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Malware

BankBot

Tracked since Jan 29, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs243Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Android

BankBot is an Android banking trojan family that emerged in 2016 and became one of the most influential mobile banker codebases after its source code leaked publicly in late 2016. It is designed primarily to steal banking credentials from Android users by masquerading as legitimate applications, hiding its presence after installation, and presenting phishing overlays or spoofed web content when targeted financial applications are opened. The family has also been associated with campaigns that impersonated system utilities, Flash Player updates, and topical lures such as COVID-19 alert applications, and some variants were distributed through both unofficial Android markets and the official Google Play store via trojanized apps and droppers.

Core BankBot functionality includes credential theft through overlay attacks, collection of device information, interception and exfiltration of SMS messages used for one-time passwords, and anti-removal measures such as requesting device administrator privileges and hiding the launcher icon. Documented variants have checked infected devices for installed banking applications, downloaded or displayed server-provided phishing pages tailored to those targets, and in some cases terminated outgoing calls to bank helplines to hinder victim reporting or remediation. BankBot-derived samples and closely related codebases have also shown use of obfuscation, packing, runtime loading of secondary DEX payloads, and abuse of Android permissions to support persistence and defense evasion.

The family has targeted banking customers across multiple countries, with repeated reporting on campaigns focused on Turkish, Russian, and Ukrainian financial institutions, while broader campaigns targeted large international banking app sets. BankBot’s leaked source code materially lowered the barrier to entry for mobile cybercrime and contributed to a proliferation of variants and offshoots across the Android malware ecosystem. It is frequently discussed alongside or in relation to other Android banking trojans such as Anubis, Exobot, MazarBot, LokiBot, and GM Bot, and some later samples have been labeled or marketed under overlapping names including Anubis and Nautilus Bot. BankBot is widely regarded as a foundational Android banking trojan family whose code reuse and derivative strains helped drive the expansion of mobile banking malware campaigns in 2017 and beyond.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

“This mechanism and similar techniques are the main implementation for the drive-by downloads typically associated with malvertising campaigns.”

T1566PhishingEvidence2

To lure the valuable information from potential victims, both types of malware make use of phishing and bogus login forms.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The credentials are leaked using a standard HTTP POST request directly to the CC PHP script, located at /private/add_inj.php

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

It highlights something particularly relevant to packing/unpacking: the use of DexClassLoader, an Android class used to load DEX executables, and, in the case of unpacking, to load the unpacked DEX.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Besides requiring unknown sources to be already enabled, this install method requires the user to press a button to continue the installation.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Another way to take over a device is through the misuse of the Android Accessibility service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The dropper will run the same check on device boot and if it succeeds it will also start the service.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Another way to take over a device is through the misuse of the Android Accessibility service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The dropper will run the same check on device boot and if it succeeds it will also start the service.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

The service will first request administrator permissions from the user and after obtaining those it will continue to the download routine.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

“As is the case with most bankers, it relies heavily on abusing the Accessibility Service.”

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

the classes in the .dex files are usually named using random words that are connected in some way, as if they were picked in succession from a glossary. This is the only sort of obfuscation present in the application

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

That path is not in the DEX. This typically indicates the sample is packed, and the manifest references names of an unpacked DEX that we need to recover.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

In most cases, the application poses as a Flash Player or some kind of Android System tool.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The malware sets up a broadcast receiver for SMS in order to handle received messages and extract the information needed from them. Moreover, it is cautious enough to delete SMS from both the “inbox” and “sent” folders.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

We search in the APK and quickly spot a Pa.json among the assets. Unfortunately, it is not a DEX, nor a ZIP, but encrypted content. So, at some point the asset Pa.json is read, then decrypted, then loaded with DexClassLoader.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When the dropper is first started, it will check the installed applications against a hardcoded list of 160 apps.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence3

Once these privileges have been obtained, the application hides by deleting its icon.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page. | it hides itself and then tricks the user into typing his or her credentials into fake bank web pages that have been injected onto the device’s screen.

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

Intercepting, redirecting, sending and deleting SMS messages, to bypass SMS-based 2-factor authentication

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Harvest entered credentials or credit/debit card details and send them to the C&C server

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

The first time it is run, the application asks the user to grant it device admin privileges.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

It then sends device information to the CC server, such as like IMEI, contacts, and SMS messages sent and received.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When the dropper is first started, it will check the installed applications against a hardcoded list of 160 apps.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware collects information like IMEI, Bank applications present on the device, OS version, presence of root, etc.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

It then sends device information to the CC server, such as like IMEI, contacts, and SMS messages sent and received.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page. | it hides itself and then tricks the user into typing his or her credentials into fake bank web pages that have been injected onto the device’s screen.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

It then sends device information to the CC server... If so, it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The BankBot APK, which is the same for all dropper samples is downloaded from hxxp://138.201.166.31/kjsdf.tmp.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

243 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching243Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.