GRAYRABBIT
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Landing page
- Platforms
- Windows
GRAYRABBIT is a lightweight, modular Windows backdoor associated with UNC3569, a China-linked threat actor operating within the cyberespionage and contractor-for-hire ecosystem. Implemented in C++, it serves as a first-stage implant that provides remote command execution, interactive reverse shells, bidirectional file transfer, system and user information collection, and additional module loading. An analyzed 64-bit variant supports reflective loading of plugins into memory and communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure using RC4-protected frames over raw TCP rather than TLS.
UNC3569 has deployed GRAYRABBIT through exploitation of CVE-2026-51990 in Tencent’s Sogou Input Method for Windows. This one-click attack begins with a crafted link and combines unchecked protocol-handler command-line arguments, unrestricted navigation in an embedded browser, and exploitation of CVE-2021-38003 in an outdated Chromium engine. The resulting code executes with the signed-in user’s permissions. The deployment chain uses a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL, which decrypts and executes the backdoor in memory. Associated loader behavior includes process-count-based anti-analysis checks and attempted self-deletion using NTFS alternate data streams.
Encrypted GRAYRABBIT payloads have also been distributed through GitHub. The backdoor has appeared alongside other UNC3569 tooling and on infrastructure associated with SHADOW-VOID-044, a campaign targeting the Chinese gambling industry. UNC3569’s broader operations target government, education, technology, finance, and other sectors worldwide, particularly in East and Southeast Asia.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In September 2026, Gen Digital said a now-patched vulnerability in the input method editor (CVE-2026-51990) was exploited by UNC3569 to deliver a backdoor dubbed GRAYRABBIT by means of a crafted link.
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
UNC3569 leverages cloud services like OneDrive for operational infrastructure and strategic cloud storage to complement operations. In one example, a DRAFTGRAPH sample... was configured to abuse OneDrive as its C2 server.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
"In watering-hole scenarios, malicious scripts injected into websites trigger downloads of the main PeckBirdy script upon victim visitation, often leading to fake software update pages that prompt execution of malicious files."
Since 2021, UNC3569 has exploited popular n-day CVEs in widely used software, such as CVE-2021-44228 and CVE‑2022-21587, to gain access to target organizations.
“A victim only had to open a specially prepared link delivered through a phishing email, a message, or a website.”
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
“The backdoor can ... run commands [and] open an interactive command shell.”
"...combined with the UuidFromStringA function of PowerShell to read, decode, and execute the backdoor payload."
Command ID 1: Start an interactive reverse shell (CreateProcessA "cmd" with piped stdin/stdout/stderr).
“[GRAYRABBIT] is used to create a command shell remotely from the attacker, allowing for the uploading and downloading of files.”
The page contains a JavaScript exploit targeting any known V8 vulnerability from the last six years.
“Three separate weaknesses could be joined into a one-click remote-code-execution attack” and “UNC3569 used a known V8 flaw, CVE-2021-38003, to take control of the outdated browser component.”
“A victim only had to open a specially prepared link” and “When a user opens one of these links, a program called bizhelper.exe reads its settings and starts the requested Sogou component.”
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
The encrypted payload blob is structured as a two-stage package: a position-independent shellcode stub followed by the XOR-encrypted GRAYRABBIT PE.
“One file was a DLL designed to spoof and hide inside a pirated copy of 7-Zip.”
It then deletes itself... and then marking the file for deletion. The file leaves the disk with no delete call in the behavior logs.
The payload is often obfuscated with an additional binary layer, including techniques such as XOR encoding, custom shellcode loaders... The shellcode decrypts the embedded PE payload using a simple XOR operation and then executes the payload.
“Running processes would be scrutinized for analysis methods in a sandboxed environment prior to deployment of the GRAYRABBIT.”
If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage. Automated malware-analysis systems tend to run few processes.
The loader reads the encrypted payload file from disk into memory, then runs an anti-sandbox gate before decrypting it... counting every running process... threshold of 50.
Gen found it moving its own contents into an NTFS alternate data stream, a hidden part of the file record, and then marking the file for deletion.
CoreClientInstall is a reflective PE loader... allocates RWX memory large enough for the full PE image, and maps the PE into it.
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
The system information beacon collects the machine's IPv4 address via GetAdaptersAddresses.
The DLL counts the processes running on the computer before it decrypts anything. If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage.
“The backdoor can contact its operators, collect system details, run commands, open an interactive command shell, move files, and load additional modules.”
“Running processes would be scrutinized for analysis methods in a sandboxed environment prior to deployment of the GRAYRABBIT.”
If it finds fewer than 50, it builds the wrong key and the payload turns to garbage. Automated malware-analysis systems tend to run few processes.
The loader reads the encrypted payload file from disk into memory, then runs an anti-sandbox gate before decrypting it... counting every running process... threshold of 50.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command ID 9: Upload a local file to the C2 (reads the file path from the payload).
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
The GrayRabbit backdoor ... provides attackers with a reverse shell and can execute processes, load plugins, write data to the interactive shell, upload files to its command-and-control (C&C) server, collect system information, and terminate itself.
“GRAYRABBIT ... sends out requests for and receives information from a command server, encrypted by RC4 over port 443.”
The backdoor reaches its server at mail.uaiubifas[.]top on port 443, and the traffic there is plain TCP scrambled with RC4 rather than TLS.
“The malicious code then retrieved files” and the listed artifacts include a downloaded trojanized DLL loader and an encrypted payload blob containing the final-stage RAT.
“[GRAYRABBIT] sends out requests for and receives information from a command server, encrypted by RC4 over port 443.”
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The GrayRabbit backdoor ... can ... upload files to its command-and-control (C&C) server.
Observables
9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.