragnar Locker gang; to encrypt a computer from within a virtual machine.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The code enumerates the running processes present, checks processes’ names against the hashed list, and terminates itself if any are detected.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Aside from the obfuscation, the Maze main binary’s authors applied a number of anti-analysis techniques to the malware. It checks debugging environment in multiple ways. In addition to using the IsDebuggerPresent API and PEB.BeingDebuggedFlag check...

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

During these stages, the use of the following tools has been observed: mimikatz, procdump, Cobalt Strike, Advanced IP Scanner, Bloodhound, PowerSploit, and others.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

During these stages, the use of the following tools has been observed: mimikatz, procdump, Cobalt Strike, Advanced IP Scanner, Bloodhound, PowerSploit, and others.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

When executing on a machine, Maze ransomware will also attempt to determine what kind of PC it has infected. It tries to distinguish between different types of system (‘backup server’, ‘domain controller’, ‘standalone server’, etc.).

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Information about the local network its target is connected is also gathered by the malware, by creating a null session connection and enumerating network resources.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence2

During these stages, the use of the following tools has been observed: mimikatz, procdump, Cobalt Strike, Advanced IP Scanner, Bloodhound, PowerSploit, and others.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The Maze ransomware operators have adopted a tactic previously used by the Ragnar Locker gang; to encrypt a computer from within a virtual machine.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The code enumerates the running processes present, checks processes’ names against the hashed list, and terminates itself if any are detected.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The binary also uses the WMI interface to query for antivirus information, executing the Windows Management Instrumentation Query Language (WQL) command “Select * from AntiVirusProduct” within WMI namespace root\SecurityCenter2.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

As with some other ransomware, Maze will terminate without encrypting files if certain languages are detected (such as those used in Commonwealth of Independent States nations).

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Aside from the obfuscation, the Maze main binary’s authors applied a number of anti-analysis techniques to the malware. It checks debugging environment in multiple ways. In addition to using the IsDebuggerPresent API and PEB.BeingDebuggedFlag check...

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Weak RDP credentials on machines accessible from the internet also pose a threat as the operators of Maze may use this flaw as well.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Since then, Maze has been delivered by multiple means: exploit kits, spam emails, and—as the group’s operations have become more targeted—Remote Desktop Protocol attacks and other network exploitation.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

The threat actor group APT28 leverages TTPs like obfuscated files or information, PowerShell, exploitation of remote services for lateral movement

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Cybercriminals are embracing data-theft extortion by creating dark web marketplaces that exist solely to sell stolen data.

T1074Data StagedEvidence2

The threat actor group APT28 leverages TTPs like obfuscated files or information, PowerShell, exploitation of remote services for lateral movement, credential stealing through spear-phishing links and data-staged techniques.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

During these intermediate stages, the threat actors attempt to identify valuable data stored on the servers and workstations in the compromised network.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

...executes a PowerShell script, which downloads and installs the Maze ransomware payload onto the victim’s system... which in turn downloads and installs the IcedID payload onto the victim’s system.

Exfiltration

6 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence2

"...stole 40GB of source code..." and "we downloaded 40GB of Python source codes from Lg"

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

Before encrypting a victim's network, most network-targeting ransomware operations will steal a victim's unencrypted files.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

threat actors who employed the Maze ransomware published stolen data if they did not succeed in getting the ransom money.

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

This information is exfiltrated back to the command and control server using a standard port 80 HTTP POST method, connecting using Windows’ socket library, WS2_32.dll.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence4

Maze ransomware operators are known to launch their attack under the surface and have a history of first stealing the data before locking their target devices.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence4

Researchers said that Maze’s operators have since created a dedicated web page, which lists the identities of their non-cooperative victims and regularly publishes samples of the stolen data.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence19

Maze ransomware operators are known to launch their attack under the surface and have a history of first stealing the data before locking their target devices.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence8

The modus operandi of Maze hackers would entail releasing threats of data dump on public forum if ransom is not paid.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

102 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching102Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping51Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.