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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

GRAYRABBIT

Tracked since Jan 26, 2026 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing page
Platforms
Windows

GRAYRABBIT is a lightweight, modular Windows backdoor associated with UNC3569, a China-linked threat actor operating within the cyberespionage and contractor-for-hire ecosystem. Implemented in C++, it serves as a first-stage implant that provides remote command execution, interactive reverse shells, bidirectional file transfer, system and user information collection, and additional module loading. An analyzed 64-bit variant supports reflective loading of plugins into memory and communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure using RC4-protected frames over raw TCP rather than TLS.

UNC3569 has deployed GRAYRABBIT through exploitation of CVE-2026-51990 in Tencent’s Sogou Input Method for Windows. This one-click attack begins with a crafted link and combines unchecked protocol-handler command-line arguments, unrestricted navigation in an embedded browser, and exploitation of CVE-2021-38003 in an outdated Chromium engine. The resulting code executes with the signed-in user’s permissions. The deployment chain uses a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL, which decrypts and executes the backdoor in memory. Associated loader behavior includes process-count-based anti-analysis checks and attempted self-deletion using NTFS alternate data streams.

Encrypted GRAYRABBIT payloads have also been distributed through GitHub. The backdoor has appeared alongside other UNC3569 tooling and on infrastructure associated with SHADOW-VOID-044, a campaign targeting the Chinese gambling industry. UNC3569’s broader operations target government, education, technology, finance, and other sectors worldwide, particularly in East and Southeast Asia.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-38003via the hacker newsV8 JSON.stringify exception-handling flaw enabling remote code executionIn September 2026, Gen Digital said a now-patched vulnerability in the input method editor (CVE-2026-51990) was exploited by UNC3569 to deliver a backdoor dubbed GRAYRABBIT by means of a crafted link.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-51990via the hacker newsExploited in the wildOne-click remote code execution in Sogou Input MethodIn September 2026, Gen Digital said a now-patched vulnerability in Sogou Input Method (CVE-2026-51990) was exploited by UNC3569 to deliver GRAYRABBIT through a crafted link. | In September 2026, Gen Digital said a now-patched vulnerability in the input method editor (CVE-2026-51990) was exploited by UNC3569 to deliver a backdoor dubbed GRAYRABBIT by means of a crafted link.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC3569

In September 2026, Gen Digital said a now-patched vulnerability in the input method editor (CVE-2026-51990) was exploited by UNC3569 to deliver a backdoor dubbed GRAYRABBIT by means of a crafted link.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

UNC3569 leverages cloud services like OneDrive for operational infrastructure and strategic cloud storage to complement operations. In one example, a DRAFTGRAPH sample... was configured to abuse OneDrive as its C2 server.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

"In watering-hole scenarios, malicious scripts injected into websites trigger downloads of the main PeckBirdy script upon victim visitation, often leading to fake software update pages that prompt execution of malicious files."

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Since 2021, UNC3569 has exploited popular n-day CVEs in widely used software, such as CVE-2021-44228 and CVE‑2022-21587, to gain access to target organizations.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

“A victim only had to open a specially prepared link delivered through a phishing email, a message, or a website.”

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

“The backdoor can ... run commands [and] open an interactive command shell.”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

"...combined with the UuidFromStringA function of PowerShell to read, decode, and execute the backdoor payload."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Command ID 1: Start an interactive reverse shell (CreateProcessA "cmd" with piped stdin/stdout/stderr).

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

“[GRAYRABBIT] is used to create a command shell remotely from the attacker, allowing for the uploading and downloading of files.”

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The page contains a JavaScript exploit targeting any known V8 vulnerability from the last six years.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence5

“Three separate weaknesses could be joined into a one-click remote-code-execution attack” and “UNC3569 used a known V8 flaw, CVE-2021-38003, to take control of the outdated browser component.”

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence4

“A victim only had to open a specially prepared link” and “When a user opens one of these links, a program called bizhelper.exe reads its settings and starts the requested Sogou component.”

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The encrypted payload blob is structured as a two-stage package: a position-independent shellcode stub followed by the XOR-encrypted GRAYRABBIT PE.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

“One file was a DLL designed to spoof and hide inside a pirated copy of 7-Zip.”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

It then deletes itself... and then marking the file for deletion. The file leaves the disk with no delete call in the behavior logs.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The payload is often obfuscated with an additional binary layer, including techniques such as XOR encoding, custom shellcode loaders... The shellcode decrypts the embedded PE payload using a simple XOR operation and then executes the payload.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“Running processes would be scrutinized for analysis methods in a sandboxed environment prior to deployment of the GRAYRABBIT.”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage. Automated malware-analysis systems tend to run few processes.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The loader reads the encrypted payload file from disk into memory, then runs an anti-sandbox gate before decrypting it... counting every running process... threshold of 50.

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence1

Gen found it moving its own contents into an NTFS alternate data stream, a hidden part of the file record, and then marking the file for deletion.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

CoreClientInstall is a reflective PE loader... allocates RWX memory large enough for the full PE image, and maps the PE into it.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The system information beacon collects the machine's IPv4 address via GetAdaptersAddresses.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The DLL counts the processes running on the computer before it decrypts anything. If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

“The backdoor can contact its operators, collect system details, run commands, open an interactive command shell, move files, and load additional modules.”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“Running processes would be scrutinized for analysis methods in a sandboxed environment prior to deployment of the GRAYRABBIT.”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage. Automated malware-analysis systems tend to run few processes.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The loader reads the encrypted payload file from disk into memory, then runs an anti-sandbox gate before decrypting it... counting every running process... threshold of 50.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Command ID 9: Upload a local file to the C2 (reads the file path from the payload).

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The GrayRabbit backdoor ... provides attackers with a reverse shell and can execute processes, load plugins, write data to the interactive shell, upload files to its command-and-control (C&C) server, collect system information, and terminate itself.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“GRAYRABBIT ... sends out requests for and receives information from a command server, encrypted by RC4 over port 443.”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The backdoor reaches its server at mail.uaiubifas[.]top on port 443, and the traffic there is plain TCP scrambled with RC4 rather than TLS.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

“The malicious code then retrieved files” and the listed artifacts include a downloaded trojanized DLL loader and an encrypted payload blob containing the final-stage RAT.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

“[GRAYRABBIT] sends out requests for and receives information from a command server, encrypted by RC4 over port 443.”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The GrayRabbit backdoor ... can ... upload files to its command-and-control (C&C) server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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the hacker newsNews · Nov 4, 2026China-Aligned Hackers Hijack Sogou Input Method DNS Requests to Deploy DarkVigil BackdoorA backdoor delivered by UNC3569 through a crafted link exploiting Sogou Input Method. The delivery chain combines command-line argument injection, unrestricted WebView navigation, and an outdated, unsandboxed Chromium engine susceptible to CVE-2021-38003. It is mentioned as historical context for a separate attack against the same application.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 14, 2026One Click on a Malicious Link Lets Hackers Backdoor Sogou Input Method Users | Cryptika CybersecurityA modular backdoor/RAT deployed through the Sogou Input Method one-click exploit chain. It provides command-and-control, system reconnaissance, command execution, interactive shell access, file transfer, and the ability to load additional modules.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 14, 2026One Click on a Malicious Link Lets Hackers Backdoor Sogou Input Method UsersA backdoor deployed by UNC3569 through a one-click exploit chain targeting Sogou Input Method on Windows. The chain abused unsafe protocol-link handling and an outdated embedded Chromium browser, then used DLL sideloading to load the payload. GRAYRABBIT supports command-and-control communication, system reconnaissance, command execution, interactive shell access, file transfer, and additional module loading. The reported C2 domain is mail.uaiubifas.top on port 443.Read more ↗security weekNews · Sep 14, 2026Chinese Hackers Exploit Critical Tencent Software Flaw for One-Click Code Execution - SecurityWeekA backdoor used by UNC3569 that provides a reverse shell and supports process execution, plugin loading, interactive-shell data writes, file upload to its C2 server, system-information collection, and self-termination.Read more ↗
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IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.