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Malware

Blackhole exploit kit

Tracked since Jan 29, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Initial access
Delivery
Landing pageDrive by
Platforms
Windows

Blackhole Exploit Kit was a widely used web-based exploit kit active primarily in the early 2010s and heavily involved in malware distribution campaigns targeting organizations and end users, including U.S. companies and financial institutions. It functioned as an exploit delivery platform that redirected victims from compromised or maliciously injected web content to attacker-controlled landing infrastructure, where browser-side exploitation was used to install follow-on malware. Blackhole was commonly used to distribute other malware families rather than serving as the final payload itself.

Observed campaigns linked to Blackhole included traffic redirection from compromised websites and server-side web compromises that injected malicious redirects into normal browsing sessions. In some cases, infected website files appended hidden iframe redirects that sent visitors onward to Blackhole infrastructure; in others, trojanized web server components intermittently redirected users to exploit-kit landing pages. The kit was also associated with large-scale criminal hosting ecosystems that provided resilient infrastructure for malware operations, botnet activity, and theft of banking credentials.

Blackhole played a significant role in cybercrime operations between roughly 2009 and 2015, appearing alongside major banking malware ecosystems such as Zeus, SpyEye, and Citadel. Its operational purpose was initial compromise and malware delivery, enabling downstream infections that could support credential theft, botnet formation, and broader post-compromise criminal activity. The kit was broadly recognized by defenders as a major malware distribution mechanism of its era.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

the defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to engage in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) arising from their providing “bulletproof hosting” services between 2008 and 2015, which were used by cybercriminals to distribute malware and attack financial institutions and victims throughout the United States.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

we also saw the redirection going to the Blackhole Exploit kit.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence9

Iframe lead on a Keitaros TDS who lead on malware: That right, second one is a blackhole exploit kit ... First one is RIG exploit kit delivering Chthonic

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Malware hosted by the organization included Zeus, SpyEye, Citadel, and the Blackhole Exploit Kit

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

Previous version of this malware was known for redirecting users to the BlackHole Exploit Kit.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

we also saw the redirection going to the Blackhole Exploit kit.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Dedicated TDS. Those TDS can be hidden behind forest of redirectors/reverse proxies. They are redirecting traffic based on country/browser depending on the needs

Stealth

1 technique
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Dedicated TDS. Those TDS can be hidden behind forest of redirectors/reverse proxies. They are redirecting traffic based on country/browser depending on the needs

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Dedicated TDS. Those TDS can be hidden behind forest of redirectors/reverse proxies. They are redirecting traffic based on country/browser depending on the needs

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

Having hundreds of domain allow bad guy to switch from one to another and escape domain based blacklisting. Managing domain generation/rotation can be manual, "outsourced", built-in the tools or managed by dedicated tools.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

making it reachable via Fast-Flux && DGA (based on Twitter trends).

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

the Sinowal/Torpig group hosting its custom Blackhole on infected nodes of its botnet and making it reachable via Fast-Flux && DGA (based on Twitter trends).

Impact

1 technique
T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1

In the sample we analyzed, the payload--which resides in memory, not on the hard drive--was redirecting web traffic, from the web server infected by Linux/Cdorked, to websites that seek to infect visitors via the Blackhole Exploit kit.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.