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Mallory
Malware

PJobRAT

Tracked since Feb 8, 2026 · Updated 9 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs10Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1593.001Social MediaEvidence1

PJobRAT can steal ... phone contacts ... The threat actor used FCM to send commands ... _kontak_ Upload contacts

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

These included third-party app stores, compromising legitimate sites to host phishing pages, shortened links to mask final URLs...

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

We don’t have enough information to confirm how users were directed to the WordPress distribution sites ... but we know that the threat actors behind previous PJobRAT campaigns used a variety of tricks for distribution. These included third-party app stores, compromising legitimate sites to host phishing pages, shortened links to mask final URLs, and fictitious personae to deceive users into clicking on links or downloading the disguised apps.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Unlike the 2021 campaign, the latest iterations of PJobRAT ... do include a new functionality to run shell commands. This vastly increases the capabilities of the malware... Figure 4: Code to execute shell commands ... _chall_ Run a shell command

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

In the latest campaign, X-Ops researchers found PJobRAT samples disguising themselves as instant messaging apps. The apps included ‘SangaalLite’ ... and CChat (mimicking a legitimate app of the same name that previously existed on Google Play).

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

PJobRAT can steal SMS messages, phone contacts, device and app information... The threat actor used FCM to send commands ... including ... _pang_ Upload device information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actor used FCM to send commands ... _dir_dir_ Upload a file from a specific folder __start__scan__ Upload list of media files and documents

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

PJobRAT can steal SMS messages, phone contacts, device and app information, documents, and media files from infected Android devices... PJobRAT uses HTTP to upload data, including device information, SMS, contacts, and files (images, audio/video and documents such as .doc and .pdf files), to the C2 server.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

The threat actor used FCM to send commands from a C2 server to the apps and trigger various RAT functions, including ... _ambrc_ Record and upload audio

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The latest variants of PJobRat have two ways to communicate with their C2 servers. The first is Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM)... The threat actor used FCM to send commands from a C2 server to the apps and trigger various RAT functions...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The second method of communication is HTTP. PJobRAT uses HTTP to upload data, including device information, SMS, contacts, and files ... to the C2 server.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The (now inactive) C2 server (westvist[.]myftp[.]org) used a dynamic DNS provider to send the data to an IP address based in Germany.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.