RedKitten is a newly identified malware campaign first observed in early January 2026 and reported under identifier TRR260101. It targets Iranian interests, with likely victims including NGOs and individuals involved in documenting recent human-rights abuses. The malware uses GitHub and Google Drive to host configuration data and retrieve modular payloads, and uses Telegram for command and control. Reporting cited in the source assesses the activity as aligned with Iran’s government security interests. High-confidence details in the provided content do not specify additional malware families, infection vectors beyond the campaign targeting context, or concrete indicators of compromise.
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1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Modular malware/campaign leveraging GitHub and Google Drive for configuration/payload staging and Telegram for C2; assessed as aligned with Iranian government security interests and linked to protest-related targeting.
Newly identified modular malware used in a campaign targeting Iranian interests; uses GitHub and Google Drive for configuration and payload retrieval and Telegram for command-and-control (C2).
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
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Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.