BankBot
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingLanding pageLure
- Platforms
- Android
BankBot is an Android banking trojan family that emerged in 2016 and became one of the most influential mobile banker codebases after its source code leaked publicly in late 2016. It is designed primarily to steal banking credentials from Android users by masquerading as legitimate applications, hiding its presence after installation, and presenting phishing overlays or spoofed web content when targeted financial applications are opened. The family has also been associated with campaigns that impersonated system utilities, Flash Player updates, and topical lures such as COVID-19 alert applications, and some variants were distributed through both unofficial Android markets and the official Google Play store via trojanized apps and droppers.
Core BankBot functionality includes credential theft through overlay attacks, collection of device information, interception and exfiltration of SMS messages used for one-time passwords, and anti-removal measures such as requesting device administrator privileges and hiding the launcher icon. Documented variants have checked infected devices for installed banking applications, downloaded or displayed server-provided phishing pages tailored to those targets, and in some cases terminated outgoing calls to bank helplines to hinder victim reporting or remediation. BankBot-derived samples and closely related codebases have also shown use of obfuscation, packing, runtime loading of secondary DEX payloads, and abuse of Android permissions to support persistence and defense evasion.
The family has targeted banking customers across multiple countries, with repeated reporting on campaigns focused on Turkish, Russian, and Ukrainian financial institutions, while broader campaigns targeted large international banking app sets. BankBot’s leaked source code materially lowered the barrier to entry for mobile cybercrime and contributed to a proliferation of variants and offshoots across the Android malware ecosystem. It is frequently discussed alongside or in relation to other Android banking trojans such as Anubis, Exobot, MazarBot, LokiBot, and GM Bot, and some later samples have been labeled or marketed under overlapping names including Anubis and Nautilus Bot. BankBot is widely regarded as a foundational Android banking trojan family whose code reuse and derivative strains helped drive the expansion of mobile banking malware campaigns in 2017 and beyond.
Techniques & procedures
27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
“This mechanism and similar techniques are the main implementation for the drive-by downloads typically associated with malvertising campaigns.”
To lure the valuable information from potential victims, both types of malware make use of phishing and bogus login forms.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.
The credentials are leaked using a standard HTTP POST request directly to the CC PHP script, located at /private/add_inj.php
It highlights something particularly relevant to packing/unpacking: the use of DexClassLoader, an Android class used to load DEX executables, and, in the case of unpacking, to load the unpacked DEX.
Besides requiring unknown sources to be already enabled, this install method requires the user to press a button to continue the installation.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.
Another way to take over a device is through the misuse of the Android Accessibility service.
The dropper will run the same check on device boot and if it succeeds it will also start the service.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
the latest campaigns we have seen use techniques such as legitimate applications containing malicious behavior on a timer (in this case two hours) in order to circumvent Google Play’s automated detection solutions.
Another way to take over a device is through the misuse of the Android Accessibility service.
The dropper will run the same check on device boot and if it succeeds it will also start the service.
The service will first request administrator permissions from the user and after obtaining those it will continue to the download routine.
“As is the case with most bankers, it relies heavily on abusing the Accessibility Service.”
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
the classes in the .dex files are usually named using random words that are connected in some way, as if they were picked in succession from a glossary. This is the only sort of obfuscation present in the application
That path is not in the DEX. This typically indicates the sample is packed, and the manifest references names of an unpacked DEX that we need to recover.
In most cases, the application poses as a Flash Player or some kind of Android System tool.
The malware sets up a broadcast receiver for SMS in order to handle received messages and extract the information needed from them. Moreover, it is cautious enough to delete SMS from both the “inbox” and “sent” folders.
We search in the APK and quickly spot a Pa.json among the assets. Unfortunately, it is not a DEX, nor a ZIP, but encrypted content. So, at some point the asset Pa.json is read, then decrypted, then loaded with DexClassLoader.
When the dropper is first started, it will check the installed applications against a hardcoded list of 160 apps.
Once these privileges have been obtained, the application hides by deleting its icon.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page. | it hides itself and then tricks the user into typing his or her credentials into fake bank web pages that have been injected onto the device’s screen.
Intercepting, redirecting, sending and deleting SMS messages, to bypass SMS-based 2-factor authentication
Harvest entered credentials or credit/debit card details and send them to the C&C server
Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The first time it is run, the application asks the user to grant it device admin privileges.
It then sends device information to the CC server, such as like IMEI, contacts, and SMS messages sent and received.
When the dropper is first started, it will check the installed applications against a hardcoded list of 160 apps.
The malware collects information like IMEI, Bank applications present on the device, OS version, presence of root, etc.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
It then sends device information to the CC server, such as like IMEI, contacts, and SMS messages sent and received.
it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page. | it hides itself and then tricks the user into typing his or her credentials into fake bank web pages that have been injected onto the device’s screen.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
It then sends device information to the CC server... If so, it then displays a webview downloaded from the server of the specific banking site spoofing-page.
The BankBot APK, which is the same for all dropper samples is downloaded from hxxp://138.201.166.31/kjsdf.tmp.
Observables
243 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.