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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

DaVinci

Tracked since Jan 29, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs24Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
macOS

DaVinci is a commercial spyware platform developed by HackingTeam and associated with its Remote Control System (RCS), also marketed under the Galileo name. It has been used by private and governmental operators, including in sophisticated nation-state-level attacks involving VUPEN exploits. Its OS X implementation, identified as OS.X/Crisis, includes user-mode and kernel-mode rootkit components for covert operation. The kernel component conceals loaded kernel extensions from enumeration tools by manipulating the structures used to track them. Its implementation resolves a kernel symbol in user space and passes the resulting address to the kernel component through sysctl, enabling it to locate the kernel-extension tracking array.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2010-3333via citizenlabExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Stack Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityThe attachment is malicious. To the user it appears to be a Microsoft Word document, however it in fact is an RTF file containing an exploit which allows the execution of code that downloads surveillance malware. This document exploits a stack-based buffer overflow in the RTF format... aka “RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The page, found at http://freeme.eu5.org/scandale%20(2).doc prompted the user for the installation of malicious java, file, 'adobe.jar'. This file then facilitated the installation of a multi-platform (OSX and Windows) backdoor.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

• Social engineering: “plz install me!!!”.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

This email... urges the recipient to read a 'very important message' and it contained the following attachment: ... veryimportant.doc. The attachment is malicious.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Mamfakinch.com received a message via their website directing recipients to a remote webpage... The page... prompted the user for the installation of malicious java, file, 'adobe.jar'.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence1

• lionSendEventToPid does two things: – Forces AppleScript to load in the target. – Injects the bundle using AppleScript events.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

• A bundle is injected into targets. • To hook interesting functions. • Send data to the main backdoor module.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

• Delivered via exploits: Flash, Word, etc(?).

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

the following registry entry created to ensure persistence: ... software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run... A registry key is added which ensures the persistence of the backdoor after reboot

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

• Injection into target applications. • How is the bundle injected into targets?

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

the following registry entry created to ensure persistence: ... software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run... A registry key is added which ensures the persistence of the backdoor after reboot

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence3

• Kernel rootkit. • 32 bits kernel extension: Lft2iRjk.7qa. • 64 bits kernel extension: 3ZPYmgGV.TOA.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

• Sdbm hash used to “obfuscate” the symbols names. • Packed with MPRESS in two samples.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

• Dynamically resolves all other required symbols. • Search for the dyld symbols that allow to retrieve loaded images.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

• Written to ~/Library/Preferences/xxxxxx.app/. • Random app name.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

• Injection into target applications. • How is the bundle injected into targets?

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

It is executed via rundll32... C:WINDOWSsystem32rundll32.exe "C:DOCUME~1ADMINI~1LOCALS~1jlc3V7weIZsROY7X.-MP",F1dd208 ... The following command is run, executing the file: "V46lMhsH.shv" C:WINDOWSSystem32rundll32.exe "C:DOCUME~1ADMINI~1LOCALS~1UbY5xEcDV46lMhsH.shv",F7ed728

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

[Inf. Module]: Spread to VMWare %S – VMWare Installation...OK ... The strings describing the Virtual Machine infection are the same as those described in the Symantec report on the Moroccan malware.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

• Hide files and processes.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

• Hide files and processes.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

• Anti-debug measure #1. • A dormant thread that checks for debugger presence and exits if present. • Sysctl anti-debugging (Technote QA1361).

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

• Keylogger/mouse tracker.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

• Keylogger/mouse tracker.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

[Inf. Module]: Spread to VMWare %S – VMWare Installation...OK ... The strings describing the Virtual Machine infection are the same as those described in the Symantec report on the Moroccan malware.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

• Anti-debug measure #1. • A dormant thread that checks for debugger presence and exits if present. • Sysctl anti-debugging (Technote QA1361).

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

• Keylogger/mouse tracker.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

• Keylogger/mouse tracker.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

• Screenshots.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

• Microphone.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

• Webcam.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

• C&C traffic over HTTP. • Encrypted data over HTTP. • REST Protocol.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Our research reveals that the RCS collection infrastructure uses a proxy-chaining technique which is roughly analogous to that used by general-purpose anonymity solutions like Tor in that multiple hops are used to anonymize the destination of information.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The file 'veryimportant.doc' is a downloader that downloads the second stage of the malware via HTTP... This is also a downloader that downloads the 3rd stage which appears to be the actual backdoor.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

• There are at least three encryption keys. • The session key dynamically negotiated with the server. • Encrypted data over HTTP.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

we map out covert networks of “proxy servers” used to launder data that RCS exfiltrates from infected computers, through third countries, to an “endpoint,” which we believe represents the spyware’s government operator.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching24Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.