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Malware

MyKings

Tracked since Feb 4, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs23Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionCrypto theftReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

MyKings is a modular, financially motivated Windows botnet active since at least 2016 and also known as Smominru. Its components include cryptocurrency miners, droppers, a bootkit, and clipboard-stealing malware. It compromises Windows systems, including servers, to generate mining revenue and redirect cryptocurrency payments. Observed propagation includes exploitation of the EternalBlue SMB vulnerability, CVE-2017-0144. Microsoft SQL Server deployments have also been targeted, with payload execution through OLE Automation and CLR stored procedures.

MyKings maintains persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation, scheduled tasks, registry-based mechanisms, and, in some variants, a bootloader rootkit. Its bootkit can disable antivirus scanners, perform asynchronous procedure call injection, and retrieve configurations and payloads from command-and-control infrastructure. SQL Server-associated components can report system information and download and execute files and shellcode.

The clipboard-stealing module monitors clipboard contents and replaces matching cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives. It also substitutes Steam trade-offer links to divert digital items and cloud-storage links to distribute additional malware through password-protected archives disguised as benign shared files. Clipboard-stealer activity has been observed globally, with substantial concentrations in Russia, India, and Pakistan. MyKings infections can persist for extended periods through overlapping persistence mechanisms and independently configurable components.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

CoinHelper is mostly bundled with cracked software installers such as WinRAR and game cheats... We’ve also found this threat inside a Windows 11 ISO image from unofficial sources... We have even seen this threat bundled with clean software such as Logitech drivers for webcams.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

In both cases, the victim downloads files from that link and opens them, because there is no reason to not trust the files received from someone they know.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For example, the component “Mysa” (in gray box) analyzed during Forensics was used for the “Scheduled Task [[URL_6fd17050_85]]” technique (T1053).

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

This file is a batch script... Both scripts contain the same strings... one script uses address http://js[.]mys2016.info:280/v.sct and the other uses address http://js[.]1226bye.xyz:280/v.sct .

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For example, the component “Mysa” (in gray box) analyzed during Forensics was used for the “Scheduled Task [[URL_6fd17050_85]]” technique (T1053).

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

For example, the component “Mysa” (in gray box) analyzed during Forensics was used for the “Scheduled Task [[URL_6fd17050_85]]” technique (T1053).

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

For protection against quick analysis and against static extraction with regular expressions, the substitute values are encrypted. Encryption used is a very simple ROT cipher, where the key is set to -1.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Apart from the NsCpuCNMiner, the sample dropped an additional file with a name java12.exe into C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\java.exe .

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

In order to avoid multiple executions, the clipboard stealer checks for mutex on execution. The mutex name is created dynamically by checking on which version of OS it is launched on.

Discovery

1 technique
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

This procedure is performed using functions RegOpenKeyExA which opens the registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion . Afterwards, a function RegQueryValueExA is called which gets the value of ProductName.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

It is easy to notice when someone forgets to copy and paste something completely different... but it takes special attention to notice the change of a long string of random numbers and letters to a very similar looking string, such as cryptowallet addresses. | The main purpose of the clipboard stealer is rather simple: checking the clipboard for specific content and manipulating it in case it matches predefined regular expressions... This process of swapping is done using functions OpenClipboard, EmptyClipboard, SetClipboardData and CloseClipboard.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

This file could be also downloaded from http://kriso[.]ru/java12.dat... This file contains a clipboard stealer.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

WMI_Killer also terminates running processes ... associated with cryptocurrency-mining malware families

Indicators of compromise

Observables

23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching23Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.