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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

FinFly Web

Tracked since Feb 3, 2026 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Capabilities
Initial accessSpoofing
Delivery
Exploit kitLanding pageLure
Platforms
WindowsmacOSLinux

FinFly Web is a web-based infection and payload-delivery toolkit in the Gamma Group/FinFisher commercial surveillance portfolio, marketed to government intelligence and law-enforcement customers. It provides an exploitation-server framework and a point-and-click interface for creating customized infection pages and code intended to covertly install spyware on target systems. It is a delivery component rather than the FinSpy surveillance implant or its command-and-control backend.

Its delivery mechanisms include Firefox extension installation, signed Java applets, iframe injection, and fake software installers targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux. These mechanisms combine web-based attacks with social engineering and do not necessarily require exploitation of a software vulnerability. An observed FinFly Web infection page impersonated the Egyptian newspaper Youm7 and presented an Adobe Reader installation lure. Customer support records document antivirus detection of static infection modules and blocking of injected JavaScript, demonstrating that its delivery mechanisms could be detected or disrupted.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Technology Research Department (TRD)

FinFly Web is a FinFisher product that allows customers to create a website to infect targets with spyware.

via citizenlabcitizenlab.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

FinFly Web ... I tried updating it online but I get a /.../bin/update not accessible message. | ClamAV blocked Webinfection ... silently were blocking our injected Javascript Code. as soon as the AV was disabled, the injected code was executed.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Finally, the .exe inside the .rar file is not melded with the Adobe Reader setup program, so a victim who executes the file may become suspicious when no Adobe setup program runs.

Stealth

1 technique
T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Trojen detected by AntiVirus FinFly Web ... the trojen popup comes behind the Youtube video in the self created website and in some websites the trojen does not appear at all.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Each FinFisher sample includes the address of one or more C&C servers that the spyware reports back to. These C&C servers are typically FinSpy Relays, which forward connections back and forth between a device infected with FinFisher, and a FinSpy Master.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.